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Adonis Antoniades
This dissertation consists of three separate essays which address questions in the field of
banking. The first two essays are motivated by the Great Recession, and study key aspects
of the experience of commercial banks during this period. One is the impact of liquidity risk
on credit supply, and the second is the effect of portfolio choices on the probability of bank
failure. The third essay shifts the focus from commercial banks to M&A transactions, and
studies the impact of a key provision in merger agreements on the initial offer premium and
target firm value.
In the first essay, titled “Liquidity Risk and the Credit Crunch of 2007-2009”, I document
the connection between liquidity risk and the credit crunch experienced during the financial
crisis of 2007-2009. Using extensive micro-level data on mortgage loan applications, I con-
struct a measure of the supply of credit that is free from demand-side bias. I then use this
measure of credit supply to estimate the effect of cross-sectional differences in unused lines of
credit and core-deposit funding on the supply of mortgage credit moving through the crisis.
I find that lenders with higher liquidity risk contracted their supply of mortgage credit more.
The channel of contraction was significantly stronger for larger lenders, which had the largest
exposure to liquidity risk. The first phase of the contraction was due to liquidity risk arising
from high exposure to lines of credit and was immediately followed by further tightening due
to the collapse of the markets for wholesale funding. I estimate that the total contraction
of mortgage lending due to liquidity stresses experienced by lenders during 2007-2009 was
$41.5 billion - $61.9 billion, or 5.2%-7.8% of total mortgage originations during that period.
In the second essay, titled “Commercial Bank Failures During The Great Recession: The
Real (Estate) Story” I identify the channels through which shocks to the real estate sector
contributed to the wave of commercial bank failures during the Great Recession. I focus on
the banks’ loan, marketable securities and credit line portfolios, and consider how choices
which shifted the composition of each portfolio towards real estate products impacted the
probability of bank failure. I find that augmenting a baseline model of failure with variables
that capture the composition of these three portfolios improves the fit of the model by
approximately 70% for small banks and 230% for large banks. I find no evidence that
banks which held more of their loans in traditional closed-end mortgages suffered a higher
probability of failure. Rather, it was investments in loans for multifamily properties and
other non-household real estate loans, as well as off-balance sheet exposures to credit lines
issued to non-household real estate borrowers, that are robustly identified as precursors of
bank failure for both small and large banks. Exposure to open-end residential real estate
loans contributed to the failure rates of small banks only. Exposure to private-label MBS is
strongly associated with a higher probability of failure for large banks, but not for small ones.
On the other hand, high holdings of agency MBS are associated with a higher probability of
failure only for smaller banks, but this result is less robust.
The third essay, titled “No Free Shop: Why Target Companies in MBOs and Private
Equity Transactions Sometimes Choose Not to Buy ’Go Shop’ Options” is joint work with
Charles W. Calomiris and Donna M. Hitscherich. In this essay, we study the decisions by
targets in private equity and MBO transactions whether to actively "shop" their initial acqui-
sition agreements prior to the shareholders’ approval of those contracts. Specifically, targets
can insert a "go-shop" clause into their contracts, which permits them to use the agreement
to solicit offers from other would-be acquirors during the "go-shop" window, during which the
termination fee paid by the target is temporarily lowered. We consider the "go-shop" decision
from the theoretical perspective of value maximization under asymmetric information, and
also consider conflicts of interest on the parts of management, bankers, and attorneys that
might affect the decision. Empirically, we find that the decision to retain the option to shop
an offer is predicted by various firm attributes, including larger size, more fragmented owner-
ship, and various characteristics of the firms’ legal advisory team and procedures. These can
be interpreted as reflecting a combination of informational characteristics, litigation risk, and
attorney conflicts of interest. We employ legal advisor characteristics as instruments when
analyzing the effects of go-shop decisions on target acquisition premia and value. We find,
as predicted in our theoretical framework, that go-shops are not a free option; they result in
lower initial acquisition premia, ceteris paribus. Our theoretical framework has an ambigu-
ous prediction about the effects of go-shop choice on target firm valuation. Consistent with
theory, we find no significant effect on abnormal returns from choosing a "go-shop" option.
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1Chapter 1
Liquidity Risk and the Credit Crunch of 2007-
2009
1.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 brought about a severe contraction of credit. While much
attention has been rightfully devoted to the causes of the crisis, the mechanisms driving the
contraction of credit experienced during the crisis received less attention. Understanding
these mechanisms is a key issue in enhancing policy-making to prevent and to respond to
such crises in the future.
Two broad categories of mechanisms may account for the contraction of credit. On
the demand side, deleveraging by households and firms should cause the amount of credit
demanded to drop. On the supply side, the deterioration in banks’ financial condition may
have produced a lower propensity to lend. Disentangling the supply channel from the demand
channel is a major challenge to identification.
This paper seeks to empirically identify the presence of a particular supply-side mecha-
nism and quantify its impact on mortgage credit. I address two specific questions: (1) did
funding illiquidity pressures on banks, or on their non-mortgage loan customers, precipitate
a contraction of mortgage lending, and (2) if such an effect was in place what was its eco-
2nomic magnitude? To answer these questions one needs a model of credit origination and
an identification strategy to separate demand-side from supply-side effects.
To my knowledge, this is the first study to identify the effect of liquidity risk on the
supply of credit while credibly controlling for variation in the demand for credit. I use
micro-level data on mortgage loan applications in the US, and identify liquidity risk effects
on the supply of mortgage credit during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The level of detail
in the data permits a more complete treatment of demand-side effects than has been possible
in previous studies, and allows me to isolate a measure of the supply of credit that is free
from demand-side bias. I am therefore able to produce precise estimates of the component
of the contraction in mortgage credit that can be solely attributed to liquidity risk.
To estimate the effect of liquidity risk on the supply of mortgage credit, I employ a two-
stage approach. The first stage identifies the supply of credit by controlling for a wide array
of demand-side determinants of credit. The second stage uses extensive data on the financial
condition of lenders to identify the effect of liquidity risk on the supply of credit.
In the first stage, my identification strategy relies on heterogeneity across borrowers to
control for demand-side effects and thereby identify the supply of credit. To control for
the demand channel, I employ individual mortgage loan-level data for 2004-2010 provided
through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The data suggest that demand-side
drivers of credit activity were important during the crisis. Demand for mortgage credit
declined dramatically after 2006, and by 2010 the number of applications to commercial
banks dropped to approximately one quarter of its peak, 2006 level.
Conditioning on each loan application, I model the supply of credit as targeting a cutoff
on the distribution of borrower characteristics and estimate a discrete choice model of the
loan approval decision. The advantage of focusing on the approval decision is that it focuses
on the flow of new credit and takes into account a broad range of lender outcomes, including
3credit rationing.1 Variation across lenders in the supply of credit is captured by lender-year
fixed effects. I control for demand-side effects by including a host of borrower characteristics
and saturating the model with location-year fixed effects.
With the first stage providing a measure of the supply of credit, in the second stage I
estimate the effect of liquidity risk on credit supply. Specifically, motivated by Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2010) and Cornett et al. (2011), I examine how high off-balance sheet exposure
to unused lines of credit,2 and high reliance on wholesale funding3 affected the supply of
credit in the mortgage market during the financial crisis.4
To identify the effects of the two sources of liquidity risk on the supply of credit, I rely on
extensive financial data obtained from the Reports of Condition and Income (Call reports)
and exploit cross-sectional differences in the levels of exposure of lenders to each source of
liquidity risk. I adopt a structural break framework, where the effect of liquidity risk is
captured by the changes from baseline pre-crisis levels in the average level of the coefficients
1These supply-side effects would have been harder to identify by focusing on the overall level of credit
origination instead. For example, rapid drawdowns on lines of credit could on the aggregate result in an
increase in the reported overall volume of lending, but could at the same time ration out loan applicants for
new loans. The maturity structure of loans on the bank’s balance sheet could also affect the variation in the
size of the loan portfolio. In addition, the volume of loan originations largely depends on the volume of loan
applications which is in turn partly determined by demand-side mechanisms.
2Unused lines of credit are issued by banks to their customers and they represent commitments to supply
credit to the customer, on the customer’s request, up to a maximum credit limit. Funding illiquidity strains
on a bank’s customers can lead to increased requests for credit, thus putting a strain on the bank’s balance
sheet.
3Wholesale funding is the part of total funding that does not come from core deposits. The two terms
will be used frequently in this paper and their effects can be interpreted in relation to each other (i.e. high
reliance on core-deposit funding means low reliance on wholesale funding and vice versa). Examples of
wholesale sources of funding are repurchase agreements and uninsured time deposits.
4Long before the events of the financial crisis, these two measures of liquidity risk had been regarded
by bank examiners and economists as indicative of potential liquidity strains. See for example the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency’s Examiner’s Guide (2001) pg 10 for loan commitments and pg 16 for
core-deposits/wholesale funding. Though loan commitments are mentioned in the section for credit risk, the
balance sheet dynamics described in Section 3 will draw the connection to liquidity risk.
4for unused lines of credit and reliance on wholesale funding.5 I use year 2004 as the baseline
pre-crisis year, and track the changes in the coefficients for the period extending from one
year before to one year after the crisis (2006-2010).
I find that lenders which were more greatly exposed to liquidity risk, through high levels
of unused lines of credit and low levels of core-deposit funding, contracted their supply of
mortgage credit more during the crisis. The negative impact of high exposure to unused lines
of credit on the supply of mortgage credit came to full effect as early as 2006, but did not
extend past 2008, whereas the effect of wholesale funding peaked in 2008 and extended, albeit
with diminished intensity, past the end of the crisis in 2009. Estimates on a split sample
show that the contraction was sharper for larger lenders, which had the largest exposure to
liquidity risk. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications.
Liquidity risk had an economically significant effect on mortgage credit during the finan-
cial crisis. I estimate that the change of responsiveness of lenders to high levels of liquidity
risk during 2007-2009 caused a total contraction of $41.5 billion - $61.9 billion, or 5.2%-7.8%
of total mortgage originations during that period. Measured as the dollar volume of mort-
gage originations, the contraction was more severe in 2007 ($20.9 billion - $31.9 billion); as a
percentage of the annual volume of originations, the largest effect was in 2008 (8.1%-9.9%).
I also estimate the increase in mortgage originations that would have occurred had the
banks operated during the crisis of 2007-2009 with their levels of exposure to each source
of liquidity risk reduced by one standard deviation. The combined increase in the dollar
volume of mortgage originations over the period 2007-2009 would have been $24.2 billion -
$27.4 billion, or 3.1%-3.5% of total originations during that period. The dollar volume of
originations would have increased most significantly in 2007 ($12.5 billion - $15 billion) but
5In a later section, I discuss how the qualitatively similar framework employed in Cornett et al. (2011),
which interacts the TED spread with the two variables that capture the degree of exposure to liquidity risk,
naturally follows from the structural break framework I employ in this paper.
5the largest percentage increase would have occurred in 2008 (4.5%-4.6%).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related work and places the
contributions of this study within the preexisting literature on credit supply shocks. Section
3 describes a stylized model of the loan approval decision which treats the supply function as
targeting a threshold on the distribution of borrower characteristics, and employs a balance
sheet framework to draw the connections between liquidity risk and the supply of credit.
Section 4 describes the data sources used and discusses data construction. Section 5 discusses
the main challenges to identification and develops a two-stage empirical strategy to address
them. Section 6 presents summary statistics which track aggregate demand and supply
conditions in the mortgage market moving through the crisis. Section 7 presents the main
results of the paper for the two stages of estimation. Given the presence of a large-small bank
dichotomy in the results for the second stage, I explore these differences in detail. Section
8 tests the results for robustness against a number of alternative specifications, Section 9
estimates the economic significance of the effect of liquidity risk on credit origination in the
mortgage market, and Section 10 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper builds on three key insights from the literature. First, to identify supply-side
effects in lending one must carefully control for demand-side effects. Second, through balance
sheet constraints, funding shocks and shocks specific to a particular line of business of a bank
can affect the supply of credit in another line of business. Third, the recent financial crisis put
a strain on both the asset side and the liability side of the banks’ balance sheets, through
simultaneous drawdowns on lines of credit and the collapse of the markets for wholesale
funding respectively.
Empirical studies have exploited exogenous shocks to funding to show that adverse shocks
6to liquidity can lead to a contraction of credit supply. Early studies did not adequately
control for demand-side factors and could have thus been estimating demand-side effects.6
The prevalent treatment for demand now in the literature is the inclusion of fixed effects for
the location of the bank’s headquarters and the inclusion of lender loan portfolio ratios to
capture the degree of exposure to business cycles in different parts of the economy.7
Due to the scarcity of data, more refined treatments for demand have thus far been
limited to a few recent studies that employ data on individual loans to examine questions
relating to the supply of credit.8 This paper contributes to this recent strand of the literature
by utilizing data on individual mortgage loan applications to study the effects of liquidity
risk on the supply of credit during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
Funding shocks can come from a tightening of monetary policy, and Kashyap and Stein
(2000) show that such shocks affect lending through the bank lending channel of monetary
transmission.9 They also show that this channel is weaker for larger banks, suggesting
that more extensive access to capital markets makes it easier for larger lenders to absorb
the shock by substituting between sources of funding. Campello (2002) provides further
evidence on this point, by showing that the effect of the bank lending channel is dampened
by the existence of internal capital markets available to banks belonging to bank holding
companies.
6The reader can refer to Kashyap and Stein (2000) for a discussion of alternative interpretations involving
demand-side explanations of the bank channel identified in Bernanke and Blinder (1992) for example
7See, for example, Cetorelli and Goldberg (forthcoming), Cornett et al. (2011), and a more sophisticated
version in Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2012)
8Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008) investigate the effect of competition on the supply of mortgage
credit before the crisis of 2007-2009, Loutskina and Strahan (2009) the effect of cost of deposits and asset
liquidity on the supply of jumbo vs conforming loans in the US, Jimenez et al. (2012) the effect of monetary
policy and balance sheet strength on the supply of C&I loans in Spain.
9Shocks to liquidity can also come from government interventions in Argentina as in Paravisini (2008), or
even from a run on dollar deposit accounts due to nuclear testing in Pakistan as in Khwaja and Mian (2008).
The results in these studies uniformly indicate that negative shocks to liquidity result in a contraction of
credit.
7Internal capital markets can operate across borders. Cetorelli and Goldberg (forthcom-
ing) track the cross-border flow of funds for global banks to show that such flows help
dissipate the impact of local shocks to liquidity. A similar interpretation of these results
suggests that negative shocks can be transmitted across markets/borders. Shocks arising
from the exposure of foreign parent banks to deteriorating stock market conditions in Japan,
for example, can adversely affect lending in the US, as in Peek and Rosengren (1997b).
Shocks can also originate in one loan market and adversely impact lending in another mar-
ket, as with the deterioration of conditions in the commercial real estate market in Japan,
which led to a contraction of both lending and real activity in the US (Peek and Rosengren
(2000)). The focus of these studies is the international propagation of shocks. Viewed more
broadly, the results also suggest a model of banks operating on an aggregate balance sheet,
with constraints to aggregate liquidity/capital resulting in the transmission of shocks be-
tween different components of the balance sheet. My paper identifies a localized version of
these mechanisms and tracks the effect on mortgage lending of exogenous shocks to liquidity
stemming from high exposure to unused lines of credit and wholesale funding.
During the financial crisis of 2007-2009 the primary shock to liquidity did not come from
monetary policy adjustments but rather from the funding illiquidity experienced in the mar-
kets for wholesale funding. Adrian and Shin (2009) study security broker dealers and find a
procyclical relationship between asset growth and leverage. They find the margin of adjust-
ment to come through collateralized borrowing and lending (repurchase agreements) and,
on the basis of this relationship, attribute the severe contraction of market credit during the
crisis to the collapse of the markets for wholesale funding. Gorton and Metrick (2010) show
that the weakening of the securitization market for subprime mortgages was not the primary
shock that caused systemic problems to the banking system. Rather, the first systemic event
of the crisis occurred in the money markets when concerns about repo collateral and bank
solvency aggregated up to the first run on repo in August 2007. Schwarz (2010) finds that,
8starting at that same month, liquidity started accounting for an increasingly larger portion of
the spreads in the interbank market and had surpassed the contribution of interbank credit
risk by April 2008, a result she ascribes to deteriorating market liquidity conditions and the
pricing of liquidity risk. Examining commercial banks, Ratnovski and Huang (2009) show
that Canadian banks that relied more on core-deposit funding fared better in a number of
performance metrics than their counterparts did during the crisis.
Further strains to liquidity can come from rapid drawdowns on lines of credit previously
issued by the bank. Firms, for example, establish lines of credit with banks as an ex-
ante contract to insure against states with negative liquidity shocks (as in Calomiris (1989),
Holmstrom and Tirole (2000)). Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) provide evidence of increased
use of credit lines by firms during the crisis of 2007-2009, and Campello et al. (2011) show
how companies substituted between internal liquidity and lines of credit during the crisis.
Both the asset and liability sides of banks’ balance sheets experienced runs during the
financial crisis, through the simultaneous collapse of the markets for wholesale funding and
rapid drawdowns on lines of credit. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that high exposure
to short-term debt and unanticipated drawdowns on lines of credit, due to high levels of
co-syndication of revolving lines with Lehman, led to a decrease in new credit for large
syndicated loans. Cornett et al. (2011) use an interaction of the levels of liquidity risk with a
measure of funding stresses in the banking sector (the TED spread), to show that exposure
to the same two sources of liquidity risk resulted in liquidity-hoarding and subsequently led
to a contraction of bank credit during the crisis.
1.3 Stylized Model
Consider the stylized model of the loan approval process shown in panel (a) of Figure 1.1.
In this model the demand side is represented by a distribution of borrower characteristics.
9One can think of the distribution of characteristics as collapsing into one dimension of the
price-adjusted risk level of each borrower, which decreases as we move toward the right tail
of the distribution. Loan supply approval targets a distribution cutoff. Applications from
borrowers to the right of the cutoff are approved and those from borrowers to the left of the
cutoff are declined. The supply threshold is set in accordance with an underlying upward-
sloping marginal cost curve, and it can move to the left or to the right as a result of a decline
or rise in marginal costs respectively.
Approval rates can change either due to shifts in demand or shifts in supply. Shifts in
demand are represented by a change in the distribution of borrower characteristics in the
pool of applicants10 and shifts in supply are represented by a shift in the supply approval
cutoff. Panel (b) shows a scenario in which borrower characteristics shift in the direction
of higher risk, and at the same time the supply approval threshold shifts in the direction
of tighter lending standards. Both of these movements in isolation would have resulted in
a decrease in approval rates, and it is this simultaneous shift in both demand and supply
that poses the fundamental challenge to the identification of supply effects in lending. This
paper relies on the use of individual loan application data to purge the approval decision
from demand-side effects and thus identify supply effects in the contraction of credit.
Credit supply can be affected by liquidity shocks because of the banks’ role in liquidity
provision and the interconnections between the different components of a bank’s balance
sheet.11 Consider the stylized balance sheet and off-balance sheet structure shown in panel
(a) of Figure 1.2. Banks rely upon a combination of core deposits and wholesale funding,
10Changes in the distribution of borrower characteristics was evident even before the crisis. Demyanyk
and Van Hemert (2008) show that the quality of borrowers deteriorated in each of the six years leading up
to the crisis and that to some extent the lenders were aware of the trend as was evidenced in the pricing of
risk in mortgage rates.
11See Berger and Bouwman (2009) for the construction of a measure of liquidity provision based on the
composition of assets and liabilities on a bank’s balance sheet.
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invest those funds in a combination of liquid and illiquid (mortgage and other loans) assets,
and hold capital to absorb losses on their loan portfolio. In addition, banks have issued a
number of commitments to fund loans, commitments which must be honored at the request
of the counterparty to the agreement; these commitments are what are normally referred to
as lines of credit.12
Shocks to wholesale funding and drawdowns on lines of credit can be caused by shocks
that are exogenous to supply and demand shocks particular to the mortgage market,13 but
which can nonetheless affect the bank’s propensity to originate mortgage loans. Consider
first what happens when a source of wholesale funding is withdrawn. The bank will reduce
its level of exposure to wholesale funding but will at the same time dishoard its liquid asset
holdings by an equal amount in order to settle the account. When a bank customer draws
down on a line of credit, the off-balance sheet exposure of the bank decreases and, to fund
the loan, an equal amount of liquid assets is converted to illiquid loans (i.e. to provide liquid
funds to the borrower in exchange for an illiquid obligation for future repayment). Similarly,
when a bank originates a new mortgage loan, it dishoards some of its liquid assets to fund
the illiquid loan. Panels (b)-(d) of Figure 1.2 illustrate balance sheet adjustments for a $1
activity flow in each of the three aforementioned scenaria respectively.
Two things are key from the above discussion. First, the bank does not control the
flow of liquid funds in the first two cases, since actions exogenous to the bank’s liquidity
management operations determine shocks in the markets for wholesale funding or the decision
to draw down a line of credit; the bank, however, has full control over the lending decision
12The terms "loan commitments" and "lines of credit" will be used interchangeably henceforth
13The shocks to the different components of the balance sheet are subject to pressures that are likely
to be correlated in an aggregate sense. As will be discussed in the next section, however, identification
relies in the cross-sectional variation in the levels of core-deposit funding and exposure to lines of credit.
Aggregate correlations in shocks are not expected to affect the cross-sectional variation and can thus be
treated as exogenous to the process. One implication of this is that the results will underestimate the impact
of liquidity risk on the supply of credit since aggregate effects will not be captured by the model.
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in the third case. Second, in this stylized world banks hold liquid assets to satisfy two
competing objectives. They must be able to absorb negative shocks to liquidity coming from
exogenous withdrawals of wholesale funding and/or drawdowns on lines of credit14 and at
the same they want to be able to invest in profitable opportunities in the mortgage market.
In an environment with the markets for funding liquidity frozen, any increase in liquidity
shocks (actualized or expected) will thus allocate more of the stock of liquid assets towards
absorbing the shocks and fewer liquid assets towards new mortgage loan origination. In
addition to these mechanisms, entering a liquidity crisis with a relatively high reliance on
wholesale sources of funding will raise the marginal cost of lending and thus shift supply in
the direction of tighter lending standards.
This paper empirically corroborates the mechanisms described above. I first identify
supply effects in credit for the loan mortgage market. I then show that the supply of credit
in this market contracted due to (i) an increase in demand in another loan market, coming
from rapid drawdowns on unused lines of credit, and (ii) funding stresses due to high reliance
on wholesale funding, the markets for which experienced rapidly deteriorating conditions
during the crisis.
1.4 Data Sources
To identify the effect of liquidity risk on mortgage lending I compiled data from two different
sources: home mortgage application data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
and bank financial data from the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports).
14The synergies arising from an imperfect correlation between deposit withdrawals and line of credit
drawdowns are shown in Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002). When such an imperfect correlation exists,
the amount of liquidity maintained by banks can be lower than if the shocks were highly correlated. The
financial crisis is an example of an event in which the two shocks are highly correlated
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1.4.1 Mortgage Loan Data (HMDA)
HMDA was enacted by Congress in 1975 and implemented by the Federal Reserve Board’s
Regulation C. It requires lending institutions to report data on mortgage loan applications
and its purpose is to enhance the enforcement of anti-discriminatory laws and publish in-
formation that would guide public investment in housing. The database covers over 90%
of all lending activity in the home mortgage market for the years from 1997 onwards, with
reporting requirements effectively resulting in the exclusion of small lenders in rural areas
(Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008)). It reports the year of application (but not exactly
when during the year the application was filed), loan characteristics (loan amount, purpose,
outcome, etcâĂę), individual applicant characteristics (income, sex, race, etcâĂę), as well
as demographic variables for the location in which the property is located (median salary,
percentage of population that are minorities, etcâĂę).
Importantly, this dataset provides information about the lending decision at the point of
application. That decision is solely controlled by the lender and is a much more informative
measure of lender behavior than aggregate measures of lending, such as the size of the loan
portfolio. Changes in the size of a bank’s loan portfolio, for example, may reflect the maturity
structure of loans or drawdowns on lines of credit, neither of which are directly controlled
by the lender. In addition, measures of aggregate lending in a lender’s portfolio largely
ignore the characteristics of the applicants and local market conditions, thus introducing
demand-side bias to the estimation.
I first drop from the sample lenders that are not commercial banks, and omit from the
sample loans that do not correspond to homes in MSA areas. Then, following Dell’Ariccia,
Igan and Laeven (2008), I drop applications with loan amounts smaller than $1,000 (because
the loan amount is reported in thousands and rounded to the nearest integer) or those with
income equal to $1,000 (because income is left-censored at that value). I then drop loans for
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multi-family dwellings, federally insured loans and refinancing loans. Multi-family dwellings
are sizeable structures that share risk characteristics that are significantly different from
those of 1-4 family dwellings, and are treated as a separate category of mortgage loans by
banks (bank financial reports make that distinction too). Federally insured mortgage loans
and refinancing of mortgage loans have different risk profiles and information structure than
those of new, non-insured mortgage loans, and are thus expected to be subject to different
decision rules. Finally, I restrict attention to loans that resulted in one of the following
actions: (1) lender approved and borrower execution, (2) lender approved but no borrower
execution, and (3) lender denial. Thus, I drop repurchases of already originated loans by a
financial institution, entries for which the application was withdrawn by the applicant, and
loan applications that were not pursued further due to incomplete information. I use year
2004 data as the pre-crisis baseline year, and years 2006-2010 to span the period from one
year before the crisis to one year afterward.
1.4.2 Bank Financial Data (Call Reports)
I obtain financial data for lending institutions from the Reports of Income and Condition for
commercial banks ("Call Reports") made available online in summary form by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. The reports cover all commercial banks, and contain detailed
financial data in a number of different schedules (balance sheet, income statement, securities
holdings, etcâĂę).
Different institution types can be identified by the regulatory authority to which they
report. The paper’s focus is on commercial depository institutions, and these institutions
report to one of three regulatory bodies: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Other institution types, such as thrifts, credit unions,
etc... operate under different legal frameworks and corporate governance structures, and
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although they account for a significant portion of the activity in the mortgage market they
do not represent commercial depository institutions and are thus excluded from my analysis.
The matching is done between the HMDA institution number (Respondent_ID in the data)
and the appropriate institution number in the "Call Report" determined by the regulatory
entity responsible for overseeing the operations of the financial institution. That is, the call
report identification number for banks regulated by the FRS, the FDIC certificate ID for
banks regulated by the FDIC, and the OCC ID for banks regulated by the OCC. As a number
of studies have documented the operation of internal capital markets for banks belonging to
bank holding companies,15 financial data are aggregated up to the holding company level.
1.5 Identification Strategy
To aid the discussion of the main challenges associated with identifying supply effects in
lending, consider the simple reduced-form model shown in Equation 1.1:
Lit = βtXit−1 + uit (1.1)
where Lit is the lending propensity of bank i in time period t, Xit−1 is a vector of time-
lagged bank balance sheet characteristics and uitis an idiosyncratic error term. I assume
lending propensity to be determined centrally based on the financial condition of the lender
at the beginning of the year. Once lending propensity is determined, subsequent adjust-
ments throughout the year take time to percolate down to the various branches and lending
propensity is thus assumed to stay fixed throughout the year.
The primary estimation challenge is that the variation in balance sheet variables may be
correlated with unobservable demand factors. Those demand factors are themselves likely to
15Campello (2002), Cetorelli and Goldberg (forthcoming) for example
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be correlated with lending propensity, thus giving rise to omitted variable bias. For example,
assume that Xit−1 contains some measure of lender profitability. High unemployment rates
in the regions of operation of the bank may have a negative impact on both profitability
and lending propensity.16 These correlations would induce a positive bias on the estimated
coefficient for profitability. In order to identify supply effects in credit, it is therefore essential
that one begin with a measure of lending propensity that is not correlated with the subset
of demand-side determinants which may in turn be correlated with our measures of liquidity
risk.
Assuming that such a “demand-free" measure of lending propensity is available, the
second major challenge is to ensure that the balance sheet variables used to capture the
effect of liquidity shocks are not set endogenously by the bank. For example, high levels of
risk aversion will both decrease lending propensity and increase liquid asset holdings, thus
inducing a negative bias in the impact of liquid asset holdings on lending propensity.17
The identification strategy consists of two stages of regressions each designed to address
one of these two sets of challenges. In the first stage, the lender’s decision of whether
to approve or deny a mortgage loan application is decomposed into distinct components
belonging either to the supply side or to the demand side of credit. In the second stage,
the estimated supply-side component of the lending decision is regressed on a set of bank
balance sheet variables that capture the degree of exposure to exogenous shocks to liquidity.
The two variables of interest are the lender’s exposure to high levels of unused lines of credit
and the lender’s degree of reliance on core-deposit funding. Definitions for the explanatory
variables used at each stage are shown in Table 1.1.
16A high level of unemployment will adversely affect the risk profile of potential borrowers and will thus
correlate negatively with lending propensity.
17This is in essence another instance of omitted variable bias.
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1.5.1 First Stage
The first stage follows directly from the logit specification shown in Equation 1.2. More
specifically, for each loan application made to lender i,18 for a property located in county j,
by borrower n, in year t, I use the specification shown in Equation 1.2 to estimate a discrete
choice model of the lending decision and extract a supply-side measure of lending propensity.
Pr(Aijnt = 1|i, j, t,Xn) = Λ(Lit + Cjt + λtXn) (1.2)
where Aijnt is the binary decision for the application, Λ(.) is the logistic function, and
Lit, Cjt are the coefficients for lender-year and county-year dummies respectively, and Xn
is a vector of borrower/loan characteristics. I include a rich set of demand-side controls to
ensure that the supply-side measure of lending propensity is free from demand-side bias, and
estimate this logit specification using a maximum likelihood estimator with errors clustered
at the lender level.
The coefficients for the lender-year dummies comprise the estimated supply-side measure
of lending propensity. The coefficients on borrower characteristics and location-year dummies
capture demand-side effects. All variables are time-interacted, to allow for time-varying
responses moving through the crisis.
Estimation of the model is computationally prohibitive due to the inclusion of thousands
of dummy variables estimated over millions of observations; each year is thus estimated
separately. Also, since the dataset includes many banks with insignificant lending activity,
for each year I sort the banks from smallest to largest (measuring size as the number of
applications) and then drop the banks which collectively account for less than the first 0.5%
of the total applications for the year. Dropping these small lenders significantly reduces the
18HMDA data are not reported at the branch level and the lender unit is not defined for each individual
branch of each bank. For example, Bank of America constitutes a lender.
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number of fixed effects without, however, affecting the representativeness of the sample in
a meaningful way. One potential concern is that this rule-based pruning mechanism could
induce sample-selection bias in the second stage, as small lenders sitting at the bottom of the
distribution may arbitrarily exit and re-enter the data depending on their relative position
in the activity rank. To alleviate such concerns, in the second stage I only include banks
that either never exit or permanently exit the sample; re-entries are thus not included in the
second stage.
Demand-side effects driven by individual loan/borrower characteristics are captured by
the inclusion of loan/borrower-level covariates. I include standard proxies for risk such as
the loan-to-income ratio, the natural logarithm of income, a dummy variable for minority
applicants,19 as well as a categorical variable for lien status (first lien, junior lien, not secured
by lien on real estate). Applications with a high loan to income ratio, low applicant income,
from minority applicants, and for properties with junior liens are expected to face higher
denial ratios. Following Loutskina and Strahan (2009) I include a dummy for jumbo loans,20
which is expected to have a negative sign. For completeness, I also include a set of variables
for the effect of which I do not have a strong prior. These are the natural logarithm of
the loan amount, a categorical variable for applicant sex (male, female, not reported), and
dummy variables for home-improvement, manufactured housing, and not-for-owner-occupied
mortgage loans.21 Detailed definitions of each variable can be found in Table 1.1.
Demand-side effects related to location are captured by the county-year dummies. For
example, unemployment levels vary across counties and the county-year effects will capture
19The minority dummy is constructed as in Munnell et al. (1996)
20Loutskina and Strahan (2009) provide evidence for higher denial rates for non-conforming loans due
to their relative illiquidity. The jumbo threshold is taken from Fannie Mae guidelines (using the "general"
threshold for 2008-2010).
21This parsimonious specification does not include securitization rates and other variables that may affect
the lending decision. In a later section, however, I will show that the estimates obtained are robust to the
inclusion of a much wider array of demand-side variables, including securitization rates.
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the impact that the probability of an applicant exiting the labor market will have on the
lending decision. County-year effects will also capture the combined effect of local lending op-
portunities, competition/market structure dynamics,22 house-price appreciation rates, crime
rates, etc...; location-specific demand-side effects will thus not “contaminate" the estimated
measure of supply-side lending propensity (the coefficients on lender-year effects).
1.5.2 Second Stage
The first stage identifies supply effects in lending and extracts a measure of lending propensity
that is free from demand-side bias. The second stage estimates the impact on the supply of
lending of liquidity risk coming from a high reliance on wholesale funding and high off-balance
sheet exposure to lines of credit.
Consider first the model shown in Equation 1.3, where αi, κt are lender and year fixed
effects controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and aggregate macro effects respectively,
Zit−1 are balance-sheet measures of liquidity risk, Controlsit−1 are additional controls and
Dt=T is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for year T and 0 otherwise. All financial
variables are measured at end of previous year levels to reflect beginning of year conditions.
The focus of this paper is on the coefficients of Zit−1.







γct(Controlsit−1 ·Dt=T ) + it
(1.3)
The time-interacted coefficients allow for time-varying responses to liquidity risk and thus
22Addressing market structure, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) provide a model which connects the
reduction in informational asymmetries between banks to a loosening of lending standards and subsequent
loan portfolio deterioration. Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008) provide related empirical evidence by
connecting the decrease in denial rates for mortgage loan applications to high housing price-appreciation
rates, to market entry by large lenders, and to securitization rates in the US mortgage market during the
period leading up to the crisis.
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capture the information provided by the timing of the liquidity shock; the timing of the
financial crisis. Specifically, the estimates for γzt trace the bank’s credit supply response
to high reliance on wholesale funding and high levels of unused lines of credit. For each of
these two variables, however, the coefficients measure the net effect on credit supply of a set
of mechanisms of which liquidity risk is but one, and thus also capture normal correlations
between the supply of credit and the levels of unused lines of credit and wholesale funding.
Key to identification is that the exogenous effect of liquidity risk on the supply of credit
is not captured by the lenders’ net response to its exposure to levels of core-deposit funding
and unused lines of credit, but is rather inferred by the structural changes of those responses
during periods of exogenous shocks to liquidity. The financial crisis brought significant and
unexpected strains on liquidity for banks and their customers. To the extent that (i) the
financial crisis was unpredicted by banks and (ii) the shocks to liquidity were primarily deter-
mined by the actions of actors outside the bank, one can assume these shocks to be exogenous
to the bank’s endogenous liquidity management operations. These liquidity strains amplify
the effect of the component of the lender’s response function that corresponds to liquidity
risk. It is this amplification effect that enables me to estimate the impact of liquidity risk on
loan supply by estimating the structural changes in the coefficients of the variables capturing
liquidity risk.
Equation 1.4 describes the model used for identification in the second stage. It is econo-
metrically identical to Equation 1.3, expressed in a form that identifies liquidity effects in
the supply of credit as the estimates of the coefficients δzt, which for each coefficient γzt
(from Equation 1.3 above) track the structural changes from the baseline year of 2004 to the
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period starting one year before and ending one year after the financial crisis (2006-2010).23







δct(Controlsit−1 ·Dt=T ) + it
(1.4)
To estimate Equation 1.4 I use OLS. Financial variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles to limit the impact of outliers. The use of an estimated dependent variable
has no impact on point estimates other than inducing heteroskedasticity in the sample; the
use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors addresses this concern.24 Errors are also
clustered by lender to control for serial correlation in the error term.
I include unused lines of credit for real estate loans as well as core deposits, both scaled
by total assets, to capture the effect of liquidity strains on lending. I aggregate home equity
lines of credit (HELOCs) and lines of credit for commercial real estate, land development
and construction loans to create unused lines of credit for real estate loans.25 In a portfolio-
rebalancing framework, a "forced" expansion of the size of the real estate loan portfolio is
expected to exhibit its strongest effect on the supply of credit for the qualitatively similar
mortgage loans that the first stage is estimated on.26 The coefficient on core deposits captures
(when interpreted as relative to the missing component of wholesale funding) the effect of
shocks coming from the collapse of the market for sources of wholesale funding during the
23The base year was chosen to be 2004 to ensure that we capture a clean picture of the pre-crisis model
without being too close to the turning point.
24This is not the same as the case of an estimated regressor, which could affect the magnitude of the
estimates.
25Activity coming from these two categories of lines of credit is likely to be correlated with mortgage
loan activity at the aggregate level but not at the individual bank level, and thus creates no concern for
identification.
26Though exposure to unused lines of credit for non-real estate loans is less likely to affect credit for real
estate loans, a measure of such exposure will be included in later robustness tests and shown to have no
effect on the results.
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crisis (repo, commercial paper, etc...). Given the mechanisms described in Section 3, I expect
the structural change in the coefficient of unused lines of credit to have a negative sign and
the change in the coefficient of core deposits to have a positive sign.
Additional controls used are the natural logarithm of assets, to control for size effects, and
asset liquidity and capital adequacy ratios as measures of the financial health of the lender.
I also include the ratios of closed-end, open-end and other real estate loans to illiquid assets
to capture the degree of lender specialization and to control for the degree of exposure to
conditions in different segments of the real estate market. In the absence of loan portfolio
ratios, the coefficient on unused lines of credit for real estate loans could be capturing the
bank’s overall exposure to the real estate market, since in general the levels of unused lines
of credit in a particular loan category correlate strongly and positively with the presence
of such loans on the bank’s loan portfolio; the omission of these loan portfolio ratios could
therefore give rise to omitted variable bias.
The direction of the effect for each of the control variables is not clear on theoretical
grounds and I will thus present their coefficients without further discussion in the results
section. With a particular focus on asset liquidity and capital adequacy one could argue
that, being measures of financial health, they should display positive structural changes. The
thinking normally employed here is that since asset liquidity provides a buffer for negative
shocks to liquidity and capital adequacy provides a similar buffer for negative shocks to
capital (writedowns on loan delinquencies for example), then the higher the buffer levels
the more "immune" the bank is to such shocks, and the more lending it should engage in.
Banks, however, may choose to build these buffers up for reasons related to asset risk (as in
Calomiris and Wilson (2004)), so high stocks of liquid assets and/or of capital could very
well correlate negatively with lending propensity.
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1.6 Summary Statistics
Figure 1.3 plots the path of mortgage loan originations measured both as the total number
and the total dollar volume for the period 2004, 2006-2010. The variation over time shown
in Figure 1.3 is striking. Mortgage loan originations peaked in 2006 and then fell sharply
during 2007-2008. The slide in originations continued at lower rates after that period, and
the total number of originations fell to about a third of its 2006 peak level by 2010.
[Figure 1.3 about here]
Figure 1.4 traces one of the major drivers of the precipitous fall in loan originations back
to the rapidly declining numbers of loan applications. This decline may on the aggregate
be driven by both demand-side and supply-side factors. The impact of loan supply on the
number of applications is mostly an aggregate effect and not likely to carry any significant
cross-sectional variation across banks.27 As discussed earlier, this means that estimates for
the effect of liquidity risk on lending are conservative estimates since they do not account for
aggregate supply effects. To the extent, however, that the drop in loan applications is non-
uniform in the cross-section of geographical areas that banks serve, this graph also suggests
that simple measures of aggregate lending by banks may well be capturing area-of-operation
(demand-side) effects.
[Figure 1.4 about here]
Figure 1.5 plots loan approval rates against time and traces part of the contraction of
lending back to lower approval rates. We can see that approval rates started dropping as
27Cross-sectional variation in the number of applications generated by supply-side drivers would require
informed applicants who can analyze the financial condition of lenders and who would form a preference
for applying for mortgage loans to financially healthier lenders. It is not clear that applicants exhibit such
behavior and this is also discussed in more detail in the section on robustness
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early as 2006 but then partly recovered from 2009 onwards. The drop in approval rates could
be driven by a shift in the distribution of borrower characteristics (demand-side effect) or by
a shift in the approval threshold targeted by banks on that distribution (supply-side effect).
The identification challenge is to disentangle these two effects and the identification strategy
proposed robustly does so. The results will show that important supply-side factors affected
approval decisions, and that liquidity risk was driving part of the decline in approval rates.28
[Figure 1.5 about here]
Table 1.2 displays summary statistics for the distribution of applicant/loan characteristics
during the period 2004, 2006-2010. Moving through the crisis, the average applicant comes
with a higher income and buys properties of higher value, with loan-to-income ratios dropping
somewhat from 2004. In an environment of rapidly declining house prices, this suggests that
less credit-worthy applicants have likely exited the market at higher proportions than overall
market exit rates. The data also show a decline in the proportion of minority applicants in
the applicant pool. Moving through the years of the crisis, we also observe an initial drop
in loan applications for home-purchase loans, as well as for applications for properties under
a first-lien; both of these trends start reversing as we move out of the crisis.
[Table 1.2 about here]
Table 1.3 provides summary statistics for lenders, with the sample split between small
and large lenders29 (definitions can be found in Table 1.1). The financial variables are
28Figures 1.3-1.5 display preliminary summary statistics on aggregate trends in the mortgage loan market.
Being geographical aggregates, these trends could be hiding the important cross-sectional effects that the
empirical strategy will identify. Extrapolations from these initial findings to cross-sectional implications
should thus be treated with caution.
29The threshold used is $1 billion in assets, against which the bank asset size averaged over all observations
for the bank in the dataset is compared for categorization purposes. The reasons behind the choice of
threshold and averaging measure are discussed in the Results section.
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reported at end of year (fourth quarter) levels.30 Smaller lenders are better capitalized and
hold higher levels of liquid assets on their balance sheets. Asset liquidity has been declining
for both large and small lenders through the end of 2008, with a sharp increase noted by
the end of 2009. Profitability for both categories of lenders experienced a sharp decline in
2008 with further losses in 2009. Smaller lenders hold a larger percentage of illiquid assets
in residential real estate loans31 and subsequently experienced higher default rates on such
loans as a percentage of total assets. Exposure to commercial and industrial loans is, as
expected, considerably higher for large lenders.
[Table 1.3 about here]
Importantly, smaller lenders are less exposed to liquidity risk than larger lenders, as they
are funded to a greater extent by core deposits and hold smaller off-balance sheet exposures
to unused lines of credit for both real estate and non-real estate loans. Figures 1.6-1.7
plot the paths of these two sources of liquidity risk moving through the crisis. Besides the
aforementioned gap in exposure levels, we can see an initial decline in core-deposit funding,
a trend, however, which started reversing in 2008. The level of exposure to unused lines
of credit for real estate loans peaked at the beginning of 2006, but rapid drawdowns led to
a steady decline which intensified in 2008. These plots suggest a pattern in the timing of
shocks to liquidity during the crisis, with drawdowns on lines of credit leading the collapse
of the markets for wholesale funding.
[Figures 1.6-1.7 about here]
30This was done to be consistent with the model used in the second stage, where lending activities during
year T are modelled as being dependent on end-of-year T-1 financial variables




In this section I discuss the results obtained from the estimation of the first stage of the
model. I then present the results obtained in the second stage, which address the focal
questions of the study.
1.7.1 First Stage
The estimated coefficients for borrower/loan characteristics are shown in Table 1.4. Consis-
tent with Loutskina and Strahan (2009) I find that jumbo loans are less likely to be approved,
as expected, due to their relative illiquidity compared to conforming ones.32 Applications
from minority applicants have a lower probability of approval. Loans under a junior lien
and/or with no lien on a dwelling are less likely to be approved, reflecting the lower expected
recovery rates in the case of a default. The negative sign for manufactured housing may
reflect the fact that this housing choice is more prevalent in low-income households.
Regarding financial variables, the loan-to-income ratio comes with the expected negative
sign, and the natural logarithm of income with the expected positive sign. The coefficient
on the natural logarithm of loan amount is also positive, perhaps proxying for wealth effects
of the applicant not completely captured by the income variable.
[Table 1.4 about here]
Interpretation of the results beyond rough checks for sign consistency should be treated
with caution. The controls aim at extracting the component of the lending decision that is
32A concern is that the reported loan amounts may be endogenously determined in order to fall below
the jumbo threshold. This may induce bias on the coefficient for jumbo loans (and/or on the coefficient for
loan amount) if unobserved borrower characteristics that are relevant for the approval decision also correlate
with the loan amount. Such bias, however, should not affect the estimated lender-year effects which capture
the supply of credit. In a robustness test, I re-estimated the first stage excluding all applications with
loan amounts which fell between 95% and 100% of the jumbo threshold (approximately 1%-2% of all loan
applications for each year). The estimated coefficients for lender-year effects remained unchanged, indicating
that my identification strategy is robust to this potential source of bias.
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due to borrower characteristics and in doing so they could well be proxying for other demand-
side unobservables. For similar reasons, the time-series variation in their levels should also
be interpreted with caution; the purpose of this first stage is only to identify supply effects
in lending through the coefficients on the lender-year dummies.
1.7.2 Second Stage
With the supply-side measure of lending propensity now identified, I proceed with estimation
of the second stage. A set of variables was included to control for the overall financial
condition of the lender and to capture business cycle effects. The two variables capturing
liquidity risk effects are Lines of credit for RE loans and Core-deposit funding; the estimated
coefficients for other controls are provided for completeness with no extensive comments.
I first estimate the model shown in Equation 1.3, where coefficients are at annual levels.
Figures 1.8-1.9 plot the path through time of the coefficients for core-deposit funding and
unused lines of credit for real estate loans respectively, with 95% confidence intervals drawn
around the estimates. As discussed earlier, the exogenous effect of liquidity risk is captured
by the structural changes of the coefficients over time; the levels of these coefficients should
thus be compared to 2004 base levels, and not to 0.
[Figures 1.8-1.9 about here]
These figures are key in displaying the central result of this paper, which is that the
response to high levels of liquidity risk became progressively stronger as we entered the
crisis,33 reached a peak in absolute value at the epicenter of the crisis in 2008, and then
gradually returned to pre-crisis levels by 2010. Though it is possible that there are banks
which experienced shocks to liquidity risk before or after the peak of the crisis in 2008 (after
33Moving in a negative direction for unused lines of credit and in a positive direction for core-deposit
funding
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all, the precipitation in real estate prices started as early as 2006), the results suggest that
the majority of the banks experienced the shocks more severely during 2008.
Table 1.5 displays the estimates of Equation 1.4, which now directly identifies the struc-
tural changes that the coefficients underwent going through the crisis, always compared to
their pre-crisis levels in 2004, and Figures 1.10-1.11 plot the time-path of these structural
changes for the coefficients of the two variables that capture liquidity risk. The results indi-
cate that high levels of unused lines of credit for real estate loans and low levels of reliance on
stable core-deposit funding resulted in decreased lending propensity. The structural changes
for core-deposit funding are statistically significant for all years. The changes for unused
lines of credit for real estate loans are statistically significant only for 2007 and 2008.
[Table 1.5 about here]
[Figures 1.10-1.11 about here]
In addition to the effects of liquidity risk, the results also show a negative effect on lending
supply coming from exposure to real estate loans, with the effect becoming stronger in the
final stages of the crisis. This could be the result of a loan rebalancing mechanism but could
also reflect actual and/or expected losses stemming from non-performing loans. With regards
to open-end loans secured by real estate (loans resulting from drawdowns on home equity
lines of credit for example), these loans have a time-lag in the revelation of strains on the
borrower’s repayment schedule. Even though the loans were properly accounted for on the
balance sheets of lenders both during and after the crisis, significant portions of them were
still within their draw period. This means that the recipients of these loans are providing
only interest payments and have not moved to a full amortization schedule, the sudden
commencement of which could result in a mass of writeoffs on these loans.34 This could be
34Exposure to HELOCs is an ongoing concern for banks and repeatedly discussed, for example, in Citi-
groups’s annual reports for 2009-2011
28
an explanation for the increase in the negative response to high holdings of open-end loans
observed during the later stages of the crisis.
1.7.3 Large-small Bank Dichotomy
The results discussed in the previous subsection identified the response of a heterogeneous set
of lenders. The literature has traditionally studied differences in bank behavior by dividing
lenders across the size dimension, as this is the dimension most likely to sort out the major
differences in important unobservables between the two groups.35 Revisiting the tables of
summary statistics for lenders, for example, one can clearly observe that smaller lenders are
less exposed to the two sources of liquidity risk discussed in this paper.
To test for the presence of a large-small bank dichotomy in the results, I divide the sample
into small (Assets<$1 billion) and large (Assets>$1 billion) lenders and study differences in
the lending behavior of lenders in each sample. The $1 billion threshold is in line with FRS
reporting guidelines. The division is based on the average asset size of each lender in all the
observations. The use of the average size ensures that I do not induce frequent exits and
re-entries in the subsamples, due to lenders with asset size around the threshold switching
between the two groups.36
To display some initial suggestive evidence of the presence of a dichotomy in the sample
of lenders, Figure 1.12 plots the time-path of the approval rates for the complete sample but
also for the subsamples of small and large lenders. As expected, due to a size effect, the
market average is driven primarily by the behavior of large lenders.37 Approval rates are
35See Allen and Saunders (1986) for differences in the costs faced in the federal funds market, Kashyap
and Stein (2000) for differences in the strength of the bank lending channel of transmission of monetary
policy.
36The results are in no way affected by using the actual asset size and re-categorizing the lenders every
year as appropriate.
37Regarding estimation, each observation in the second stage is weighted equally so the second-stage results
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noticeably lower for larger lenders. There is a monotonic, albeit small, drop in the approval
rates of small lenders that seems to level off by 2010. The decline in approval rates is much
sharper for large lenders, with significant declines experienced as early as 2006; a reversal of
this trend takes place in 2009 and approval rates level off by 2010.
[Figure 1.12 about here]
Approval rates, of course, capture the net effect of demand and supply factors. Though
suggestive, the above evidence is thus not definitive proof of the presence of a dichotomy in
the supply of mortgage credit. To test for differences in the effect of liquidity risk on the
supply of mortgage credit for the two categories of lenders, I re-estimate the second stage
separately for each sub-sample and the results are shown in Tables 1.6-1.7.
[Tables 1.6-1.7 about here]
The results indicate that a large-small lender dichotomy is indeed present in the sample.
Though the time-path of the coefficients for each lender category is consistent in shape and
direction with the one obtained for the whole sample, it is now clear that the effects are much
stronger for larger lenders compared to smaller ones. This suggests that empirical studies
which fail to account for this dichotomy will produce underestimates of the true effects of
liquidity risk on the contraction of credit.
For smaller lenders, liquidity risk has a statistically significant effect only at the epicenter
of the crisis in 2008. By contrast, for larger lenders the effect of core-deposit funding is
statistically significant for all the years from 2006 to 2010, and the effect of unused lines
of credit is statistically significant for all the years from 2006 to 2008. The size of the
coefficients is also appreciably larger for larger lenders. These non-linearities could be driven
are not driven by the behavior of any one lender in particular.
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by the higher levels of exposure of larger lenders to both wholesale funding and unused lines
of credit.
The estimates suggest that the relative immunity to monetary policy tightening enjoyed
by larger lenders38 does not extend to funding shocks coming from the markets for wholesale
funding, high exposures to which can quickly amplify such shocks. The results now more
clearly indicate differences in the timing of the effects between the two sources of liquidity
risk. With reference to the estimates for larger lenders shown in Table 1.7, the contraction
in the supply of mortgage credit due to high levels of exposure to unused lines of credit came
to full effect as early as 2006, persisted through to 2008 but did not extend past that year.
The effect of high exposure to wholesale funding reached its peak in 2008 but extended with
diminished intensity past the end of the crisis in 2009.
The second-stage results shown in this section use far fewer observations than comparable
studies relying just on call report data do. This is partly because the focus of this paper is on
the subset of commercial banks which are mortgage lenders and largely because the lending
decisions are only observed at the year level thus yielding just a single annual, instead of
four quarterly, observations per lender per year. A consequence of this limitation is that I
cannot track the crisis with the quarterly precision of other studies. Despite such limitations
in the data, the estimation method fares well in tracking the different phases of the crisis
with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
1.8 Robustness Tests
This section discusses a number of robustness tests. The results prove robust to the inclusion
of additional demand-side observables, suggesting that the identification strategy does indeed
38Due to their comparative advantage in the markets for wholesale funding (as in Kashyap and Stein
(2000)
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robustly isolate supply-side from demand-side factors. Also, the results remain unaffected
by the inclusion of a richer set of covariates in the second stage, hold under the second-
stage specification employed by Cornett et al. (2011), and are robust to a number of other
alternative specifications.
1.8.1 Potential Omitted Variable Bias in the First Stage
The first stage of the identification strategy does not aim at providing a complete model
for the loan approval decision but rather seeks to isolate the component of that decision
which is driven solely by supply-side mechanisms. The set of control variables used, though
extensive, is not exhaustive and this may give rise to concerns pertaining to omitted variable
bias. Omitted variables in the first stage can bias second stage results if and only if (i) the
lender-year effects estimated in the first stage are "contaminated" by such omitted variable
bias and (ii) the bias correlates with shocks to liquidity risk.39
More concretely, one potential challenge to the first-stage results is the absence of any
control variables measured at the lender-county-year level. Such variables would control, for
example, for different branches of a bank engaging in different lending practices in differ-
ent locations. Such lender-specific spatially-heterogeneous responses could potentially bias
the estimated coefficients for lender-year effects. Examples of variables capturing such in-
teractions might include securitization rates,40 subprime mortgage activity, loan portfolio
concentration, etc..., all measured at the lender-year-county level.
A second potential concern is that, for some lenders, the relevant market may not be the
39Using second-stage regressors that are exogenous to first-stage unobservables is the standard method
employed in the literature to deal with first-stage bias carrying through to the second stage. See, for example,
the two-stage estimation strategy used in Kashyap and Stein (2000), Campello (2002), Cetorelli and Goldberg
(forthcoming).
40Shown by Mian and Sufi (2009) to matter for the correct identification of lending drivers before the
crisis. Keys et al. (2010) also show that the ease of securitization led to higher default rates for applicants
with almost identical risk profiles.
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county but rather a more refined subdivision; one might thus need to look to an additional
level of geographic refinement to capture location effects adequately.41 Levels of unemploy-
ment, for example, may vary within a county. To the extent that some lenders (due to size
or other strategic reasons) operate in distinct smaller areas, such as census-tract units, the
county-year fixed effects may not capture such variation adequately; again, the concern is
that this may bias the lender-year estimates.42
My strategy for addressing the concerns expressed above, is to include additional ob-
servables in the first stage, re-estimate the first stage, and show that (i) the new estimates
of the lender-year effects are very highly correlated with the ones obtained from the origi-
nal, parsimonious model thus suggesting that the original specification does robustly isolate
supply-side from demand-side effects, and (ii) the second stage results remain virtually un-
changed, indicating that whatever insignificant amount of bias might have originally carried
through to the second stage does not correlate with liquidity risk.
To address the first challenge discussed above, I include the rates at which originated
loans were sold to a host of different types of intermediaries, local market shares, loan con-
centration rates,43 and a measure of the proportion of originated loans which were classified
as subprime;44 all variables are measured at the lender-county-year level.
41A similar concern is expressed in Mian and Sufi (2009)
42The first stage estimation drops a lot of small lenders who collectively account for less than 0.5% of
total activity in the mortgage market. As these lenders are the ones most likely to operate within more
refined definitions of location, this second potential source of bias is not likely to have a strong presence in
the results.
43See Loutskina and Strahan (2011) for example, for empirical evidence indicating a negative relationship
between lender geographic concentration and credit-rationing
44The HMDA dataset does not explicitly identify subprime applications. For originated loans, however,
it does contain a rate-spread measure reported for borrowing rates exceeding a certain threshold when
compared against the rates on treasury securities of comparable maturity. Including this measure in the first
stage would force all of these observations to be dropped, since where the rate is reported the loan is known
to have originated and the logit estimation thus becomes unstable. Instead, to identify subprime activity,
where the rate-spread measure is reported I create a "subprime" dummy which I average over all originations
at the lender-county-year level and use this average as a control variable.
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To address the second challenge I would ideally want to introduce census-tract-year effects
but doing so would increase the number of fixed effects by at least an order of magnitude and
thus make the computational cost prohibitive. Instead, I include local income as a percentage
of MSA income and the percentage of minority population in the area, both measured at
the census-tract level. Should within-county variation be a significant source of bias for the
lender-year effects, the inclusion of these two variables should severely alter my first-stage
estimates. Table I provides definitions for the additional control variables used in this test.
The model I estimate is shown in Equation 1.5, where Yijt andWkt are vectors of variables
containing the additional controls discussed above and measured at the lender-county-year
and census-tract-year levels respectively.
Pr(Aijnt = 1|i, j, t,Xn, Yijt,Wkt) = Λ(Lit + Cjt + λtXn + µtYijt + θtWkt) (1.5)
The results show unambiguously that the first stage robustly identifies the supply-side
component of the lending decision, even in the absence of economically significant demand-
side covariates in the original parsimonious model. Table 1.8 shows the first stage coefficients
for the estimation using the richer set of covariates described above. For the most part, the
coefficients of the loan/borrower variables in the original parsimonious specification retain
their signs and orders of magnitude with the observed changes. This indicates that the
omission of some demand-side characteristics in the original specification may have induced
a slight bias on these coefficients, which should be expected as the coefficients may be
proxying for a host of other demand-side unobservables. The coefficients of the additional
variables introduced in Equation 1.5 are shown in Table 1.9.
[Tables 1.8-1.9 about here]
Importantly, Table 1.10 shows that the correlations between the estimated lender-year
effects in the parsimonious and richer specifications are almost perfectly correlated for every
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year of the estimation. This is a clear indication that demand-side unobservables in the first
stage are either (i) staying in the error term or (ii) slightly biasing demand-side coefficients
while leaving the supply-side effects intact. Tables 1.11-1.12 prove this point further by
estimating the second stage (for the split sample) using the lender-year effects obtained
from the first stage specification with the richer set of controls. The results in the second
stage remain largely unaffected, with the coefficients for liquidity risk moving slightly in the
direction of a more aggressive response.
[Tables 1.10-1.12 about here]
1.8.2 Potential Omitted Variable Bias in the Second Stage
Concerns similar in spirit to the ones discussed for the first stage can also be raised for
the second stage of the model. Business cycle effects may be experienced differently in the
cross section depending on the bank’s loan portfolio choices. Unused lines of credit for non-
real estate loans could generate liquidity shocks. The lending decision may depend on the
aggregate demand for loans faced by the bank. Bank profitability or loan default rates may
affect the lending decision. The key results in this paper could thus be biased if any of these
omitted variables correlates with any or both of the two sources of liquidity risk.
To test for omitted variable bias in the second stage, I reestimate Equation 1.4 this time
augmenting the set of controls to include the shares of consumer & industrial loans as well
as loans to individuals in the illiquid asset portfolio,45 total residential loan defaults over
total assets,46 unused lines of credit for non-real estate loans, the return on average assets,
45To the extent that different loan-types correspond to activity in different sectors of the economy, the
loan-decomposition variables provide a more refined measure of the bank’s exposure to the business cycle.
The degree of exposure to each loan category can also affect liquidity and hence lending. Loutskina (2011)
proposes an index for "bank loan portfolio" liquidity and shows that a loan portfolio with a high proportion
of "easier" to securitize assets leads to lower levels of bank liquidity maintained by the bank and to increased
lending activity.
46The results remain unchanged if I use total loan defaults over assets, or residential real estate loan
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and the total dollar value of mortgage loan demand from the first stage scaled by the size of
the residential real estate loans already on the balance sheet of the lender. The results for
the small and large lender subsamples are shown in Tables 1.13-1.14, where for comparison
purposes I used the parsimonious model in the first stage. The coefficients on unused lines
of credit for real estate loans and on core-deposit funding are very close to the original ones
reported in Tables 1.6-1.7. For completeness, Tables 1.15-1.16 show the second-stage results
for a model that includes the augmented set of controls both in the first and the second
stage.
[Tables 1.13-1.16 about here]
1.8.3 Alternative Specification Using an Interaction with the TED-spread
An alternative specification that also aims at identifying the exogenous effect of liquidity risk
on lending, is the one employed by Cornett et al. (2011), which I adapt to fit the framework
of this paper in Equation 1.6, where TEDt is the average TED spread for year t:47
Lit = αi + κt + γzZit−1 + γcControlsit−1 + δz(Zit−1 · TEDt−1) + δc(Controlsit−1 · TEDt−1) + it (1.6)
The TED spread measures funding strains for the banking sector, and as an aggregate
measure is understood to change exogenously to an individual lender’s financial condition.
The effect of liquidity risk can thus be captured by a term which interacts liquidity risk
variables with the TED spread. One limitation of my dataset is that I only observe lending
decisions at an annual frequency. By necessity, therefore, I use the average TED spread over
each year. Figure 1.13 shows monthly and annual averages for the TED spread starting in
defaults over residential real estate loans are used instead.




[Figure 1.13 about here]
This plot demonstrates the "mechanics" of the identification strategy under this specifi-
cation. Observing the time-series variation at the annual level, one can see the TED spread
widening significantly, first in 2007 and then even further in 2008. With lending-propensity
measured at the annual level, the interaction term will thus act as a dummy of sorts - a
weighting mechanism- indicating whether the response to high levels of liquidity risk was
disproportionately higher in 2007-2008 compared to the other periods. This specification
can thus be seen as adding the identifying restriction that the time-path of the estimated
coefficients of the model shown in Equation 1.4 should follow the time-series variation in the
TED spread.
I estimate the specification shown in Equation 1.6 using the additional sets of controls
discussed in Subsections 1 and 2 above. The results, shown in Table 1.17, are consistent with
those obtained using the structural changes approach of Equation 1.4. I obtain statistically
significant coefficients of the same sign and order of magnitude as before,48 with the statistical
significance for core deposits lost for smaller lenders.49
[Table 1.17 about here]
The TED spread captures funding strains for the banking sector and thus tracks shocks
in the markets for wholesale funding fairly accurately. As the markets for wholesale funding
collapsed in 2007-2008, to the extent that some of the banks’ customers experienced liquidity
48Order of magnitude comparisons are in general not appropriate when comparing an interaction with a
dummy variable (structural breaks model) to an interaction with a continuous variable (TED spread model),
but given the earlier discussion on the workings of the TED spread interaction, and the fact that the TED
spread in its peak years is of the order of magnitude of 1-1.5 units of measurement (percentage points) a
simple sanity-check type comparison of the coefficients can be safely performed here.
49The results also hold if observations for 2004 are excluded from the sample.
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strains at time-periods other than 2007-2008, the interaction term may not capture the
effect of liquidity risk stemming from drawdowns on lines of credit accurately through time.
For example, real estate developers drawing down on lines of credit for commercial real
estate loans may have been induced to do so by exogenous (unanticipated) shocks to their
profitability. Unable to fund new projects from profits, they draw down their credit lines thus
inducing negative shocks to the bank’s liquidity. If the levels of such drawdowns are in excess
of the normal levels anticipated and provisioned for by the banks’ liquidity management
operations, then they will impose exogenous (unanticipated) shocks to bank liquidity. If,
furthermore, such shocks took place earlier than 2007, then the TED spread interaction
term will not adequately capture the full effect of exogenous shocks to liquidity from line of
credit drawdowns on lending propensity.50 The summary statistics presented in an earlier
section showed that drawdowns on lines of credit did lead the collapse of the markets for
wholesale funding. In addition, the plot of the Case-Shiller index shown in Figure 1.14,
suggests that shocks to the real estate market might have been in place as early as 2006,
which is when housing prices first started showing signs of the impending decline.
[Figure 1.14 about here]
1.8.4 Unobserved Applicant Exits
Tighter bank lending standards may induce unobserved exits. For example, a rise in down-
payment requirements may force applicants who understand that they are less likely to be
approved for a loan (under the new more stringent standards) to exit the market for mortgage
loans. These "potential" applicants would thus not be documented in HMDA data.
50Even in the presence of fully functional markets for wholesale funding (low TED spread) exogenous
shocks to liquidity from drawdowns on lines of credit may still induce rationing, assuming that the lender
already operates on the margin of a regulatory (or market) liquidity constraint, which would make raising
additional funds in the markets for wholesale funding undesirable.
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For many applicants such tightening of lending policies becomes evident after an ap-
plication for a mortgage loan is filed and they thus do not exit the market before their
application is registered in HMDA data. Also, one of the additional controls included in the
richer second-stage specification (discussed in subsection B above) is a measure of aggregate
demand for the lender, which will capture the effect of sudden decreases in demand driven
by non-demand related factors.
Assuming, however, that unobserved exits do somehow affect the reported data, a trou-
bling scenario would be one in which the degree of tightening of lending standards that
leads to such exits correlates with liquidity risk. If that was the case, however, then (i)
unobserved exits would be positively correlated with liquidity risk, and (ii) unobserved exits
would induce a positive bias on the supply of credit estimated in the first stage, since the
estimated lending propensities would not account for the unobserved exits of lower quality
applicants. The net effect would be to bias the absolute value of the estimated coefficients
for liquidity risk in a positive direction (positive bias for unused lines of credit and negative
bias for core-deposit funding). Under such a scenario, the second-stage estimates would be
lower bounds in magnitude to the true effects. Therefore, the results would have been even
stronger had this source of bias not been present.
1.8.5 Value of Intangibles for Core Deposits
The previous robustness tests established that the effect captured by core deposits is due to
the level of core-deposit funding and not due to a correlation with some unobservable demand
or bank characteristic. Still, one could argue that the observed effect is reflecting more than
liquidity risk. For example, it may be related to other core-deposit intangibles, such as lower
funding costs. Calomiris and Nissim (2012), however, show that the value of such intangibles
declines in a low interest rate environment, such as the one prevalent during the years of the
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crisis.51 Hence, if the value of such intangibles is indeed also captured by the coefficient on
core-deposit funding, then the observed increase in the size of this coefficient moving through
the crisis (in the presence of a decreasing value for other core-deposit intangibles) suggests
that the effect of liquidity risk is even stronger than estimated.
1.8.6 Other Robustness Tests
In other tests not reported here, the results proved robust to the use of alternative definitions
of asset liquidity excluding agency obligations or including all security holdings except for
mortgage backed and asset backed securities, to the use of alternative definitions for core
deposits including insured brokered deposits and including uninsured brokered deposits, to
the use of a risk-weighted measure of capital adequacy, to the inclusion of the ratios of private
and agency mortgage backed securities as well as the ratio of asset backed securities to illiquid
assets in the set of controls, and to the use of September call report data to ameliorate the
effects of end-of-year window-dressing operations on the bank’s balance sheet.
1.9 Economic Significance
In this section I estimate the economic impact of liquidity risk on credit origination in the
mortgage market. I first estimate the increase in the dollar volume of originations that would
have been occurred had the banks not adjusted their credit supply in response to liquidity
risk experienced during 2007-2009. I then estimate the increase in the dollar volume of
originations that would have resulted from the banks adjusting their credit supply in response
to liquidity risk, but operating during the crisis with levels of liquidity risk reduced by one
51Although in Calomiris and Nissim (2012) value creation extends into 2008, as argued by the authors,
this is likely due to the use of a market-based measure of value creation. Commercial banks, however, are
likely to internalize the effects of the drop in interest rates on core-deposit value creation with a much shorter
lag than markets do.
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standard deviation.
The estimates rely on the use of two different models (i) the model with structural breaks
(Equation 1.4) and (ii) the model with the TED spread interactions (Equation 1.6). I use the
richer set of control variables described in the previous section in both the first and second
stage of estimation.52 The models are estimated on a split sample for small and large banks,
allowing for the use of a different set of coefficients and standard deviations for each group.
The first step in this process is to compute baseline values for expected level of mortgage
originations for each year. In particular, for each year I first use the logit model of the
approval decision to compute the predicted probability of approval for each loan. I then
multiply the predicted probability of approval by the loan amount and sum over all loans
to get a base level for the expected volume of mortgage originations predicted by the first
stage model for each year. Loans that have been approved but not taken, and hence not
originated, are excluded from the sample.53 The results are shown in Table 1.18, where we
can see that the first-stage model predicts total originations reasonably precisely for each
year.
[Table 1.18 about here]
I then compute the change in mortgage originations that would have resulted had banks
not changed their responses to high levels of liquidity risk in 2007-2009. In this counterfac-
tual, the banks retain their level of exposure to each source of liquidity risk but do not adjust
credit supply to respond to these risks. I proceed in two steps. First, I use the second-stage
52As the estimated coefficients are very similar in magnitude in all specifications, the results remain
unchanged if the original parsimonious specifications are used instead.
53The results remain qualitatively unchanged if I keep approved but not taken loans in the sample and
thus run the counterfactual analysis on loan approvals rather than loan originations. The only difference is
that the predicted base volume is now even closer to the actual volume of approved loans in the data (within
$1 billion - $2 billion for any year). This is to be expected since the first stage uses approval rather than
origination as the decision variable.
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model to estimate the change in lending propensity that would have resulted from the banks
not adjusting their responses to each (or both) sources of liquidity risk. I then substitute
the adjusted lending propensities back into the first-stage model to compute the adjusted
probability of approval for each loan, and from that the expected volume of originations.54
For the model with structural breaks (Equation 1.4), to compute the independent effect of
each source of liquidity risk on lending propensity, I set the corresponding interaction term to
zero for each year; to compute the combined effect, I set both interaction terms to zero. For
each source of liquidity risk, the resulting increase in the coefficient for the lender-year effect
is equal to the product of the level of exposure to the risk times the previously estimated
structural change of the coefficient for that source of risk; to get the combined increase, I
add the two adjustments. For the model with the TED spread interactions (Equation 1.6),
I reduce the TED spread down to its 2004 level. The corresponding individual adjustments
involve increasing the lender-year effects by the triple product of the previously estimated
coefficient for the TED spread interaction term, the level of exposure to the source of liquidity
risk, and the change in the TED spread from its 2004 level.
The final step is a straightforward substitution of the adjusted lender-year effects back
into the first stage model to arrive at the expected adjusted dollar volume of originations.
I repeat this exercise separately for each of the years of the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
The level of detail in the HMDA dataset allows me to use demand covariates at their actual
values for each individual loan application. The first stage model thus does not restrict
adjustments in credit supply to affecting all lending decisions uniformly. Rather, the impact
on the lending decision will depend on the probability of approval in the baseline scenario,
which is determined by the baseline values of demand-side characteristics and supply-side
lending propensity. For example, for the same increase in the level of a lender-year effect,
54Because of the non-linearity of the first stage, the combined effect of removing both sources of liquidity
risk simultaneously is not equal to the sum of the effects of removing each source independently.
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loan applications with an already high baseline probability of approval will experience a
smaller increase in the probability of approval than ones with a lower baseline probability of
approval.
Table 1.19 shows the estimated increase in the volume of originations in $billion (panel
a) and also as a percentage of the total base volume for each year (panel b). Each panel
shows separate estimates for scenaria in which the sources of liquidity risk are removed
independently or simultaneously. The first three columns show estimates using the model
with structural changes and the remaining three columns show estimates using the model
with the TED spread interactions.
[Table 1.19 about here]
As can be seen in Table 1.19, liquidity risk had the largest impact on the dollar volume
of mortgage originations in 2007, a result driven by the larger size of the mortgage market
during that year. The two models estimate the combined effect for 2007 to be between $20.9
billion and $31.9 billion. As a percentage of the dollar volume of originations, the largest
effect is observed at the peak of the crisis in 2008. For that year, the two models estimate
the effect to be between 8.1% and 9.9%.
Had the banks’ credit operations not adjusted their response levels to liquidity risk in
2007-2009, the total combined increase in mortgage originations would have been between
$41.5 billion and $61.9 billion, or 5.2%-7.8% of total mortgage originations for the period.
Although the estimates indicate that for 2007-2009 the two sources of liquidity risk generated
contractions of the same order of magnitude, funding stresses in the markets for wholesale
funding have contributed more to the overall effect.
In a second counterfactual, I estimate the increase in mortgage originations that would
have resulted had the banks adjusted their responses to liquidity risk, but operated during
2007-2009 with a one standard deviation reduction in their levels of liquidity risk; that is,
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increasing the degree of core-deposit funding and decreasing the exposure to unused lines
of credit for real estate loans.55 In this counterfactual, banks’ credit supply responds to
liquidity risk but the levels of exposure to liquidity risk are lower.
For the model with structural breaks, for each source of liquidity risk, the adjustment
involves an increase of the lender-year effect equal to the product of the structural break of
the coefficient for liquidity risk times the size of the change in the level of liquidity risk. For
the model with the TED spread interactions, the adjustment results in an increase equal
to the triple product of the TED spread, the change in exposure to liquidity risk, and the
coefficient of the TED spread interaction term. Table 1.20 shows the resulting estimates.
[Table 1.20 about here]
The estimates indicate that for the period 2007-2009 as a whole, the total combined
increase in mortgage originations would have been between $24.2 billion and $27.4 billion,
or 3.1%-3.5% of total originations for that period. The largest increase in the dollar volume
of originations would have occurred in 2007 ($12.5 billion - $15 billion) and the largest
percentage increase would have occurred in 2008 (4.5%-4.6%).
Consistent with findings reported earlier in the paper, the estimates obtained using the
model with flexible structural breaks are comparable to the ones obtained using the model
with the TED spread interactions. As discussed earlier, this study does not fully capture the
aggregate effects of liquidity risk on lending; these numbers are thus conservative estimates
of the true effect.
55The changes in the levels of liquidity risk are censored where needed to ensure that (i) the adjusted
values of unused lines of credit do not fall below 0 and (ii) the sum of the equity capital and adjusted core
deposit asset ratio does not exceed 1.
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1.10 Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 offers a unique opportunity to refine our understanding of
the mechanisms through which liquidity risk materializes on the balance sheets of banks
and contributes to the subsequent collapse of credit. In this paper I use micro-level data on
mortgage loan applications to estimate the extent to which liquidity risk contributed to the
decline in the supply of mortgage credit. The data allow me to identify shifts in loan supply
at the actual point of the approval decision for granting a mortgage loan and purge the
lending decision from demand-side effects with a greater degree of precision than previous
studies.
The results suggest that liquidity risk was an important driver behind the credit crunch.
In particular, banks with higher levels of unused lines of credit for real estate loans and lower
levels of core-deposit funding, tightened their lending standards more than banks that were
less exposed to these sources of liquidity risk. A large-small bank dichotomy is present in
the second stage of the estimation. Larger lenders responded more aggressively to higher
levels of exposure to liquidity risk. The identification strategy also allows me to track the
impact of liquidity risk through time and show that the effect of exposure to credit lines
preceded the effect of high dependence on wholesale funding. The results prove robust to
the inclusion of a much richer array of covariates, both in the first and second stages, hold
under the second-stage specification employed by Cornett et al (2011), and are robust to a
number of alternative specifications.
In counterfactual analysis, I estimate that the total contraction in mortgage lending due
to the increased responsiveness to liquidity risk during 2007-2009 was $41.5 billion - $61.9
billion, or 5.2%-7.8% of total mortgage originations during that period. I also estimate that
had banks operated during the crisis of 2007-2009 with their levels of exposure to each source
of liquidity risk reduced by one standard deviation, this would have resulted in a combined
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increase in the dollar volume of mortgage originations of $24.2 billion - $27.4 billion (3.1%-
3.5%).
Access to the markets for wholesale funding provides the funding margin which allows
lenders to rapidly respond to profitable loan opportunities as those arise. Excessive use of
this margin can, however, lead to high levels of exposure to wholesale funding and this paper
showed that such exposure can in turn result in a severe contraction of credit supply in the
event of actual or anticipated disruptions in the markets for wholesale funding. An interesting
research question would be the design of optimal funding-mix rules for the bank, which take
into account both the upside and the downside of reliance on wholesale funding over the full
business cycle. This question can also be approached from the standpoint of a regulator,
where the two competing objectives would be the facilitation of credit-provision and the
safeguarding of the economy against a recurrence of the contraction of credit experienced
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
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Figure 1.1: Stylized model of the loan approval process
(a) Loan supply approval as targeting a distributional cutoff
(b) Contraction of lending due to a simultaneous shifts in demand and supply
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Figure 1.2: Balance-sheet dynamics. Panel (a) shows a stylized balance sheet for a bank. Panels (b), (c)
and (d) show a $1 withdrawal of wholesale funding, a $1 drawdown on an unused line of credit, and a $1
origination of a new mortgage loan respectively.
BALANCE SHEET OFF- BALANCE SHEET
ASSETS LIABILITIES Unused lines of credit
Liquid assets Core deposits
Mortgage loans Wholesale funding
Other loans Capital
(a) Stylized bank balance sheet and off-balance sheet exposure
BALANCE SHEET OFF- BALANCE SHEET
ASSETS LIABILITIES Unused lines of credit
Liquid assets -$1 Core deposits
Mortgage loans Wholesale funding -$1
Other loans Capital
(b) Balance sheet adjustments for a $1 withdrawal of wholesale funding
BALANCE SHEET OFF- BALANCE SHEET
ASSETS LIABILITIES Unused lines of credit -$1
Liquid assets -$1 Core deposits
Mortgage loans Wholesale funding
Other loans +$1 Capital
(c) Balance sheet and off-balance sheet adjustments for a $1 drawdown on a line of credit
BALANCE SHEET OFF- BALANCE SHEET
ASSETS LIABILITIES Unused lines of credit
Liquid assets -$1 Core deposits
Mortgage loans +$1 Wholesale funding
Other loans Capital
(d) Balance sheet adjustments for a $1 mortgage loan origination
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Figure 1.3: Mortgage loan originations for commercial banks for 2004, 2006-2010. The left axis measures
the number (million) and the right axis the dollar volume ($billion) of originations.
Figure 1.4: Mortgage loan applications to commercial banks for 2004, 2006-2010. The left axis measures
the number (million) and the right axis the dollar volume ($billion) of originations.
Figure 1.5: Mortgage loan approval rates of commercial banks for 2004, 2006-2010.
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Figure 1.6: Core-deposit funding scaled by total assets for small and large lenders. The values correspond
to beginning of year levels.
Figure 1.7: Unused commitments for real estate loans scaled by total assets for small and large lenders.
The values correspond to beginning of year levels.
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Figure 1.8: Level and confidence intervals for the coefficient on core deposits for the specification shown
in Equation 1.3. Coefficients are at annual levels. The effect of liquidity risk is the structural change from
2004 levels.
Figure 1.9: Level and confidence intervals for the coefficient on unused lines of credit for real estate loans
for the specification shown in Equation 1.3. Coefficients are at annual levels. The effect of liquidity risk is
the structural change from 2004 levels.
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Figure 1.10: Level and confidence intervals for the coefficient on core deposits for the specification shown
in Equation 1.4. Coefficients are structural adjustments from 2004 levels.
Figure 1.11: Level and confidence intervals for the coefficient on unused lines of credit for the specification
shown in Equation 1.4. Coefficients are structural adjustments from 2004 levels.
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Figure 1.12: Mortgage loan approval rates of commercial banks for 2004, 2006-10 by asset category.
Approval rates are shown for all banks, but also separately for the split sample of small banks (Assets<$1
billion) and large banks (Assets>$1 billion)
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Figure 1.13: The TED spread for the period 2000-2011. This figure shows monthly and annual averages of
the TED spread from 2000 to 2011. The TED spread measures funding stresses in the banking sector and
is defined as the difference in interest rates between 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month Treasury bill.




Measured at the application level
Minority HMDA Applicant is a minority
Female HMDA Applicant is female
Sex Not Reported HMDA Applicant’s sex is not reported
Entity HMDA Applicant is an entity
log Income HMDA Natural logarithm of applicant’s income
log Amount HMDA Natural logarithm of the loan amount
Loan to Income Ratio HMDA Loan amount divided by income
Manufactured HMDA Loan is for manufactured housing
Improvement HMDA Loan is for house improvement
Jumbo HMDA Loan falls in the jumbo category
Second lien HMDA Loan is secured by junior lien
No lien HMDA Loan not secured by lien on dwelling
Measured at the lender-county-year level
LCPctSold HMDA Number of same year securitizations divided by originations
LCPctSoldGSE HMDA As above, sold to a Government Sponsored Enterprise
LCPctSoldSec HMDA As above, sold for a private securitization
LCPctSoldAffiliate HMDA As above, sold to a bank affiliate
LCPctSoldCommercial HMDA As above, sold to a commercial bank
LCPctSoldOther HMDA As above, sold to other institution
LCPctSoldMortgage HMDA As above, sold to mortgage company
BLPortfolioConcentration HMDA Applications in ijt divided by total applications to lender at year t
BL Market Share HMDA Lender number of applications in jt, divided by total number of
applications to all lenders in jt
BLPctSubprime HMDA Total subprime in ijt divided by total originations in ijt
Measured at the census-tract-year level
Tract income HMDA Average income as percentage of MSA income
Tract Pct Minority HMDA Percent of population who are minority
Measured at the lender-year level
log Assets Call Report Natural logarithm of assets
Tier1 leverage ratio Call Report Tier 1 capital, divided by assets
ROAA Call Report Net income divided by average assets
Liquid assets Call Report The sum of cash, federal funds sold, securities purchased under
agreement to resell, treasury securities, and agency obligations
Illiquid Assets Call Report Total assets - Liquid assets
Closed-end RE loans Closed-end revolving loans secured by 1-4 family residential prop-
erties divided by illiquid assets
Open-end RE loans Call Report Open-end loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties divided
by illiquid assets
Other RE loans Call Report All other loans secured by real estate divided by illiquid assets
Commercial and industrial Call Report Commercial and industrial loans divided by illiquid assets
Loans to individuals Call Report Loans to individuals divided by illiquid assets
Default rate for RRE loans Call Report Loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties over 90 days late
plus loans not accruing divided by total assets
Core-deposit funding Call Report The sum of demand deposits, MMDA and other savings deposits,
NOW, ATS and other interest-bearing transaction accounts, and
insured time deposits scaled by total assets
Lines of credit for non-RE loans Call Report Unused lines of credit for non-real estate loans
Lines of credit for RE loans Call Report Unused lines of credit for real estate loans
RRE loan demand HMDA/ Call
Report
Total dollar volume of HMDA applications to lender divided by
book value of stock of residential real estate loans of the lender
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for loan/borrower characteristics 2004, 2006-2010.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics for bank characteristics 2004, 2006-2010. The left panel displays statistics for banks with an average asset
size of less than $1 billion and the right panel for banks with an average asset size greater than $1 billion. The averages are taken over the
six years of observations. Bank variables are obtained from end of year (fourth quarter) call reports.
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Table 1.4: First stage results for the specification shown in Equation 1.2. Each year was estimated
independently, with observations for lenders with a total combined number of applications accounting for
less than 0.5% of total market activity dropped.
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Table 1.5: Estimated coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.4. The first column shows the
base 2004 values and the other columns show structural adjustments from 2004 levels.
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Table 1.6: Estimated coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.4 for lenders with Assets<$1
billion. The first column shows the base 2004 values and the other columns show structural adjustments
from 2004 levels.
Table 1.7: Estimated coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.4 for lenders with Assets>$1
billion. The first column shows the base 2004 values and the other columns show structural adjustments
from 2004 levels.
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Table 1.8: First stage results for the model with a more expansive set of controls shown in Equation
1.5. Each year was estimated independently, with observations for lenders with a total combined number
of applications accounting for less than 0.5% of total market activity dropped. The table shows coefficients
and standard errors for the subset of controls that is common with the specification shown in Equation 1.2.
Table 1.9: First stage results for the model with a more expansive set of controls shown in Equation
1.5. Each year was estimated independently, with observations for lenders with a total combined number
of applications accounting for less than 0.5% of total market activity dropped. The table shows coefficients
and standard errors for the subset of controls that were added in addition to the original controls used in
Equation 1.2.
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Table 1.10: Yearly correlations for the estimated lender-year effects between the parsimonious first stage
and the one using the more expansive set of controls.
Table 1.11: Estimated second-stage coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.4 for lenders with
Assets<$1 billion using the richer first stage shown in Equation 1.5. The first column shows the base 2004
values and the other columns show structural adjustments from 2004 levels.
Table 1.12: Estimated second-stage coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.4 for lenders with
Assets>$1 billion using the richer first stage shown in Equation 1.5. The first column shows the base 2004
values and the other columns show structural adjustments from 2004 levels.
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Table 1.13: Estimated second-stage coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.4 for lenders with
Assets<$1 billion using a richer set of covariates in the second stage. For comparison purposes with Table
1.6, the parsimonious model was used in the first stage. The first column shows the base 2004 values and
the other columns show structural adjustments from 2004 levels.
Table 1.14: Estimated second-stage coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.4 for lenders with
Assets>$1 billion using a richer set of covariates in the second stage. For comparison purposes with Table
1.7, the parsimonious model was used in the first stage. The first column shows the base 2004 values and
the other columns show structural adjustments from 2004 levels.
63
Table 1.15: Estimated second-stage coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.4 for lenders with
Assets<$1 billion using a richer set of covariates both in the first and second stages. The first column shows
the base 2004 values and the other columns show structural adjustments from 2004 levels.
Table 1.16: Estimated second-stage coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.4 for lenders with
Assets>$1 billion using a richer set of covariates both in the first and second stages. The first column shows
the base 2004 values and the other columns show structural adjustments from 2004 levels.
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Table 1.17: Estimated second-stage coefficients for the specification shown in Equation 1.6 (TED spread
interactions). The more expansive sets of controls were used both in the first and second stage. The effect
of liquidity risk is captured by the interaction terms (xTED column) for Lines of credit for RE loans and
Core-deposit funding
Table 1.18: Actual vs predicted volume of mortgage originations. The first row lists the actual dollar
volume of mortgage originations measured in the data. The second row lists the expected dollar volume of
mortgage originations predicted by the first stage model.
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Table 1.19: Economic significance of liquidity risk under a "no crisis" counterfactual. The table shows the
economic effect of completely removing each source of liquidity risk independently or removing both of them
simultaneously. To compute the estimates, for the model with flexible structural breaks I set the interaction
terms to 0, and for the model with the TED spread interactions I set the TED spread back to its 2004 level.
Panel (a) shows the expected increases in the dollar volume of loan originations in $billion and panel (b)
shows the same increases as a percentage of the expected base volume for each year.
(a) Dollar volume of increase in originations
(b) Dollar volume of increase in originations as a percentage of expected base volume
Table 1.20: Economic significance of liquidity risk under a "reduced exposure" counterfactual. The table
shows the economic effect of reducing each source of liquidity risk independently by one standard deviation,
or reducing both of them simultaneously. The adjustments to the levels of liquidity risk are censored where
needed to ensure that (i) the adjusted values of unused lines of credit do not fall below 0 and (ii) the sum of
the adjusted core deposit and equity capital ratios does not exceed 1. Panel (a) shows the expected increases
in the dollar volume of loan originations in $billion and panel (b) shows the same increases as a percentage
of the expected base volume for each year.
(a) Dollar volume of increase in originations
(b) Dollar volume of increase in originations as a percentage of expected base volume
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Chapter 2
Commercial Bank Failures During The Great
Recession: The Real (Estate) Story
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis proceeded in phases, the onset of each phase marked by the failure
(or acquisition) of one or more large financial institutions.1 Though the main drivers of
key failures of financial institutions that took place during 2007-2008 have been discussed
extensively in the press and generated a number of scholarly articles,2 the wave of bank
failures that immediately followed the main events of the crisis received less attention.
The FDIC reported 468 bank failures during 2006-2012, with the vast majority (440) of
those failures taking place after 2008. Bank failures are of concern to policy-makers because,
1New Century Financial Corporation filed for bankruptcy in April 2007, Countrywide Financial Corpo-
ration warned of financial difficulties in July 2007 and was acquired by Bank of America in June 2008, Bear
Stearns liquidated two MBS hedge funds in July 2007 and was acquired by JPMorgan Chase & Co in March
2008, and September 2008 was the epicenter of the crisis with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac placed in gov-
ernment conservatorship, Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual filing for bankruptcy, and AIG bailed
out by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis provides a detailed
description of the timeline of the crisis on its website: http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline
2See for example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2010), Reinhart (2011), Johnson
and Mamun (2012)
67
as discussed in Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996), they result in the loss of non-
transferable components of charter value such as profitable lending relationships. Charter
value is important because the possibility of its loss helps countervail the moral hazard
problems created by the deposit insurance system (Keeley (1990)).
Bank failure is the result of the accumulation of excessive risk by banks, and bank risk
can have a direct impact on the real economy. Excessive risk-taking by banks can amplify
stresses experienced during crises, and transmit them to the real economy through the bank
credit channel. Studying the Great Depression, for example, Calomiris and Mason (2003)
show that variation in credit supply due to bank distress can explain income growth and
activity in the construction sector in 1931-1932. With a focus on the recent financial crisis,
Antoniades (2013) shows that high levels of liquidity risk led to a contraction in the supply of
mortgage credit. Antoniades (2013) conservatively estimates that commercial banks would
have originated an additional $40 billion home mortgage loans during 2007-2009 had liquidity
risk not been a concern during that period. And with the globalization of banking, the
bank channel is no longer local but can operate across borders and affect the real economy
in countries other than the one in which bank risk originated (as in Peek and Rosengren
(2000)).
Given these negative consequences of bank failure, it is important for policy-makers to
understand which particular choices made by banks, as reflected perhaps in their balance
sheet structure, increase the probability of bank failure. Though various papers have studied
bank failures during recent episodes (see for example, Cole and Gunther (1995), Estrella,
Park and Peristiani (2000), Berger and Bouwman (2009), Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Cole
and White (2012)), with the exception of Cole and White (2012) these studies rely on the use
of a standard set of predictors of failure and do not attempt to extract additional information
from the banks’ choices regarding the composition of their various portfolios.
Composition effects are important. We know, for example, that during the Great Reces-
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sion one of the primary source of stresses for commercial banks was their exposure to various
segments of the real estate sector. Any model that aims at examining the determinants of
bank failure during this period should therefore account for the different channels through
which stresses in the real estate sector were transmitted onto the banks’ balance sheets and
contributed to bank risk and subsequent bank failure. In this paper I make progress on this
front.
I identify three sources of exposure to the real estate sector. These are (1) the bank’s
loan portfolio, (2) the bank’s portfolio of marketable securities, and (3) the bank’s off-balance
sheet credit line portfolio. For each of these portfolios, I consider how choices that shifted
the composition of the portfolio towards real estate products affected the probability of bank
failure.
Using pre-crisis financial data, I first estimate a binary probit model of bank failure using
as explanatory variables standard predictors of failure not related to real estate exposures.
I then augment the model to account for portfolio choices relating to real estate products,
and find that doing so significantly increases the fit of the model. Pseudo-R2 measures of fit
indicate an approximate 70% improvement in fit for the model estimated over a sample of
small banks (assets less that $1 billion) and a 230% improvement for the model estimated
over a sample of large banks (assets greater than $1 billion). Accounting for real estate
product choices in the loan and credit line portfolios are the prime drivers of the increase in
predictive power, whereas accounting for the holdings of MBS in the portfolio of marketable
securities only adds marginally to the fit of the model.
In contrast to what the commentary surrounding the crisis would suggest, I find no
evidence that commercial banks which held more of their loans in traditional closed-end
residential real estate mortgages experienced a higher probability of failure. Instead, it was
banks which placed a greater emphasis on loans secured by multifamily properties and on
other non-household real estate loans (such as commercial real estate and land development
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projects) that were more likely to fail during the crisis. I also find that open-end residential
real estate loans (loans from home equity lines of credit) were one of the precipitating factors
in bank failures for small banks but not for large banks.
I then examine whether a high concentration of MBS in a bank’s portfolio of marketable
securities contributed to bank default risk. The results show that holdings of private-label
MBS contributed to the failure rates of large banks but not to small banks, possibly a result
of the relatively small exposure that small banks had to this asset category. Holdings of
agency-issued MBS on the other hand, are associated with a statistically and economically
less significant increase in the probability of failure of small banks.
Last, I show that off-balance sheet exposures from lines of credit for real estate loans also
contributed to bank failures. Lines of credit extended to non-household real estate borrowers
- such as for commercial real estate, land development projects, etc...- raised the probability
of failure for both large and small banks. Exposure to lines of credit for home equity loans
on the other hand, is not related to bank failure in a statistically significant way.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant work and places
the contribution of this study within the preexisting literature on bank risk and bank failure.
Section 3 describes the data sources. Section 4 discusses the timeline of bank failures, and
evolution of bank-risk more broadly, moving through the recent financial crisis. Section 5
presents and estimates the baseline model for bank failure, and Section 6 augments the model
to include the three sources of exposure to the real estate sector. Section 7 examines the
presence of a size-dichotomy in the results, and Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Capital buffers are a bank’s main defense against losses, and a number of studies have
naturally focused on the effect of capital on the probability of bank failure. Peek and
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Rosengren (1997a) examine the wave of bank failures in the New England region in the
early 1990s and show that even seemingly well-capitalized banks can fail, as capital buffers
deteriorate rapidly as banks approach failure. More specifically, four-fifths of the failed banks
in their sample were considered well-capitalized as close as two years before their failure date
and a little over one-fourth of those banks were considered well-capitalized even as close as
one year before failure. Both failed and survivor banks experienced rapid erosion of their
capital buffers during the crisis.
Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000) show that simple capital ratios, such as the leverage
ratio and gross revenue ratio, perform better than more complicated risk-weighted ratios in
predicting the probability of failure over short one- to two- year horizons. Risk-weighted
ratios on the other hand, perform better over longer horizons as, the authors argue, they
tend to better capture the long-term performance of assets.
In a more recent paper, Berger and Bouwman (forthcoming) study the effect of capital
on two dimensions of bank performance, probability of survival and market share. They
find the effect to vary across banking crises, market crises and normal times. In particular,
capital increases the probability of survival and market share of smaller banks for all three
types of crises but improves the performance of medium and large banks primarily during
banking crises.
Other studies focus on the effect of managerial quality and corporate structure on bank
risk. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) examine the effect of managerial quality on bank failures
and bank acquisitions. They proxy for managerial quality using a number of measures of
productive efficiency, and show that banks with low managerial quality were more likely to
fail and less likely to be acquired.
Laeven and Levine (2009) use an international sample of 270 listed banks from 48 coun-
tries to study the effect of conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders on risk-
taking. They find that banks with more powerful owners tend to take greater risks. Interest-
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ingly, they also find the impact of banking regulations to vary with shareholder concentration.
Banks with powerful, diversified owners, respond to higher capital ratios, more stringent cap-
ital oversight, restrictions on bank activities, and deposit insurance, by increasing risk more
than widely-held banks do. In this paper I focus on the impact of managerial choices as
those are reflected on the balance sheets of banks on the probability of bank failure, but re-
main agnostic as to the underlying drivers of those choices (managerial conflicts, corporate
governance, etc...)
Some recent studies have focused exclusively on bank performance during the financial
crisis of 2007-2009. In its early stages, the crisis manifested as a liquidity crisis, and in a
liquidity crisis failing banks can impose externalities within their relevant market for deposits.
They do so by affecting the funding costs, and hence the profitability and probability of
failure, of financially healthy competitors. Acharya and Mora (2012) show, for example,
that during the recent financial crisis failing banks scrambling for liquidity sought to attract
deposits by raising their rates. This put funding pressures on healthy banks which reacted
by raising their deposit rates too.
Ratnovski and Huang (2009) examine bank performance on a sample of large OECD
banks (assets greater than e 100 billion as of end 2006) and show that higher levels of
capital adequacy, deposit funding, and asset liquidity were associated with both a lower
probability of government intervention and lower stock price declines.
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) examine the determinants of stock return performance across
an international sample of banks during the period from July 2007 to December 2008. They
confirm the findings of similar studies suggesting that banks that were funded more heavily
by wholesale funds and held less capital, performed poorly during the crisis. Importantly,
they also find that banks which were less exposed to the US real estate market performed
better.
Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) examine bank failure rates during 2007-2010 and draw
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parallels between the recent failures and the 1987-92 episode. The authors move the focus
away from balance sheet effects and restrict their attention to the effect of local economic
conditions on bank failure. They find that bank failures were concentrated in regions with
the largest declines in economic activity (as evident in declines in personal income or gross
state product, and in increases in unemployment) and with the most severe stresses in the
real estate market (as evident in declines in house prices and increases in delinquency rates).
Cole and White (2012) examine commercial bank failures in 2009 and show that the
composition of the loan portfolio of banks was one of the driving factors of bank failure.
They estimate a model in which, in addition to standard predictors of failure, they include
variables which decompose the bank’s loan portfolio into various categories of real estate loans
and show that it was exposure to non-household rather than residential real estate loans that
was associated with a higher probability of failure. They do not find that holdings of MBS
had any impact on the probability of bank failure.
This paper is more closely related to Cole and White (2012), but I improve on Cole and
White (2012) in four important ways. First, whereas Cole and White (2012) consider bank
failures only in 2009, and have to estimate proxies for "would be" failures for later years, I
use more complete data that include all bank failures for 2006-2012; the data suggest that a
significant number of failures took place after 2009.
Second, Cole and White (2012) control for the holdings of marketable securities without
explicitly accounting for the holdings of MBS, yet make inferences about the effect of MBS
holdings on the probability of bank failure and find that they are not related to failure. In
this paper, I decompose the securities portfolio further and find that holdings of private-label
MBS contributed to the failure of large banks.
Third, I account for off-balance sheet exposures to real estate and show that high exposure
to credit lines for real estate loans to non-household borrowers was associated with a higher
probability of bank failure. Given the high correlations that exist between exposure to lines
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of credit on any loan category and the presence of such loans on the bank’s balance sheet,
accounting for these off-balance sheet exposures also lends more credibility to the estimated
coefficients of variables related to the composition of the loan portfolio of banks.
Fourth, I make the distinction between open-end and closed-end residential real estate
loans and show that holdings of open-end residential real estate loans contributed to the
failure rates of smaller banks.
2.3 Data Sources
I obtain financial data for commercial banks from the Reports of Income and Condition (Call
Reports) made available online in summary form by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
The reports cover all commercial banks, and contain detailed financial data in a number of
different schedules (balance sheet, income statement, securities holdings, etc...). I obtain the
list of failed institutions from FDIC’s failed bank list and merge the two datasets using the
FDIC cetrificate number.
The FDIC reported 468 bank failures during 2006-2012. When I merge with the call
reports, I have 11,191 banks 411 of which failed. To achieve a more uniform sample, I drop
a number of observations. I first drop thrifts and other institutions that are not classified
as commercial banks in the call reports, and are left with 9,323 commercial banks and 391
bank failures. I drop small banks with average assets in 2004 less than $50 million, and
have 7,410 banks with 334 failing banks, and then drop banks that entered the sample after
2004, and have 5,849 banks (285 failed) in the sample. Last, I drop banks that exited the
sample before 2012 without being reported as bank failures by the FDIC (due to mergers,
headquarter failures, or change in reporting requirements) and I am left with a final sample
of 4,457 banks of which 285 failed between 2006-2012.
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2.4 Bank Failures During the Great Recession
In this section I discuss the timeline of commercial bank failures during the Great Recession
and also detail the evolution of bank risk during the same period.
2.4.1 Timeline of Bank Failures
Figure 2.1 shows the number of bank failures per quarter for the period 2005-1012. A total
of 285 commercial banks in the sample failed during this period. Though the first stresses
in the real estate sector were experienced as early as 2006, up until the end of 2007 there
were no commercial bank failures. The banking sector started experiencing the first bank
failures during the first quarter of 2008. The number of failures continued increasing at an
accelerated pace and reached a peak during the third quarter of 2009 when 33 banks failed
(up from 17 in the previous quarter). The number of bank failures gradually declined after
that quarter, and by the fourth quarter of 2012 it had dropped down to 4.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
2.4.2 Evolution of Bank-Risk
Though the number of bank failures peaked in 2009, the banking sector started experiencing
strains earlier than 2009. To see how bank risk evolved during the same period, I construct
a measure of bank risk, the z-score, and study its time series variation.
The z-score is defined in Equation 2.1, where µROAA is the mean of the distribution of
asset returns ( ˜ROAA), CAR is total equity capital divided by total assets, and σROAA is the
standard deviation of asset returns. A state of insolvency results when ˜ROAA+ CAR < 0.
If profits (and hence ˜ROAA) are normally distributed then the z-score is inversely related to
the probability of insolvency (Roy (1952)). Banks with higher z-scores are therefore further
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removed from a state of insolvency.
z − score = µROAA + CAR
σROAA
(2.1)
In Figure 2.2, I plot the evolution of the z-score separately for the groups of failed and
survivor banks. For each year, I plot the median z-score of all quarters for all banks in
each group. I aggregate over the four quarters to avoid over-interpreting variation in the
z-score due to seasonal variation in ˜ROAA, and use the median because the z-score is highly
skewed.3
Failed banks enter the crisis with a lower median z-score than survivor banks. The median
z-score of failed banks increases until 2007 but experiences a significant drop in 2008. As
expected, the downward trend in the z-score of failed banks continues at an accelerating pace
through to 2012.4
More interesting insights come from observing the variation in the z-score for survivor
banks. For those banks, we first observe a small decline in the z-score in 2008, which
continues through to 2010. The median z-score of survivor banks starts recovering in 2011,
and by 2012 it reaches a higher level than the median pre-crisis level. The time-path of the
z-score demonstrates that the bank failures, and associated time-path of bank failures, were
not driven solely by stresses idiosyncratic to the failed institutions, but were at least partly
due to system-wide stresses that were also experienced by survivor institutions.
[Figure 2.2 about here]
To further understand what was driving bank risk during this period, I plot the evolution
3The observed time-trends remain the same if I plot the natural logarithm of the z-score instead.
4As banks fail, the group of failed banks becomes progressively smaller and contains a higher proportion
of banks that are very close to failure. The z-score is thus likely to drop monotonically with time for this
group.
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of CAR and ROAA in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. I plot ROAA instead of µROAA as
it tracks more closely the shocks in profitability that banks experienced moving through the
crisis.
Failed banks enter the crisis with lower median capital buffers than survivor banks. The
size of the capital buffers is increasing for both groups until 2007. Starting in 2008, the
capital buffers of failed banks start rapidly deteriorating, whereas those of survivor banks
continue to gradually increase in size moving through the crisis.
The path of ROAA shows that for both failed and survivor banks declines in profitability
started as early as 2007. The declines in profitability were likely a result of the rising numbers
of non-performing loans, as well as of both aggregate and idiosyncratic5 increases in funding
costs. Though failed banks never quite managed to increase profitability, except from an
increase possibly due to sample selection in 2012, survivor banks started recovering their
profitability as early as 2010.
[Figures 2.3-2.4 about here]
2.5 Predictors of Bank Failure
The z-score is a good proxy for bank risk, but observing the z-score alone offers no insights
on what the underlying causes of shifts in bank risk might be. In particular, though the
z-score uses information on capital adequacy and profitability, it abstracts away from the
specific mechanisms that drive variation in these two quantities; understanding what these
mechanisms are is crucial to policy-making.
5As in Acharya and Mora (2012)
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2.5.1 Baseline Model
I focus on a key set of balance sheet variables to better capture the bank’s financial condition
and business choices. I include standard CAMEL indicators employed by supervisory regula-
tors to assess the financial health of banking institutions. The acronym stands for (C)apital
adequacy, (A)sset quality, (M)anagement Capability, (E)arnings, and (L)iquidity. In ad-
dition, I augment the model to include other indicators of risk identified in the literature.
Table 2.1 provides definitions for these variables.
To control for capital adequacy I include the ratio of total equity capital to assets.6
Capital buffers provide the necessary equity cushion for absorbing losses, and one would
expect the presence of thick capital buffers to increase the probability of bank survival.
As the events of the crisis showed and the results in Calomiris and Mason (2004) suggest,
however, the presence of large capital buffers may also reflect significant on- and off- balance
sheet exposures not adequately addressed by regulatory capital requirements. To the extent
that the risk of these exposures was underpriced in capital, high capital buffers could very
well be positively correlated with bank failure.
Commercial banks hold the majority of their assets in loans, and losses on a bank’s
loan portfolio is the prime cause of bank insolvency. I include the ratio of non-performing
loans to total loans as a measure of asset quality. Following Campello (2002), I define non-
performing loans as loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing plus loans not accruing.
This definition reduces the effect of managerial discretion in reporting losses.
I proxy for managerial quality by including the bank efficiency ratio. The bank efficiency
ratio measures the bank’s ability to turn resources into income; the higher the ratio the more
efficient the bank is. This ratio decreases in the presence of unproductive overhead and it is
6The results reported throughout this paper remain unchanged if I include the equity capital to risk-
weighted assets ratio instead.
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in this sense that it can proxy for managerial quality.
To control for earnings, I include the return on average assets.7 More profitable banks
are better placed to absorb losses on equity, by rebuilding their equity buffers from retained
earnings, and are thus expected to have a lower probability of failure. On the other hand,
during the upswing of the cycle, high asset returns may also capture high asset risk that
might have been underpriced ex-ante; high earnings may thus be associated with a higher
probability of failure.
The last CAMEL indicator I include is asset liquidity. Banks with high asset liquidity can
dishoard liquid assets to mitigate the effects of negative shocks to liquidity, such as the ones
experienced during the recent financial crisis, and high asset liquidity should be associated
with a lower probability of default. Though it is standard practice in the literature to include
a single ratio of total liquid assets over assets as the sole measure of asset liquidity, I include
three ratios, making the distinction between holdings of cash, money market instruments,
and marketable securities. These three categories of liquid assets hold different levels of both
liquidity and asset risk, and may influence the probability of bank failure in different ways.
For this reason, I include separate ratios in an effort to capture the effect of composition of
the liquid asset portfolio on default probability.
I augment the model with additional control variables that have been shown to affect
bank risk. The first additional control is a dummy variable indicating whether the bank
is member of a bank holding company. Members of a bank holding company can draw on
internal capital markets to dumpen the impact of financial shocks (as in Campello (2002)
for example) and ceteris paribus are more likely to survive a crisis.
Size can proxy for a number of unobservables, such as opacity and "too big to fail" effects,
and it is not clear on a priori grounds in which direction the net effect of asset size should
7The results remain unchanged if the return on assets is used instead
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be. Nonetheless, I include the natural logarithm of total assets to capture net size effects
and rid the estimates from possible omitted variable bias due to correlations with size.
Funding liquidity risk can impact the financial condition of banks through rising funding
costs and/or high rollover risk of short-term wholesale funds, and a number of studies have
shown that the funding structure of banks can affect their probability of failure.8 I thus
include the ratio of core deposits to total assets to capture the extent to which the bank is
funded from stable sources of funds, and expect this variable to correlate negatively with
the probability of failure.
Last, I include the ratio of unused lines of credit to total assets to capture the effect of
off-balance sheet exposures on the probability of failure. Rapid drawdowns on lines of credit
impose an adverse shock to a bank’s liquidity position, but also result in the assumption of
loans on the bank’s balance sheet; during a crisis, such loans may come with a high probabil-
ity of default. Dwyer, Zhang and Zhao (2011) show, for example, that riskier borrowers tend
to utilize a larger portion of their credit lines. Though adequate capital may have been allo-
cated based on the ex-ante risk profile of these loans when the credit line was first extended,
the ex-post performance of the loans during the crisis may have necessitated a higher capital
allocation. This is supported by the results in Dwyer, Zhang and Zhao (2011), which also
show that defaulted firms draw down more of their lines than non-defaulted ones do, and
that they do so more heavily as they approach default. I exclude commitments associated
with credit cards from the aggregate measure of credit lines, because credit card lines are
not likely to be associated with both the credit and liquidity risks discussed above.9
8See for example, Ratnovski and Huang (2009), Beltratti and Stulz (2012)
9See Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) for a longer discussion on why credit cards should not be lumped
together with other lines of credit.
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2.5.2 Endogenous Management of Financial Variables
Most of the variables discussed in the previous subsection are actively managed by banks in
response to changing economic and financial conditions. One can reasonably assume that
during the recent financial crisis, such active management was at least partly driven by
information regarding bank risk and hence the probability of bank failure. The endogenous
determination of these variables implies that fitting a model that uses their levels during the
period of the crisis would introduce simultaneity bias to the estimates.
To address this source of endogeneity, I focus on a pre-crisis snapshot of the banks’
balance sheets, and ask whether cross-sectional differences in the pre-crisis financial condition
of banks can explain the probability of failure during the crisis.
I choose 2004 as the base pre-crisis year, and make this choice based on two identifying
assumptions. The first is that in 2004 banks did not anticipate the shocks that would hit
the banking sector during the financial crisis. This is a reasonable assumption to make,
as 2004 was followed by two more years of rapid credit expansion, and the first shocks in
the real estate and financial sectors were experienced in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Under
this assumption, the cross-sectional variation in the levels of financial variables in 2004 was
not a result of cross-sectional differences in the banks’ estimation of their probability of
failure due to the events of the impending crisis; in other words, the levels of these variables
were determined exogenously to the probability of failure during the crisis.10 The second
identifying assumption is that 2004 is close enough to the years of the crisis to ensure that
the static picture of the 2004 balance sheet is a good proxy for the financial condition in
10At any point in time, banks estimate their own internal models of bank risk and the estimates of these
models are fed directly into the decision-making processes of the bank. Though one cannot reasonably argue
that the 2004 levels of financial variables were not partly determined in response to the banks’ own internal
assessments of their probability of failure, it would not be controversial to suggest that these models did
not incorporate information regarding the impending crisis. Therefore, the choices made in 2004 did not
correlate with the increased probability of failure experienced moving through the crisis.
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which the banks entered the crisis.
2.5.3 Summary Statistics and Conditional Means Tests
Table 2.2 displays summary statistics for the 2004 levels of the baseline set of predictors of
failure.
[Table 2.2 about here]
The distribution of asset size is skewed to the right, with the median asset size at $139
mil but the average asset size much higher at $1.272 bil. 18% of the banks are members of
a bank holding company.
The average bank is well-capitalized with a capital ratio of 10.3% and is funded at 68%
by core deposits. It holds 4.4% of its assets in cash, 3.2% in money market instruments
(reverse repo and federal funds sold), and 23.9% in marketable securities. On average, a
very low percentage (0.9%) of the banks’ loans are non-performing.
The average ROAA is 0.74%. The average bank efficiency ratio is 1.64, indicating that
the for each $1 in non-interest expense the average bank generates $1.64 of total non interest
plus net interest income. Finally for every $1 of assets held on balance sheet, banks on
average hold $0.11 of off-balance sheet exposure to unused lines of credit.11
The summary statistics discussed above are aggregates over a sample which includes both
failed and survivor banks. As was shown in the previous section, however, these two groups
of banks entered the crisis with different levels of key financial variables, such as capital
adequacy and profitability, and one can reasonably expect that such differences extend to
other financial variables. To test for differences in means between the groups of failed and
survivor banks, I perform a series of t tests and the results are shown in Table 2.3:
11excluding credit card commitments
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[Table 2.3 about here]
The differences run in the expected direction. The average failed bank is an order of
magnitude smaller than the average survivor bank and is 7.5% less likely to be part of a
bank holding company. Failed banks are also both less profitable and less efficient, though
the difference in efficiency is not economically significant.
Survivor banks are more liquid. They hold 0.7% more of their assets in cash, 0.4% less
in reverse repos and fed funds sold, but significantly more (9.5%) in marketable securities.
Also, survivor banks are better-capitalized by 0.7% and obtain 5.6% more of their funds
from stable, core-deposit funding. They are 5.8% less exposed to credit lines and, inter-
estingly, have a statistically significant, though economically not significant, higher rate of
non-performing loans.
2.5.4 Probit Estimation
Though suggestive of possible predictors of failure, the conditional means tests discussed
above do not take into account possible correlations between the variables and thus can
not be relied upon to extract conclusions regarding each variable’s independent power as a
predictor of failure. To address this limitation, I estimate the probit model shown in 2.2:,
where I(.) is the indicator function, Controlsit is a vector containing the predictors of failure,
κt are quarter fixed effects and it is a normally distributed error term.
Faili = I(Controlsit + κt + it > 0) (2.2)
Failure is defined as the bank having been placed under FDIC receivership during 2006-
2012.12 For each bank, I use the values of control variables over the four quarters of 2004,
and the vector of control variables is thus time-indexed. The results are shown in column (1)
12The first recorded failure in the dataset was in 2008
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of Table 2.4, where the reported coefficients are average marginal effects (AMEs) and can
be interpreted as the increase in the average probability of failure for a one unit increase in
the corresponding covariate.13
[Table 2.4 about here]
The effect of size is not statistically significant at any reasonable level of statistical signif-
icance. As expected, membership in a bank holding company results in a lower probability
of failure. Also in line with expectations, more profitable banks have a lower probability of
failure, but the effect of efficiency is not statistically different than 0.
Asset liquidity reduces the probability of failure. An asset structure which consists of high
holdings of cash, marketable securities, and money market instruments (fed funds, reverse
repo) is associated with a lower probability of failure, though the effect for money market
instruments is an order of magnitude smaller and not statistically significant. The magni-
tudes of the coefficients indicate that substitution from either money market instruments
or marketable securities into cash, would have resulted in a higher probability of survival
during the financial crisis.
On the funding side, banks that were funded more by stable core-deposits had a lower
probability of failure. High equity buffers also indicate a lower probability of failure. Though
it could still be possible that equity buffers may have been reinforced to account for off-
balance sheet exposures, the sign of the coefficient suggests that the risk from such exposures
was not severely underestimated and under-provided for in the cross-section of banks, at least
not to such a great extent that would have dominated the primary function of equity buffers
13Average marginal effects (AMEs)are different than the often-used marginal effects at the means (MEMs).
The latter impose a linear approximation of the probit model around a single point representing an arbitrary
"average" bank, and thus ignore the distribution of bank risk along the probit curve. For this reason, I opted
for estimating AMEs, which better capture this distribution.
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as increasing the distance from default.14 The difference in the coefficients suggests that
replacing 10% of core deposit funding with 10% equity funding would have resulted in a
0.91% lower average probability of failure.
High levels of non-performing loans in 2004 do not yield a statistically significant effect
on the probability of failure. There can be two explanations for this result. The first, and
more likely explanation, is that the levels of non-preforming loans in 2004 do not adequately
capture the unexpected increase in loan losses that was experienced during the crisis. The
second, is that there could be strategic (mis)reporting of loan losses by banks that received
early signs of increases in non-performing loans, though this mechanism is more likely to be
present later on as the banks entered the early stages of the crisis.
In line with the discussion in Dwyer, Zhang and Zhao (2011), off-balance sheet exposure
to credit lines results in a higher probability of failure.
2.6 The Real Estate Story
The results shown in the previous section involve standard predictors of failure that have
been regularly used in studies examining bank failures during crises. Not all crises are the
same, however. What is particular to the nature of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the
degree to which the banks’ fortunes were tied to the rise and subsequent fall of the real estate
market.
To examine the extent to which choices made by banks regarding their exposure to the
real estate sector impacted their probability of failure, I introduce three groups of variables
that capture a bank’s choices regarding the composition of (1) its loan portfolio ,(2) its
marketable securities portfolio, and (3) its off-balance sheet exposure to credit lines. I posit
14Had that not been the case, the coefficient on equity capital in the model would have entered with a
positive sign.
85
that choices which shifted each of these portfolios towards real estate products increased the
probability of bank failure, and call the corresponding hypotheses for (1), (2), and (3) the
"lending hypothesis", the "MBS hypothesis", and the "credit line hypothesis" respectively.
Banks hold a significant portion of their illiquid assets in loans, and losses on the loan
portfolio are the primary cause of bank failure. A high portion of these loans are normally real
estate loans and we know that during the recent financial crisis banks experienced increasing
default rates for real estate loans. To identify the effect of exposures to different categories
of real estate loans on the probability of failure, I augment the baseline model to include the
ratios of four categories of real estate loans to total illiquid assets: (1) closed-end residential
real estate loans, (2) open-end residential real estate loans, (3) loans secured by multifamily
residential properties, and (4) other RE loans. The effects captured by the coefficients of
these ratios should be interpreted with respect to the missing category, which is loans in
non-real estate sectors and other illiquid assets.
Much of the discussion surrounding the crisis has revolved around stories involving bor-
rowers for traditional 1-4 family closed-end residential real estate loans. The basic storyline
involves mortgage borrowers carried away by rapidly rising home prices, overextending them-
selves and assuming mortgage loan obligations on which they would consequently default
during the downturn of the economy. The first ratio aims at testing whether exposure to
closed-end residential real estate loans contributed to bank failures during the crisis.
The next two ratios aim at examining the effect of other sources of exposure to residential
real estate loans. A home-equity loan is collateralized by the equity that the borrower holds
on his property, and its default risk is thus tied to price fluctuations in the housing market.
Loans secured by multifamily residential properties are not traditional mortgage loans, but
rather investments in larger residential real estate properties. The performance of these
loans too is sensitive to price fluctuations in the residential real estate market, but the end-
recipients as well as the underlying collateral are different from normal residential mortgages.
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I thus include this third ratio to capture the independent effect of exposure to this loan
category on the probability of bank failure.
The last variable examines whether loans in other non-household real estate loan cate-
gories, such as loans for commercial real estate, construction or land development projects,
impacted the probability of bank failure. As Cole and White (2012) show, exposure to these
loan categories was more strongly connected to the probability of bank failure than exposure
to residential real estate loans was.
I also want to examine the effect that portfolio choices in the bank’s portfolio of mar-
ketable securities had on bank failure. We know, for example, that entering the recent
financial crisis investment banks held a significant portion of their assets in mortgage backed
securities (MBS), and subsequently experienced severe liquidity spirals of market and fund-
ing (il)liquidity (as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)), which led to the failure of some
of these institutions.15 Commercial banks too hold MBS in their portfolio of marketable
securities and it would not be unreasonable to suspect that holdings of MBS contributed to
the failure of commercial banks.
There are differences between investment and commercial banks however. The holdings
of MBS by commercial banks during the crisis were significantly lower than the correspond-
ing holdings of investment banks. So was the extent to which commercial banks funded
themselves in the repo market, where sudden increases in haircuts on collateral can induce
firesales of assets. Should holdings of MBS prove to have a positive effect on the probability
of failure of commercial banks, it is thus not immediately clear that they operate through
the same mechanism of liquidity spirals that was so central a component to the experience
of investments banks during the crisis.
The presence of a negative effect of high holdings of MBS on commercial bank survival
15Bear Stearns for example
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could involve at least two additional explanations. One would be the direct channel of
unrealized capital losses due to mark-to-market accounting for these securities.16 Though
marking securities to rapidly declining market values would not necessarily result in the
firesale of these assets (and hence the realization of capital losses), it would deplete the bank
from precious Tier 1 regulatory capital that could absorb future losses on the banks’ loan
portfolio; it would also make the bank inadequately capitalized in the eyes of the regulator.
A second explanation would be that the presence of high holdings of MBS reflects poor
risk-management practices by the bank and may therefore also indicate high unobserved
levels of risk for the bank’s mortgage loan portfolio. Though securitization enabled banks
to pass on loan default risk to investors, part of the originated loans may have remained
on the balance sheet of the banks either as part of the normal lifecycle of the securitization
process or, especially regarding the holdings of private-label MBS, due to the requirement
by investors for the bank to retain a stake in the securitized loans on its balance sheet.
To control for composition effects of the bank’s portfolio of marketable securities, I include
the ratios of agency and private-label MBS to total securities. Agency MBS are issued
or guaranteed by government-sponsored enterprises such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac and must conform to a set of criteria that effectively cup their risk profile.
Private-label MBS, on the other hand, are issued by private securitizers, are subject to less
stringent requirements, and are therefore more likely to correspond to toxic, subprime-related
assets. As with the variables capturing composition effects on the bank’s loan portfolio, these
coefficients should be interpreted in relation to the missing category of holdings of non-MBS
securities.
The last source of exposure I consider is off-balance sheet exposure from unused lines of
credit for real estate loans. During the period that this paper examines, the drawdown risks
16The available-for-sale securities portfolio is marked to market, though the smaller held-to-maturity
portfolio is not.
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identified in Dwyer, Zhang and Zhao (2011) should have been particularly pronounced for
lines of credit for real-estate loans. Banks that were more exposed to credit lines for real
estate loans would thus face a higher probability of failure. To examine this hypothesis, I
include the ratios to total unused credit lines for two categories of real estate credit lines:
credit lines extended to residential real estate borrowers (HELOCs) and credit lines extended
to other non-household real estate borrowers (commercial real estate, land development
projects, etc...).
2.6.1 Summary Statistics and Conditional Means Tests
Table 2.5 displays summary statistics for these additional regressors. The average loan
portfolio consists of 22.4% closed-end residential real estate loans, 2.7% open-end residential
real estate loans, 1.9% loans secured by multifamily residential properties, and 35.9% non-
household real estate loans; the remainder is invested in loans in sectors other than real
estate and other illiquid assets.
26.9% of marketable securities are agency MBS and a very small portion of the order of
0.59% is invested in private-label MBS. As the median indicates, in 2004 most banks did
not hold private-label MBS on their balance sheets. Regarding off-balance sheet exposures,
12.8% of unused lines of credit are issued for home equity loans, and 29.5% for loans for
other real estate projects.
[Table 2.5 about here]
Table 2.6 displays conditional means tests for survivor vs failed banks for the real-estate
related predictors. Significant differences exist in the means of the distributions of these
variables between the two groups.
Failed banks hold a significantly lower portion of their illiquid assets (8.2%) in closed-end
residential real estate loans. They do however invest 0.77% more in open-end residential real
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estate loans, 2.1% more in multifamily loans and 16% more in other real estate loans. These
numbers suggest that it is potentially the exposure to real estate loan categories other than
traditional mortgages that might have been one of the driving factors of bank failures during
the crisis.
Failed banks hold on average 6.2% more of their marketable securities in agency MBS
and 0.6% more in private-label MBS. Though the latter difference seems economically small,
it still represents a close to 100% increase in the average level of that particular source of
exposure for small banks, and should also be interpreted in the context of most banks having
had no exposure to private-label MBS in 2004. Last, failed banks hold a smaller portion
of their credit-line exposures in home equity lines of credit(1.5%) but a significantly larger
portion in credit lines for other real estate loans (22.7%).
[Table 2.6 about here]
2.6.2 Probit Regressions
The means tests discussed above suggest that the choices made by banks regarding their
exposure to the real estate sector may have been precipitating factors in bank failures during
the Great Recession. The results also suggest that it is not traditional, closed-end residential
mortgage lending that might have been the main culprit.
To examine these theories, I reestimate the baseline probit model presented in Section 5,
augmenting it with the real estate variables discussed above. The results are shown in Table
2.7, where columns (1)-(4) display estimates starting from the baseline model presented in
the previous section and incrementally adding sets of regressors that correspond to the three
sources of exposure to the real estate sector discussed earlier in this section.
[Table 2.7 about here]
90
To test the "lending hypothesis", I first augment the model to include the loan portfolio
ratios, and show the estimated coefficients in column (2). From the four real estate loan
categories, closed-end residential real estate loans are the only category that enters with a
negative sign, but its coefficient is statistically undifferentiated from 0. Open-end residential
real estate loans, loans for multifamily properties and other real estate loans all enter with
positive signs, and are statistically significant at the 10%, 1% and 1% levels respectively.
Consistent with early remarks, these results invalidate theories that suggest that exposure
to traditional residential mortgage loans, held on-balance sheet, was the primary driver of the
bank failures experienced during the crisis. Rather, as regards the on-balance sheet choices
of loan mix, the main drivers were high exposure to home equity loans, to loans secured by
multifamily properties, and to other non-household real estate loans.
To test the "MBS hypothesis" I augment the model to include the ratios of agency and
private-label MBS; the results are shown in column (3). The coefficients indicate that both
holdings of agency and private-label MBS were positively related to bank failure and the
results are statistically significant at the 5% level. Importantly, the coefficients testing the
"lending hypothesis" remain unaffected, both in magnitude and statistical significance, by
the inclusion of these covariates.
The last hypothesis I test is the "credit line hypothesis" and the results are shown in
column (4). I find that exposure to lines of credit for real estate loans to non-household
borrowers is related to a higher probability of bank failure, and the result is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Exposure to home equity lines of credit on the other hand, enters
with a negative coefficient but this result is not statistically significant.
As column (4) illustrates, adding credit line exposures as additional covariates has an
effect on the previously estimated coefficients for the loan composition variables. The coef-
ficient of open-end residential real estate loans increases appreciably in magnitude, whereas
the coefficients for multifamily residence loans and other real estate loans both decrease in
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magnitude, the latter significantly so. The appreciable changes in magnitude for open-end
residential real estate and other real estate loans, are due to the strong correlations that
exist between the size of the exposure to credit lines for these particular loan categories
and the presence of such loans on the bank’s balance sheet. Failing to control for these off-
balance sheet exposures could have thus significantly biased the estimates for the "lending"
hypothesis with effects stemming from off-balance sheet exposures.
Observing the pseudo-R2 measure of fit and comparing the baseline model in column
(1) to the full "real estate" model in column (4), one sees that augmenting the model with
variables capturing real estate exposures improves the explanatory power appreciably. The
pattern of relative improvements in fit depends on the order in which one adds the additional
groups of regressors, so the pattern of increases in pseudo-R2 observed in Table 2.7 do not
necessarily correspond to the true independent contribution of each set of covariates. In
unreported experiments where I vary the order in which I add each set of covariates, I show
that the loan portfolio and credit line variables add approximately equally to the explanatory
power of the model, but the MBS variables only make marginal contributions to fit.
Standard caveats regarding the interpretation of pseudo-R2 measures of fit not with-
standing, these observations strongly suggest that (1) exposures to the real estate sector were
detrimental to the banks’ ability to survive the crisis, and (2) the main channels through
which exposures to the real estate sector increased the probability of bank failure were the
composition of the loan and off-balance sheet credit line portfolios of banks.
2.7 Size Dichotomy
In constructing the dataset, I employed pruning rules to ensure that the banks included in
the resulting sample were highly uniform on aspects of corporate structure and regulatory
oversight. Unobserved heterogeneity could still be present in the sample, however, and could
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bias the results reported in the previous section.
The literature has traditionally studied differences in bank behavior by dividing lenders
across the size dimension, as this is the dimension most likely to sort out major differences
in important unobservables.17 In the context of bank failure, larger lenders are more likely
to be deemed systematic and thus more likely to be rescued by the state and not be placed
under FDIC receivership. On the other hand, the introduction of this source of moral hazard
may have led larger lenders to engage exactly in the kind of risky practices that led to their
eventual failure.
To test whether the "loan", "MBS", and "credit line" hypotheses hold equally for small
and large banks, I divide the sample using a $1 bil threshold rule, applied to the average
total assets of each bank for 2004. Tables 2.8-2.9 show the results for small and large banks
respectively.
[Tables 2.8-2.9 about here]
The complete sample over which the probit models were estimated, contains many more
small banks than large banks and, naturally, the patterns observed in the estimates for the
complete sample still hold for the sample of small banks. One difference is that the coefficient
for closed-end loans is now statistically significant (but still negative). Another difference is
that holdings of private-label MBS do not seem to be associated with an increased probability
of failure for small banks, likely a result of the minimal exposure that small banks had to
this category of MBS.
The estimated coefficients for the sample of large banks are also for the most part con-
sisted with those for the sample of small banks. Exposure to either loans for multifamily
properties or to other real estate loans still result in a higher probability of failure but the
17See Allen and Saunders (1986) for differences in the costs faced in the federal funds market, Kashyap
and Stein (2000) for differences in the strength of the bank lending channel of transmission of monetary
policy.
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coefficients are now larger in magnitude. Also, the effect of exposure to credit lines issued
to non-household real estate borrowers is larger than the one for smaller banks.
Some notable differences exist in the case of large banks, however. Exposure to open-end
residential real estate loans is not associated with the probability of bank failure. Exposure
to agency MBS has a positive but statistically not significant effect on the probability of
failure, but the effect of private-label MBS is now much larger in magnitude and strongly
statistically significant. This dichotomy can be attributed to the comparatively larger pres-
ence of private-label MBS on the marketable securities portfolio of large banks, but could
also reflect unobserved heterogeneity in the risk-profile of the underlying assets backing these
securities.
Comparing the values of the pseudo-R2 measure of fit in column (1) of Tables 2.8-2.9, we
see that the baseline model holds the same predictive power for both small and large banks.
Also, the values in column (4) show that controlling for exposures to the real estate sector
significantly improves the explanatory power of the model for both groups. Comparing the
relative improvements in fit for the two models, however, we see that real estate exposures
carry more explanatory power in the model estimated over the sample of large banks (roughly
230% increase in fit) compared to the model estimated over the sample of small banks
(roughly 70% increase in fit). This pattern also holds true for the improvement in fit achieved
by adding MBS holdings as additional covariates.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper studies the period of the Great Recession and asks whether exposure to the real
estate sector was one of the precipitating factors in the wave of commercial bank failures
that took place in 2008-2012.
I examine the banks’ balance sheets and identify three possible channels through which
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stresses in the real estate sector could have transmitted onto the balance sheet and impact
the probability of bank failure. Cross-sectional variation in the degree of exposure to each
of these channels comes from banks’ choices regarding the composition of their on-balance
sheet loan and marketable securities portfolios, and off-balance sheet credit line portfolio.
In particular, for each of these portfolios, I consider how choices which shifted the balance
of the portfolio towards real-estate products impacted the probability of bank failure.
Starting with a baseline model which only includes standard predictors of failure unre-
lated to real estate exposures, I show that accounting for composition choices in these three
sources of exposure to the real estate sector significantly improves the fit of the model. A
pseudo-R2 measure of fit indicates an approximate 70% improvement in fit for the model
estimated over a sample of small banks and a 230% improvement for the model estimated
over a sample of large banks.
The results indicate that all three sources of exposure contributed to the probability of
failure. Regardless of size, banks that were more exposed to loans secured by multifamily
properties and to other non-household real estate loans were more likely to fail during the
crisis. I also find that exposure to open-end residential real estate loans contributed to the
failure rates of small banks but not of large banks. I do not find any evidence that commercial
banks that held more of their loans in traditional closed-end residential real estate mortgages
experienced higher failure probabilities.
Holdings of private-label MBS were a contributing factor to the failure of large banks
only. Holdings of agency MBS also appear to have contributed to the probability of failure,
but this result is less robust and only marginally significant for small banks.
The last finding is that a credit line portfolio that was weighted towards non-household
real estate borrowers was positively associated with the probability of failure for both large
and small banks. Lines of credit for home equity loans, on the other hand, were not associated
with a lower probability of failure for either group.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Commercial Bank Failures. This chart displays the number of bank failures per
quarter for the period 2005-2012. The sample includes only commercial banks, with average asset size in
2004 greater than $50 million, and excludes banks which entered after 2004. Failure is defined as the bank
placed under FDIC receivership.
Figure 2.2: Evolution of the median z-score. This chart displays the evolution of the median z-score in
2005-2012, shown separately for failed and survivor banks. The z-score measures distance to default and
is defined as the sum of equity capital plus the return on assets, divided by the standard deviation of the
return of assets.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of the median equity capital ratio. This chart displays the evolution of the median
equity capital over assets ratio in 2005-2012, shown separately for failed and survivor banks.
Figure 2.4: Evolution of the median return on assets. This chart displays the evolution of the median
return on assets in 2005-2012, shown separately for failed and survivor banks.
Figure 2.5: Evolution of the median standard deviation of return on assets. This chart displays the
evolution of the median standard deviation of return on assets in 2005-2012, shown separately for failed and




logAssets The natural logarithm of assets
BHC The bank is a member of a Bank Holding Company
Efficiency (Total non interest income + net interest income)/ (total non interest
expense)
ROAA Net income divided by average assets
σROAA The standard deviation of ROAA over the 16 quarters prior to the
measurement quarter
Cash_ta Total cash assets divided by total assets
FFRV_ta The sum of federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement
to resell divided by total assets
Securities_ta The sum of held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities divided by
total assets
EquityCapital_ta Total equity capital divided by assets
CoreDeposits_ta The sum of demand deposits, MMDA and other savings deposits, NOW,
ATS and other interest-bearing transaction accounts, and insured time
deposits divided by total assets
LoanDefaultRate Loans past due more than 90 days plus loans not accruing divided by
total loans
UCnCC_ta Total unused loan commitments (excluding credit card lines) divided
by total assets
Total illiquid assets Total assets minus the sum of cash assets, federal funds sold, securities
held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities
CERRELoans_til Closed-end loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties divided by
total illiquid assets
OERRELoans_til Open-end loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties divided by
total illiquid assets
MultiFamilyLoans_til Loans secured by multifamily properties divided by total illiquid assets
OtherRELoans_til All other real estate loans divided by total illiquid assets
MBSAgency_ts MBS issued or guaranteed by a government sponsored enterprise (GSE)
MBSOthers_ts MBS issued by non-GSE issuers
UCORE_tuc Commitments to fund commercial real estate, construction, and land
development loans, divided by total unused commitments (excluding
credit card lines)
UCHEL_tuc Revolving, open-end lines secured by 1-4 family residential properties
divided by total unused commitments (excluding credit card lines)
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for the baseline model. This table displays summary statistics for a standard
set of predictors of failure. The values of the variables are obtained over the four quarters of 2004.
Table 2.3: Conditional means tests. This table displays tests for the equality of means for a standard set
of predictors of failure for the groups of survivor and failed banks. The values of the variables are obtained
over the four quarters of 2004. The tests assume unequal variances for each group. The levels of statistical
significance are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10
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Table 2.4: Standard predictors of failure. This table shows the results of estimating a baseline probit
model of the probability of a commercial bank failing during 2006-2012, using a standard set of predictors
of failure and not directly controlling for exposures to the real estate sector. The reported coefficients are
average marginal effects. The model is estimated using the values of variables over the four quarters of 2004.
Quarter fixed effects are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The
levels of statistical significance are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics for real estate variables. This table displays summary statistics for variables
capturing the banks’ level of exposure to the real estate sector through the composition of the loan, mar-
ketable securities, and credit line portfolios. The values of the variables are obtained over the four quarters
of 2004.
Table 2.6: Conditional means tests for real estate variables. This table displays tests for the equality of
means for variables capturing the banks’ level of exposure to the real estate sector through the composition
of the loan, marketable securities, and credit line portfolios, for the groups of survivor and failed banks. The
values of the variables are obtained over the four quarters of 2004. The tests assume unequal variances for
each group. The levels of statistical significance are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10
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Table 2.7: Real estate predictors of failure. This table shows the results of estimating a probit model of
the probability of a commercial bank failing during 2006-2012. The model is estimated using the values of
variables over the four quarters of 2004. Column (1) reports results for the baseline model which only uses
a standard set of predictors of failure. Column (2) augments the model to include variables that capture
the exposure of the bank’s loan portfolio to various categories of real estate loans, column (3) adds variables
which capture the exposure of the marketable securities portfolio to MBS, and column (4) adds off-balance
sheet exposures to credit lines for real estate loans. The reported coefficients are average marginal effects.
Quarter fixed effects are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The
levels of statistical significance are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10
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Table 2.8: Real estate predictors of failure for small banks. This table shows the results of estimating a
probit model of the probability of a commercial bank failing during 2006-2012, for banks with average assets
in 2004 less than $1 billion. The model is estimated using the values of variables over the four quarters
of 2004. Column (1) reports results for the baseline model which only uses a standard set of predictors of
failure. Column (2) augments the model to include variables that capture the exposure of the bank’s loan
portfolio to various categories of real estate loans, column (3) adds variables which capture the exposure of
the marketable securities portfolio to MBS, and column (4) adds off-balance sheet exposures to credit lines
for real estate loans. The reported coefficients are average marginal effects. Quarter fixed effects are included
but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The levels of statistical significance are
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10
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Table 2.9: Real estate predictors of failure for large banks. This table shows the results of estimating a
probit model of the probability of a commercial bank failing during 2006-2012, for banks with average assets
in 2004 greater than $1 billion. The model is estimated using the values of variables over the four quarters
of 2004. Column (1) reports results for the baseline model which only uses a standard set of predictors of
failure. Column (2) augments the model to include variables that capture the exposure of the bank’s loan
portfolio to various categories of real estate loans, column (3) adds variables which capture the exposure of
the marketable securities portfolio to MBS, and column (4) adds off-balance sheet exposures to credit lines
for real estate loans. The reported coefficients are average marginal effects. Quarter fixed effects are included
but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The levels of statistical significance are
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.10
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Chapter 3
No Free Shop: Why Target Companies in MBOs
and Private Equity Transactions Sometimes Choose
Not to Buy ’Go Shop’ Options
(joint with Charles W. Calomiris and Donna
M. Hitscherich)
3.1 Introduction
The manner in which firms sell themselves in the market is an important, and little-studied,
topic. Firms have to decide whether to enter into an agreement with an acquiror as part of
a bilateral discussion or as part of a broader "auction" process. Once they have chosen to do
Calomiris is Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions, Columbia Business School, and a Re-
search Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research; Hitscherich is Senior Lecturer in the Discipline
of Business in the Finance and Economics Division and Director of the Private Equity Program, Columbia
Business School. The authors thank Michael Hillmeyer, Zheli He, and Greg Rafert for excellent research
assistance, Andrea Pratt and Larry Wall for very useful discussions.
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one or the other, they then must decide how aggressively to continue to market themselves
to other would-be acquirors prior to their shareholders’ vote on the acquisition. Firms,
unlike commodities, are unique assets and they are acquired as part of a costly process of
investigation by potential acquirors. And yet, interestingly, that process is not uniform; the
decisions targets make about how to market themselves to acquirors, both before and after
they enter into an acquisition agreement, vary greatly.
Legal constraints govern the process of marketing targets, but targets enjoy substantial
latitude under the law about the manner in which they may sell themselves. When a US
public company agrees to be purchased by an acquiror in a change of control transaction
requiring the approval of the target company shareholders, the transaction is announced
publicly and the executed contract providing for the purchase (the merger agreement) is
filed as an exhibit to a Form 8-K filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
In such a transaction, the board of directors of the target company must obtain the best
transaction reasonably available to the company. This mandate is often expressed as the
board of directors’ "Revlon duties" based on the 1986 Delaware case where the court held
that in a "change of control" scenario "[t]he directors’ role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders
at a sale of the company." Revlon does not require any particular procedure for sale of the
company, but rather provides that if the target receives a competing bid after the execution
of the merger agreement but before the target shareholders approve the transaction, the
board of directors must consider the competing bid.
While the target board may choose not to market the company widely prior to the initial
accepted acquisition offer, and may also choose not to actively "shop" the target after the
execution of the merger agreement (as defined below), the target board of directors must
Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
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evaluate bona fide offers made by competing acquirors. It is for this reason that acquirors
often contract for a fee to be paid by the target company in the event that the target
board terminates the merger agreement to pursue the competing bid. These so called target
termination fees generally range between 3 and 5 percent of the transaction value of the
target.
Beginning in 2004, "go-shop" provisions began to appear in merger agreements. A go-
shop provision in a merger agreement enables the investment bank financial advisor to the
target company to actively solicit (i.e., "shop") and negotiate with other potential acquirors
(notwithstanding the executed merger agreement contract) with a reduced termination fee
for a specified period of time generally ranging from 30 to 50 days (such period of time being
referred to as the "go shop window"). Should the target board of directors determine to
terminate the merger agreement with the acquiror based on a bid received during the go
shop window, the termination fee paid to the acquiror typically will be approximately one
third to two thirds of the full termination fee that would be payable were the same bid to
be received and pursued after the go shop window.
In recent years, at least one academic commentator has argued that the option to shop
an offer can, and on average does, lead to a higher price for the target firm. The views of
practitioners on the efficacy of go shops have been mixed, however, with some suggesting that
the go shop may in certain circumstances be "window dressing" and others suggesting that
the go shop presents an opportunity to overcome a "much lower threshold of obstacles" than
would be faced by a competing bidder in the absence of a go shop. It is also recognized that
Such a provision in the merger agreement is often referred to as a "no-shop." The no-shop provision does
not eliminate the "fiduciary out" of the board of directors to evaluate bona fide competing offers received
after the execution of the merger agreement but before approval of the merger agreement by the target
shareholders in a change of control transaction.
Subramanian (2008)
Compare LLP (2008) (observing that the utility of the go shop is a function of the context in which
the target board determines to negotiate for it and suggests that if the initial transaction is the product
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the option to shop for an offer may have an additional benefit of the reduction in litigation
risk for the target. Nevertheless, when a target firm buys a go-shop option it must pay for
that option, and in theory that payment should take the form of a lower initial offer price for
the firm, ceteris paribus. The current literature on go-shops has neither come to grips fully
with the tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of go-shops, nor has provided empirical
evidence about go-shops that fully takes account of all those costs and benefits.
In this paper, we examine the determinants of the go-shop decision and the effect on
the bidding activity and pricing of an acquisition that results from the decision of the target
board of directors to include a go-shop clause rather than a no-shop clause. Economic theory
implies that there are countervailing considerations that the target board of directors should
take into account when deciding whether to include a go-shop clause, and we take these
considerations into account when modeling the go-shop decision and its consequences.
On the one hand, there is the obvious positive value, ex post facto of the signing of the
merger agreement, from retaining the option to shop any offer at a reduced termination fee
for a period of time. With an offer in hand, the target can attract new offers more easily by
showing that a credible bidder has already ascertained that the target firm is worth enough
to warrant the offer that is being shopped. In the presence of search and due-diligence costs
to potential acquirors, being able to shop an offer may attract bidders who otherwise would
not participate in the bidding to acquire the target, and it may encourage them to bid above
of overreaching by target management then the go shop will have little utility) with Signal Hill Capital
Group LLC (2012) (hereinafter "LLC (2012)")(quoting Robert Friedman, former Chief Legal Officer of the
Blackstone Group stating that "Go-Shops are meaningfulâĂęBoth the strategic universe and the private
equity universe would be reticent to come in during a classic no-shop process [after a signed deal is announced].
We just wouldnâĂŹt do it. But when you put a ’For Sale’ on the door, and say come get me then people
drop everything and look because they are being invited in.").
Compare LLC (2012) (observing that in the years 2010 and 2011 transactions with go shops were subject
to litigation 70% and 76% of the time, respectively) with Research (2013) (observing that M&A shareholder
litigation of all deals valued at over $500 million impacted 95% and 96% of the deals in the years 2010 and
2011, respectively).
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the price of the offer being shopped, especially if there are competitive considerations leading
competing bidders to want to prevent the original bidder from consummating its offer at the
agreed price.
On the other hand, if a target insists on a go-shop clause, doing so may have a chilling
effect, ex ante facto of signing the merger agreement, on the willingness of the initial acquiror
to expend search and due-diligence costs, and to offer a high price for the target. Knowing
that its offer will be shopped, and understanding the positive externalities that its offer
creates for other would-be acquirors (precisely as the result of the search and due-diligence
costs that create ex post option value for the target), ceteris paribus, the initial acquiror
should be less likely to bid, and should bid at a lower price, if a target insist on including a
go-shop clause.
In addition to the two countervailing economic implications of the go-shop choice, there is
a third potential value-maximizing influence on the go-shop decision, namely concerns about
legal liability or what we will term "litigation risk." Target firms that employ go-shops may
be less likely to face legal challenges from their stockholders about the bargaining process
that resulted in the acquisition, and may expect lower litigation costs associated with the
challenges that they do face. The duty of the board of directors of the target firm to act as
"auctioneers" when considering offers for the target firm does not specifically require them
to actively solicit alternative offers, either before the merger agreement is executed (through
what is sometimes called a "pre-signing market check" or an "auction" of the firm), or after
the merger agreement is executed (through what is sometimes called a "post-signing market
check" or a go-shop clause). Doing so, however, may reduce the risk that a suit will be filed
claiming that directors failed to fulfill their fiduciary duties or if filed, that the directors
will ultimately be found to have breached their fiduciary to the shareholders. This implies
that, for some target firms, including a go-shop may be value-maximizing because of its
incremental effect on expected litigation costs, even if absent those considerations (based
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on the first two countervailing considerations) a go-shop clause would not have been value-
maximizing.
In addition to the three influences that matter for the go-shop choice from the perspective
of value maximization, agency problems may also distort the go-shop decision. We take into
account three different agency problems.
First, the interests of target board of directors and/ or managers may conflict with target
shareholders with regard to the decision over the go-shop clause. If a target manager either
is part of the group acquiring the target (as in a management buyout or so called, MBO),
or if the target manager is promised employment by the would-be buyer, those conflicts
of interest may make the manager more willing to agree to a lower acquisition price, and
less willing to insist on a go-shop clause in the merger agreement (in order to discourage
competing bids). Concerns about director and managerial conflicts of interest are central to
the Delaware court’s concerns about the sufficiency of offer prices.
Second, the interest of legal counsel may also diverge from that of target shareholders. To
the extent that future potential clients evaluate law firms on the basis of their ability to avoid
litigation risk in the crafting of merger agreements, lawyers seeking to acquire reputations for
negotiating transactions that avoid litigation risk may advise their clients to use go-shops too
frequently. Because go-shops may serve to reduce litigation risk, lawyers always benefit when
their clients include a go-shop clause, even if adopting a go-shop is not value maximizing for
the client. To our knowledge, we are the first to consider agency conflicts faced by lawyers
As we show in Section 2, however, in theory the manager may also worry about the litigation risk from
behaving this way. In fact, in Section 4, we find that this litigation risk effect makes MBOs more likely to
employ go-shops, ceteris paribus.
Weil Gotshal (2006) writes that "Delaware courts, including the recent decision concerning the 2005
SS&C Technologies going-private transaction, have questioned the adverse effects that a private equity
sponsor’s arrangements with management can have on a sales process by chilling the potential for competing
bids." For additional legal perspectives on the origins of "go-shop" clauses, see LLP (2008), Latham Watkins
(2007), Debevoise Plimpton (2006), and Subramanian (2008)
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when analyzing the contracting choices faced by a target firm.
A third potential conflict of interest involves the investment banker to the target firms.
It is sometimes suggested that investment banks may take into account the business the
bank may have with the acquiror as a consequence of the transaction (for example, target
investment banks can provide financing or other services to acquirors). If such conflicts
of interest are important, no-shops could be a means for conflicted investment bankers or
managers to limit competition in pricing, and thereby pass on an implicit side payment to
the acquiror. According to this view, the absence of a go shop clause reflects a conflict of
interest that leads to under-pricing of the target firm.
We label the six posited influences on the go-shop choice as the (positive) "ex post op-
tion effect," the (negative) "ex ante chilling effect," the (positive) "expected litigation cost
effect," the (negative) "managerial agency effect," the (positive) "lawyer agency effect," and
the (negative) "banker agency effect" (where positive or negative refer to the effects on the
probability of choosing a go-shop provision). The importance of each of these six effects
should vary across transactions, depending on the characteristics of targets and the char-
acteristics of their transactions. We consider the nature of the cross-sectional variation in
observable characteristics that might arise in the choice of go-shops and we test those al-
ternative perspectives in our empirical analysis of the choice of go-shop clauses and their
consequences for bids and for target firm value.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical framework that considers various
potential influences on the go-shop/no-shop decision. There we derive predictions from
a heuristic framework (rather than a formal model) about the choice of go-shop clauses,
and about the effects of the go-shop choice on potential bidding, before and after the merger
agreement is executed. In Section 3, we review the literature on go-shops. Section 4 describes
the data that we have collected to test the model developed in Section 2. We explain our
econometric methodology in Section 5, and summarize our empirical findings in Section 6.
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Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Theories of the Go-Shop Decision
Some targets employ go-shop provisions, while others choose no-shop provisions. Under
the assumption (subsequently relaxed) that targets and acquirors bargain over contracts to
maximize their respective benefits from the deal, and that each party to the negotiation
has a correct understanding of the consequences of its choices, when one observes a target
employing a go-shop clause to purchase that option as part of the contract, the implication
of observing that choice is that the value to the target of buying that option should exceed
the cost to the acquiror of granting that option (which is impounded in the acquiror’s bid).
Otherwise, both parties could be made better off by agreeing to include a no-shop clause in-
stead. According to contract theory, therefore, heterogeneity in the choice regarding go-shop
clauses in contracts entered into by well-informed value-maximizing targets and acquirors
acting in their own interests - where some contracts grant the option to shop, while others
do not - should reflect heterogeneous circumstances across firms with respect to the relative
sizes of the benefit targets receive, and the cost acquirors incur, from the go-shop option. As
already noted, it is also possible that non-value-maximizing motivations related to agency
problems may encourage non-value maximizing choices. A theoretical framework for pre-
dicting go-shop choice, therefore, should also attempt to capture the presence of agency
problems that distort the go-shop decision.
When one takes proper account of heterogeneous circumstances, whether one adopts a
value-maximizing theoretical framework, or one that also admits the possibility of agency
problems, there is no reason to expect any simple correlation between the presence of a go-
shop clause and the size of the acquisition premium received by a target or the consequences
of an acquisition for a target’s stock price. Under the assumption of value maximization,
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go-shops are endogenous decisions with different consequences for different firms. Firms
that choose go-shop or no-shop clauses have different, legitimate reasons for choosing one
or the other; there is no reason to expect a go-shop decision to be associated with higher
target value. In the presence of agency problems, this remains true, especially given the fact
that the various agents of the target firm (directors, management, lawyers and investment
bankers) differ in the nature of their conflicts; for lawyers, conflicts of interest make go-shops
more likely ceteris paribus, while for directors, managers and bankers, conflicts make them
less likely.
It is possible, however, to construct alternative theoretical models that predict how the
heterogeneous circumstances of targets should be associated with different propensities to
choose a go-shop clause. It is also possible to predict the consequences for acquisition premia
and target valuation of an exogenous increase in the propensity to choose a go-shop clause
(captured with instruments), after controlling for all influences that affect target valuation.
We will explore both of those empirical questions below in our empirical analysis of the
causes and consequences of go-shop decisions.
With respect to the modeling of the use of go-shops, observable cross-sectional character-
istics that predict the use of go-shops should reflect the underlying theoretical motivations for
employing them. Under the assumption of value maximization, retaining the option to shop
an offer has two potential gross advantages to a target firm whose directors, management
and advisors are acting in the interest of its shareholders. First, having a bona fide offer in
hand can be a useful means to convey information to other would-be acquirors, which may
demonstrate hard-to-observe valuable aspects of the target to them, and thereby convince
would-be acquirors that chose not to participate in the initial bidding to now invest time
and effort in formulating a competing bid. In other words, when targets shop their offer,
they encourage "free riding" by would-be acquirors on the investment of time and effort in
due diligence by the acquiror whose offer is being shopped. Of course, initial bidders are
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somewhat protected against such free riding by termination fees (and in some cases match-
ing rights which allow initial bidders to respond to subsequent bids), but go-shop windows
temporarily lower those termination fees precisely to encourage some free riding. If shopping
an offer encourages additional bidding, then targets that include a go-shop clause in their
contract may enjoy an increase in the acquisition price paid.
Second, as noted before, the presence of a go-shop clause may reduce the litigation
risk faced by the target. Given the risk that target stockholders may challenge no-shop
transactions - charging that the target failed to receive a sufficient price due to conflicts
of interest - go-shop provisions may serve a useful role in mitigating litigation risk. Of
course, a go-shop clause is only one of several possible devices that could provide prima facie
evidence that directors and management are insuring that acquirors do not get a "steal."
Other alternative means of immunizing against litigation risk - which one would expect
to substitute for the use of go-shops - include: (a) a widespread "market check" undertaken
prior to the execution of the merger agreement (what is sometimes termed engaging in a pre-
signing market check or "auction") or (b) an ownership structure that is highly concentrated
and/or aligned with management, which would make it difficult to argue that management
would have agreed to a low price as the result of a conflict of interest.
To the extent that go-shop clauses create value for the target, a value-maximizing target
will only choose a go-shop clause if the value to the target from retaining that option (the sum
of the expected improvement in the offer price, plus the expected benefit of the mitigation
of litigation risk) is greater than the implicit cost the target firm must pay for it. If targets
demand a go-shop clause, then acquirors should charge for the go-shop option by reducing the
offer price they would otherwise pay. Furthermore, if acquirors see the go-shop as reducing
the probability of consummating their transaction, they may invest less in due diligence
prior to their first bid, which may also lead them to bid less for the target (as the result
of less confidence about its value). Finally, if initial bidders are concerned that their initial
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bid might provide a signal of high target value to otherwise uninformed prospective bidders,
that could further reduce the initial bid they offer.
It is conceivable that the choice of a go-shop option could raise the initial bid price. For
example, assume an extreme case for which there is a near zero probability of attracting a
future bidder, and assume that the only gain to using the go-shop clause is the reduction
of expected litigation risk. Furthermore, assume that expected litigation cost savings are
shared by both the target and the acquiror. Under these assumptions, the use of a go-shop
clause should result in a higher initial offer price.
The magnitude of the adverse price impact of a go-shop should vary across targets,
as it should reflect the differing consequences of the inclusion of the go-shop clause for the
probability that the target will receive a superior offer from an alternative acquiror. A value-
maximizing target firm will choose a go-shop clause when the price reduction on the initial bid
is expected to be smaller than the sum of (1) the expected gains from attracting additional
bids at higher prices during the go-shop window and (2) reductions in expected litigation
costs. The initial price reduction, the expected gains from future bids, and expected litigation
cost savings all differ according to the circumstances of the target. Under the assumption of
value maximization, the paucity of the use of go-shop clauses suggests that negative effects
on expected offer prices likely dominate positive effects for most targets; otherwise, go-shops
would be ubiquitous.
We consider a variety of influences on litigation risk. Litigation by target shareholders
challenging an acquisition, ceteris paribus, should be more likely if ownership is more diffuse
because concentrated ownership is prima facie evidence of less managerial latitude in accept-
ing too low a price as it relates to those shareholders. Litigation risk should also be lower
In some cases, block shareholders may retain (or "roll over") their interest in the firm alongside manage-
ment in an MBO. In such cases, the effect of ownership concentration on litigation risk may be mitigated.
We examine this possibility in our robustness analysis below, but find no mitigating effect.
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if the target has marketed the firm broadly to solicit bidders, either in a pre-signing market
check (i.e., before the merger agreement is executed) or afterward through a go-shop. Finally,
the history of the target firm’s stock price may contribute to litigation risk. In particular, if
the market price of the target in the recent past had been high (say, $20 per share), but a
sudden fundamental shock has reduced the value of the target (say, to $15 per share), then
management might hesitate to accept a no-shop offer for $17 per share, even if this is a good
offer, fearing that shareholders would not understand the nature of the sudden fall in the
fundamental value of the firm. In that case, value-maximizing targets may prefer a go-shop
offer (even if it reduces the value of the deal to $16.50 per share), if the use of the go-shop
clause substantially reduces expected litigation cost (by more than $0.50 per share). In our
empirical work, we take account of all these possibilities.
For illustrative purposes, to help fix ideas about the "value-maximizing" approach to go-
shops, we construct a simple graphical depiction of the go-shop decision in Figure 3.1, under
the following simplifying assumptions: (1) Target directors choose "go-shops" to maximize
the value of the firm for its stockholders, which reflects their views of the effect of that
choice on the offer price, on future bidders, and on the expected costs of litigation. (2)
Expected litigation costs are born entirely by target shareholders and are an increasing
function of target size because of fixed costs that deter would-be litigant stockholders from
suing smaller firms, and because accusations of conflicts of interest are harder to win when
ownership is concentrated, as it tends to be in smaller firms. With concentrated ownership,
it is likely that blockholders (who would have enough knowledge of the firm’s prospects and
enough voting power to block the transaction) are able to constrain management, making
undervalued sales that are contrary to shareholders’ interests less likely. (3) To simplify this
discussion, we abstract from other contractual aspects of the transaction (whether the initial
bid resulted from a broad marketing of the target firm); for simplicity we assume that no
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firms are broadly marketed prior to the first accepted bid. (4) For more opaque firms (which
also are assumed to be smaller) the effect of a go-shop in attracting potential bidders is
relatively muted because of the higher fixed costs and greater marginal due-diligence costs
associated with making a bid. (5) Acquirors reduce initial offer prices in the presence of
a go-shop clause as a result of the greater free riding on their due diligence costs by other
potential bidders that occurs with go-shops.
Assumption (1) means that the target firm will choose a go-shop whenever the benefits
from doing so exceed the costs (from the standpoint of the value received by target firm
shareholders). Assumptions (2) and (4) imply that the gross benefits of employing a go-
shop clause are rising in firm size. Assumption (5) implies that the cost of employing a
go-shop clause is non-zero and constant with respect to firm size. Figure 3.1a solves for the
equilibrium size cutoff for the use of go-shops. Target firms larger than S* choose a go-shop;
those smaller than S* choose a no-shop.
Now, consider how conflicts of interest - which lead to departures from value maximization
- affect the go-shop size cutoff in Figure 3.1. First, as shown in Figure 3.1b, consider an
acquisition involving a managerial conflict in the form of, say, an MBO that is priced below
correct value, where the manager sees a private benefit from pushing the deal through and,
therefore, a private cost from including a go-shop (which raises the probability of losing his
good deal). This implies that the cost curve from the perspective of the manager will shift
In Figure 3.1, if we alternatively assumed that all deals were broadly marketed prior to receipt of the
initial accepted bid, the benefit curve would shift down (due to reduced savings from lower expected litigation
costs).
The theoretical predictions of our model would still hold if the cost curve were either declining or
increasing in firm size. For the latter case, the slope of the cost curve would need to be smaller than the
slope of the benefit curve.
MBOs are, by definition, transactions involving a potential conflict. Of course, a managerial conflict of
interest arises in any deal with an employment relationship between the target manager and the acquiror.
In our sample, preexisting managers tend to remain in acquired targets post-acquisition, so conflicts are
almost always present to some extent. One could argue, however, that some deals exhibit more potential
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upwards. The presence of the underpriced MBO, however, also raises the expected litigation
costs, in which the manager also shares, and this in turn implies that the benefit curve will
also shift upwards. The overall effect of managerial agency on the use of go-shops, therefore,
is ambiguous. Under the assumption that the first shift dominates the second, the new size
cutoff is S’, which implies a higher size cutoff for choosing a go-shop; but, if the increased
expected costs of litigation outweigh the gains from protecting the manager from higher bids,
then the size cutoff is at point S”, implying a greater use of go-shops.
A conflict of interest related to the target’s investment bank can also be depicted in
Figure 3.1b. The conflicted investment banker, who seeks to please the acquiror - with
whom he hopes to have future business - would use his influence to discourage the target
firm from including a go-shop clause, arguing that the litigation costs from the no-shop were
low relative to the cost of a reduced initial bid. As in the case of managerial conflict, the
equilibrium size cutoff for the use of the go-shop clause would shift to the right, to a point
like S’ (if the effects of investment banker conflict on expected litigation costs are relatively
small), or to a point like S”, if the litigation cost consequences of investment banker conflicts
dominate.
Finally, consider the effect of the target lawyer’s conflict of interest. The essence of that
conflict is that the target lawyer may earn a private benefit reputationally when her clients’
deals are able to avoid high litigation costs. In other words, the conflict arises if lawyers
are not credited fully with their contributions to higher acquisition premia in the deals on
which they advise, but are credited fully (or even excessively) for avoiding costly litigation
and blamed for not having avoided high litigation costs. This incentive distortion, if it
for conflict than others. Short of outright MBOs, the subset of transactions involving 13E-3 disclosures, are
deals where existing management is in the driver’s seat more than for other deals. Furthermore, investment
bankers working for targets will sometimes have contractual connections to acquirors, and sometimes not.
The manager shares these costs for several reasons. First, the manager typically is a shareholder. Second,
litigation may threaten the manager’s interests as part of the acquiring team in the MBO.
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exists, leads lawyers to prefer go-shops excessively, because they reduce expected litigation
costs. Because lawyers can influence managerial perceptions of litigation costs, a conflicted
attorney who encourages excessive use of go-shops shifts the benefit curve upwards, as shown
in Figure 3.1c, making the size cutoff for go-shops (S”’) smaller.
As this analysis shows, a proper analysis of the choice of go-shop clauses requires one to
take account of the heterogeneous circumstances of the target firms that are choosing whether
to include go-shop or no-shop clauses. Larger target firms, targets with more diffuse owner-
ship, firms that did not widely market a target before executing the merger agreement, firms
where potential director, managerial or investment banker conflicts of interest are absent,
and firms with lawyers who are excessively risk averse in their concerns about litigation risk,
ceteris paribus, may be more likely to choose a go-shop clause; smaller targets, target firms
with more concentrated ownership, targets that were widely marketed prior to executing
the merger agreement, or firms that suffer from director, managerial or investment banker
conflicts may be less likely to choose a go-shop. As we will discuss in detail in our empirical
analysis below, simple cross-sectional comparisons regarding the characteristics of targets
that employ go-shops or no-shops, as well as regression analysis of the go-shop choice, are
broadly consistent with the predictions from Figures 3.1a-3.1c.
Our empirical analysis also explores the effects on initial accepted bids and on target firm
values of choosing to include a go-shop clause. In theory, an exogenous influence that leads a
firm to employ a go-shop clause should reduce the initial accepted bid (because the acquiror
charges for the granting of this option, as discussed above). Whether an exogenous influence
that leads a firm to employ a go-shop clause raises or lowers the market value of the target
firm is ambiguous, depending on what other influences matter for the go-shop decision. In
This incentive distortion may reflect differences in the signal-to-noise ratio for evaluating the contribution
of the law firm to the outcome. It is plausible to think that it is much easier to infer the role of a lawyer in
affecting litigation costs than in the bid received on a deal.
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a value-maximizing framework, an exogenous increase in the use of go-shops (for example,
if for reasons unrelated to the fundamentals of the transaction the target firm happens to
have an attorney that encourages the excessive use of go-shops) will reduce the value of the
target. If, however, as the result of director, managerial or investment banker conflicts, the
target was likely to under-employ a go-shop clause, then this exogenous influence could be
favorable for target firm value.
In our review of the literature, in Section 3, we discuss more fully the challenges that
arise when attempting to identify shifts in the probability of go-shop choice that do not have
direct consequences (other than through the consequences of the go-shop decision itself)
for the initial or subsequent bids received by the target. In Sections 4-6, we address those
challenges with our own empirical estimation techniques.
3.3 Literature Review
Go-shop clauses began to be used with frequency in 2004 and, to our knowledge, there are
few academic studies of their effects, of which only one is an empirical analysis of the use of
go-shop clauses (Subramanian (2008)).
Roberts and Sweeting (2011) develop a theoretical framework that is most directly appli-
cable to go-shops, although it is more general in its treatment. Building on the theoretical
and empirical M&A studies of Wilson (1987), Fishman (1988), Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998),
Wasserstein (2000), Boone and Mulherin (2007), Horner and Sahuguet (2007), Ye (2007)),
and Bulow and Klemperer (2009), Roberts and Sweeting (2011) explore a range of theoreti-
cal questions related to the differences between sequential and simultaneous auctions. They
show that sequential auctions can be value-creating for targets when bidder entry is costly
and when potential bidders receive imperfectly informative signals about their values prior
to deciding whether to bid. In other words, sellers can benefit from the learning process that
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occurs in a sequential auction, such as a go-shop. Under some circumstances, structuring
a bidding process for a target firm to elicit accepted bids in a sequence tends to result in
higher ultimate bids.
Subramanian (2008) finds that deals with go-shop clauses yield greater search (both
pre- and post-signing of the merger agreement) than no-shops. He also finds that pure
go-shops - go-shop deals without pre-signing market checks - result in a higher post-offer
bidder 17 percent of the time (a total of six instances), and that target shareholders receive
approximately 5 percent higher returns from the pure go-shop process than they do under
a no-shop. The exceptions are management buyouts (MBOs), where the inclusion of a go-
shop clause has no discernible effect on competing bidding. Subramanian concludes that
"the Delaware courts should generally permit go-shops as a means of satisfying a sell-side
board’s Revlon duties but should pay close attention to their structure, particularly in the
context of go-shop MBOs."
Subramanian (2008) analyzes 141 public company buyout transactions for U.S. targets
of greater than $50 million in value announced between January 2006 and August 2007.
He excludes from his sample acquisitions out of bankruptcy, as well as acquisitions with a
controlling target shareholder [using a threshold of 35%], on the theory that "any shopping
process would not be meaningful in these deals unless the controller agreed to sell its shares
into a higher-value competing bid (which is rare)." We would note that, as we discuss above,
it is also true that closely controlled targets may have less need of a go-shop provision to
mitigate litigation risk, because the implicit approval of the controlling shareholder argues
against the possibility of managerial conflicts of interest. As we show below, closely held
firms are less likely to choose go-shop provisions.
Subramanian (2008) finds that go-shop provisions are used in roughly a third of the
transactions he studies. He compares cumulative abnormal stock returns (net of the S&P
Composite Index) over the period from 30 days prior to the deal announcement to 30 days
121
after the announcement, and finds that the deals with pure go-shop clauses (29 observations)
have cumulative abnormal returns that are 5 percent higher than the other firms, which is
significant at the 90% level, although he finds no statistically significant difference between
go-shops as a whole and no-shops.
Subramanian (2008) offers important confirmation that go-shops provide a bona fide
means of marketing a target firm after the receipt of an accepted offer. His focus on re-
turns is also potentially useful for distinguishing whether go-shops are chosen in a manner
consistent with value maximization. If go-shops are chosen by targets only in order to max-
imize expected target value, then holding other factors constant, the cumulative abnormal
returns associated with go-shop choice should be zero. As the market observes firms pre-
dictably choosing go-shops or no-shops and bargaining to maximize their potential value,
there should be no consequence for abnormal returns of the predictable differences in con-
tracting structure that reflect firms’ heterogeneous circumstances. Conversely, if go-shops
deliver excess abnormal returns, after holding other factors constant, this would provide evi-
dence in favor of the under-use of go-shops by at least some of the no-shop firms, presumably
reflecting conflicts of interest.
Nevertheless, we do not believe that Subramanian (2008) has estimated a convincing
measure of the net expected benefits to target firms from choosing go-shops, holding other
factors constant. He does not model the go-shop decision, nor adequately considers how
differences in firms’ circumstances and in deal characteristics increase or decrease the proba-
bility of the choice of a go-shop clause. When go-shop decisions are an endogenous outcome
of firms’ circumstances, a two-stage regression analysis is needed to disentangle the extent to
which the correlation between go-shops and acquisition premia reflects the go-shop decision
per se, or the consequences for acquisition pricing of cross-sectional differences in firm at-
tributes that also predict the use of go-shops. Subramanian (2008) recognizes this problem,
and constructs a "matched sample" of no-shops that he matches with his pure go-shops in
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an attempt to control for differences in target firms’ circumstances. In his matched-sample
comparisons, he again finds a 5 percent difference in returns, although they are no longer
statistically significant. The differences across deals that Subramanian takes into account
in his matched-sample comparisons (deal size, who initiates the deal, and the timing of the
transaction), however, as we show below, do not capture all of the important heterogeneity
in targets’ characteristics that matter for the go-shop choice. Because go-shop decisions are
not made randomly by firms, Subramanian’s methodology results in biased estimates of the
effects of go-shops on firms’ returns.
Indeed, as we discuss in Section 2, in theory, once the endogeneity of go-shops is taken
into account, the exogenous effect of go-shops on the initial offer price should be negative,
not positive, and the effect on returns is ambiguous. In our empirical work, we model the
go-shop decision explicitly, and measure the effect of exogenous influences on the go-shop
choice on the offer price received by the target, and on target returns, after controlling for
firm and deal characteristics that affect the offer price and target returns directly (rather
than through the go-shop decision).
We do not attempt a comprehensive review of the literatures on conflicts of interest
here. With respect to conflicts of target management in M&A transactions, Brewer and
Wall (2012) provide a review of the literature, and an empirical methodology that shares
many aspects with our approach (see also Yim (forthcoming)). For Brewer and Wall (2012)’s
sample of bank mergers, they find evidence that CEOs wishing to find future employment
opportunities (instrumented by age) limit the marketing of target firms. For a review of the
literature on investment bankers’ conflicts of interest in M&A transactions, see Calomiris and
Singer (2004) and Calomiris and Hitscherich (2007). These studies examine whether prior
relationships between a target’s investment bankers and the acquiror are associated with
different outcomes in acquisition premia for targets. Calomiris and Singer (2004) analyze
52 large hostile takeover transactions between 1993 and 2003. They find no evidence that
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potential conflicts affect acquisition premia. Calomiris and Hitscherich (2007) examine 170
cash acquisitions of more than $100 million over the period 1994 to 2002. They find no
evidence of a connection between a target bank’s prior relationship with the acquiror and
the acquisition premium.
With respect to the lawyer conflict modeled in Section 2, we are unaware of any prior
study related to this phenomenon. There are, however, studies that posit effects on corporate
financing decisions that vary with the identities of legal advisers. Coates (2001), for example,
shows that despite theoretical predictions suggesting that takeover defenses can lead to lower
proceeds in IPOs, "companies advised by larger law firms with more takeover experience
adopt more defenses." Coates argues that the decision to take an action that can affect firm
value is the net sum of a host of motivations, many of which may also directly correlate with
firm value. He argues that a key aspect of legal advisers is that they tend to be exogenous
influences on firm value, especially in light of the fact that the choice of legal counsel tends
to pre-date the relevant transactions being studied. The choice of legal advisor is thus a
valid instrument that can help identify the exogenous effect of the recommended action on
firm value. Building on Coates (2001), Johnson and Yi (2012) use the choice of legal advisor
as an instrument to identify the causal effect of takeover defenses on firm valuation. Our
use of legal adviser identity is similar is spirit to these studies, although the three measures
related to the firm’s legal team are new, and reflect our desire to consider which aspects of
legal advice are more likely to be associated with a conservative posture toward litigation
risk.
3.4 Data
The transactions in our sample were identified based on information set forth in the database
of MergerMetrics, which is a product of FactSet. To be included in the sample, the trans-
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action needed to satisfy the following criteria: 1. The transaction was announced between
January 2004 and December 2011; 2. The target was a U.S. public company; 3. The consid-
eration paid to the target shareholders was cash and was offered pursuant to a transaction
whereby public ownership in the target would cease; 4. The acquiror was either a financial
or private equity buyer; 5. The transaction was not pursuant to a tender offer; and 6. The
target had available each of the (a) merger agreement and Merger Proxy Statement for the
transaction and the most recent proxy statement for the regularly scheduled annual meeting
of shareholders on the EDGAR database of the SEC and (b) stock price data. These various
requirements, especially given the 52-week range of analysis of stock prices used in our study,
reduced the number of observations in the sample from 356 identified transactions to 321
usable transactions. For each of the transactions so identified, information on a number of
attributes of the transaction was obtained, as described in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 also provides
the labels for the regressors used in the tables that report summary statistics. We focus on
cash deals with financial or private equity buyers because these transactions permit a clear
analysis of the responses of returns to deal characteristics. Deals that involve the exchange
of stock or involve strategic buyers who may reap synergies from the transaction complicate
the analysis of returns because once an accepted bid is announced changes in target value
reflect both the fortunes of the target and those of the would-be acquiror.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for those variables. Some key variables have defi-
nitions that depend on the choice of the base, pre-offer price. Our main analysis relies on
defining the pre-offer price using the closing price 30 days prior to the offer announcement.
This makes it unlikely that the pre-offer price will contain pre-announcement information
that reflects the bidding for the target firm. In a robustness section we will show that the
results remain qualitatively unaffected if instead we use a 5-day pre-announcement window,
The most significant source of attrition are price variables, for the computation of which we required no
fewer than 180 non-missing price observations over a calendar year (252 trading days)
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rather than a 30-day window. Our discussion henceforth will refer to definitions of variables
based on the 30-day pre-offer window.
In a little over half (57.6%) of the deals, the target was widely marketed (a so-called
"auction" was conducted) as part of the process of determining the initial bid. In terms of
the parameters of the deal, the average termination fee for the acquiror is 3.2% and the
average termination fee for the target is slightly higher at 3.6%. That difference is a result of
the fact that in a large number of deals (129) the acquiror was not subject to a termination
fee.10% of the deals are management buyouts (MBOs). In a MBO the buyers are also the
managers of the firm, and this can give rise to important differences between this type of
acquisition and other acquisitions, stemming either from conflicts of interest (discussed in
Section 2) or from differences in the extent of informational asymmetries. Unlike other
acquisitions, In an MBO, the buyer (management) likely knows more about the company
than the seller (the board of directors). Because of these considerations, we will perform our
analysis both on the complete sample and on a subsample that excludes MBOs. Our results
remain quantitatively unchanged across these two sampling methods.
There is great variation in the size of target firms. The average enterprise value is $2.3bil,
with values ranging from $300k to $123bil. Target firms have an average leverage ratio of 0.22,
with 91 (28%) target firms financed exclusively by equity. 86% have a shareholding structure
in which shareholders who individually own more than a 5% stake collectively control more
than 20% of the target. 56.4% of the target firms have "concentrated ownership," which we
define as an ownership distribution for which the ownership of the largest shareholder or the
collective ownership of officers and directors (a coordinated block) exceed 20%. The number
of officers and directors of the firm varies from 4 to 34, with the average at 12.9.
The average offer premium is 34.3%. There is substantial variation in the offer premium,
Also known as the reverse termination fee.
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with a standard deviation of 49% and offer premia ranging from a low value of -74.8% to a
high value of 352.3%. The average 52 week high offer ratio is 148.8%, ranging from 100% to
1688%, and the average annualized volatility of daily returns is 48.4%, ranging from 15.7%
to 265.6%.
In 22.1% of the deals the acquiror has the option to exit the deal if they fail to secure
financing for the acquisition, but in 15.3% of the deals the target’s financial advisor agreed
to offer the acquiror the option of financing. In almost half the deals (49.2%), the target
firm’s financial advisor has a prior relationship with the acquiror.
Litigation risk is an important concern in acquisitions, as is evident by the fact that more
than half of the deals (57.9%) had a special committee formed to examine the transaction
and report directly to the board of directors on how to structure the acquisition. 10% of
the target firms retained the services of multiple legal advisors to advise them about their
acquisition. By construction, roughly a fourth of the targets are classified as retaining the
services of what we define as "top-tier" legal advisors.
M&A activity seems to have been affected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Figure 3.2
shows the number of deals per year for the period 2004-2011. Activity peaked in 2006 and
2007, with 65 and 68 acquisitions announced in each of those years respectively. Activity
dropped significantly in 2008-2009 to 25 and 21 deals, respectively, and recovered partially
in 2010-2011. Go-shop provisions initially gained in popularity over time, rising from 13%
of all deals in 2004 to 38% by 2007. The share of deals with go-shop provisions remained
at similar levels until 2011 when it suddenly dropped to 22%. As can be seen in Figure
3.3, these patterns extend to the dollar value of the deals per year where, however, a much
sharper decline after 2007 is visible.
Our definition of "top-tier" is shown in Table 3.1 and described in detail in a subsequent section.
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3.4.1 Mean Comparisons: Go-shops vs no-shops
A central question of our paper is whether the inclusion of a go-shop provision in the merger
agreement affects the offer premium. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the offer premium
for go-shop and no-shop deals. Panel (a) shows the offer premium computed based on the
30-day pre-offer price and panel (b) using the 5-day pre-offer price. The distribution of the
offer premium appears to be centered on a slightly higher mean for go-shops, the difference
being a bit more significant for the distribution of the 5-day premia.
The offer premium may of course depend on a number of factors, so further analysis -
in particular, the regression analysis developed in Sections 4 and 5 below - is needed before
one can derive conclusions about the effect of the go-shop provision on the premium. Firm
attributes that may directly affect the offer premium, such as size, for example, may be
substantially different in the two populations.
In Section 2, we developed several theoretical predictions, based on a simple model of go-
shops, about differences between the attributes of go-shop and no-shop transactions. Those
predictions generally are consistent with the simple comparisons of means reported in Table
3.3. In particular, as further illustrated in Figure 3.5, go-shop firms tend to be larger than
no-shop firms. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the natural logarithm of enterprise value
for target firms, for the populations of go-shops and no-shops, where it is clear that go-shops
are associated with larger targets.
Table 3.3 provides other support for the simple comparative static exercises of Section
2. In theory, if litigation risk is higher for deals with relatively high ratios of high 52-week
highs to offer price, then go-shops should display higher ratios, which they do, although
the difference in means is not statistically significant. Similarly, widely marketed deals
("auctions") are much less likely to require go-shops, presumably because there is less value
in the go-shop option, and because there is less to be gained in terms of mitigating litigation
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risk from including a go-shop clause. In theory, greater ownership concentration should
be associated with less use of go-shops because it mitigates concerns about litigation risk,
and we find that this is true (whether one uses the Total Ownership by 5% holders, or an
indicator for whether there is a >20% owner, as the measure of ownership concentration).
In theory, the effect of MBOs on the go-shop decision is ambiguous; in Table 3.3, MBOs
tend to make greater use of go-shops, presumably out of concern for litigation risk. Similarly,
with respect to the effect of investment banker conflicts on the go-shop decision (which is
ambiguous in theory), go-shops are more likely to be chosen if the target’s investment bank
has a relationship with the acquiror.
We construct three binary indicator variables to capture the effects of lawyer conflicts
on the go-shop decision. We assume that lawyers’ excessive risk aversion will be higher (1)
the higher is the rank of the law firm advising the target (because that firm has greater
reputational capital at stake from litigation costs), (2) if a special committee is formed
to advise the board on the transaction (because this places a greater focus on procedural
concerns and gives greater weight to lawyers’ opinions on contractual terms), and (3) if
there are multiple law firms advising the target (because more lawyers will be associated
with a greater focus on procedural concerns, and because retaining more lawyers increases
the probability of a conservative legal opinion in favor of a go-shop, which other lawyers
would have little interest in opposing). (The details of the construction of the legal rank
variable are provided in Section 5 below.) All three of these dimensions of targets’ legal
advisors prove to be associated with a greater use of go-shops, and all three are statistically
significant. We also find that target firms with a greater number of officers and directors
are more likely to choose go-shops. There are many potential interpretations of that finding.
One possibility is that more officers and directors may be associated with a preference for
formalized procedures.
No statistically significant differences exist in the offer premium, although the offer pre-
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mium is somewhat higher for go-shops on average (as we show below, this difference is not
present once one controls for other differences in deals). There are no large or statistically sig-
nificant mean differences between go-shops and no-shops associated with volatility, leverage,
or the size of the termination fees for either the target or the acquiror. Merger agreements
with go-shop provisions are less likely to include a financing condition, and marginally less
likely to include the option for the acquiror to obtain financing from the target firm’s fi-
nancial advisor. These differences in contract structure may reflect other aspects of no-shop
transactions (e.g., greater opacity of no-shops, which may make financing by an informed
target banker useful).
3.4.2 OLS Regressions: Partial Covariance between Go-Shop Choice and the
Offer Premium
The differences in means tests presented in Table 3.3 suggest that including a go-shop pro-
vision in the initial agreement may be associated with a positive, albeit statistically not
significant, effect on the offer premium. As the same tests also showed, however, the pop-
ulation of deals with go-shop provisions differs along a number of characteristics from the
population of deals with no-shop provisions. To the extent that these characteristics are
related to firm value, the observed differences in the offer premium may be unrelated to the
go-shop provision.
To measure the partial covariance between the go-shop choice and the initial offer pre-
mium, we estimate a linear model of the offer premium using a rich set of controls as
explanatory variables, in addition to the dummy variable for the go-shop provision. We
emphasize that the coefficient on the go-shop choice should not be interpreted as indicative
of a causal effect of the go-shop choice on the offer premium because the go-shop choice is
itself an endogenous variable (we address this endogeneity problem at length in Sections 5
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and 6). Our OLS specification is shown in Equation 3.1:
OPit = κt + β ·GOi + γ · Controlsit + uit (3.1)
OPit is the offer premium for deal i announced in year t. GOi is a dummy variable
indicating whether the initial agreement contained a go-shop provision and Controlsit is a
vector that contains a rich set of additional controls (definitions are shown in Table 3.1).
We also include year fixed effects (κt) to control for the impact of aggregate macroeconomic
conditions on offer premia; uit is an idiosyncratic error term.
The control variables used in the OLS regressions can be grouped into three broad cat-
egories, based on the degree to which they convey information about target characteristics,
market perceptions, or attributes of the initial agreement.
Characteristics of the target firm can have an effect on the offer premium. High leverage
may indicate growth opportunities, positive creditor perceptions and/or managerial disci-
pline, and could thus enter the equation with a positive sign. Previously, we argued that
small size may be a proxy for greater asset opacity, but it may also be associated with many
other characteristics that could matter for valuation, and therefore the likely effect of large
size on the premium is uncertain. The effect of shareholding structure is also unclear on a
priori grounds, but to control for the possibility of an effect we include two dummy vari-
ables, one indicating whether the largest coordinated shareholding block (single shareholder
or collective ownership of owners and directors) controls an excess of 20% of the firm and the
other indicating whether holders of a minimum 5% stake collectively own more than 20% of
The time index indicates the use of time-dependent rather than time-varying controls, as all controls are
measured at only one point in time for each deal.
Though a host of target firm characteristics can affect firm value, for identification we can limit our
attention only to those characteristics that may affect the offer premium, which measures the premium of
the initial offer in relation to a pre-announcement market measure of firm value.
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the target firm.
Market controls are also included. Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2012) show that reference
point prices can have a positive effect on the bidder’s offer price. To control for this effect,
we include the 52 week high offer ratio. We also include returns volatility although its effect
is not clear.
The initial contract specifies termination fees for the target firm and for the acquiror.
Although it is not clear how these fees might covary with the premium, we include them as
important financial parameters of the agreement. Termination fees impose exit costs and
may also reflect bargaining power differentials between the parties involved in the acquisition,
and, therefore, may covary with the offer premium. The financing aspects of the contract
may also covary with the offer premium. A financing condition is a right to the acquiror
to exit the contract if financing cannot be secured. Such exit risk, however, can be hedged
by the target firm’s financial advisor agreeing to offer financing to the acquiror as needed.
This financing option reduces exit risk for the target, but at the same time, it may create
a conflict of interest for the financial advisor who, on one hand, has an incentive to obtain
the highest offer possible for the target, but on the other hand, may stand to profit from
financing the deal for the acquiror. We include two binary indicator variables to indicate the
presence of a financing condition or a financing option, and proxy for additional potential
conflicts of interest by including a dummy variable indicating whether the target’s financial
advisor had a prior relationship with the acquiror.
The acquisition may be a management buyout. We have no strong prior on the direction
of this effect but recognize that MBOs are qualitatively different from normal acquisitions,
due, for example, to lower informational asymmetries. We therefore add a binary indicator
for whether the deal is an MBO. We also re-estimate our models on a slightly smaller sample
that excluded management buyouts. Finally, we include a dummy variable which indicates
whether an auction was conducted as part of the process of obtaining the initial bid. All of
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the regressions include year fixed effects.
Table 3.4 shows the results of the OLS regression. Column (1) shows the estimates over
the complete sample, which includes MBOs, using the 30-day closing price as the pre-offer
price. We repeat the estimation on a sample that excludes MBOs in column (2). Columns
(3)-(4) repeat the estimates shown in columns (1)-(2) for definitions which use the 5-day
closing price as the pre-offer price. In all four columns, the go-shop provision does not covary
statistically significantly with the offer premium in the presence of the various controls. We
do not discuss the partial covariances between the offer premium and the various control
variables, except to mention that several of them are statistically significant.
3.5 2SLS Methodology for a Continuous Endogenous Regressor
In contrast to Subramanian (2008), our OLS estimates indicate no simple empirical con-
nection between go-shops and offer premia once one controls for firm, market and deal
characteristics. We do not, however, present these OLS estimates as conclusive measures
of the causal effects of the choice of go-shop provisions on acquisition premia. As discussed
in Section 3, in our review of Subramanian (2008), the go-shop decision is not exogenous
to many factors that are correlated with the acquisition premium. In order to estimate
the exogenous effect of the go-shop provision on the offer premium, we need to employ a
framework that addresses the endogeneity of the go-shop decision.
With appropriate instrumental variables, we can employ the use of the two-stage least
squares methodology (2SLS) to estimate the exogenous effect of the go-shop provision on
the offer premium. The instrumental variables should affect the offer premium only through
their influence on the determination of the go-shop decision.
The 2SLS estimation method we employ consists of two linear stages, the first modeling
the go-shop decision and the second using the fitted values from the first stage to estimate
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the exogenous effect of the go-shop decision on the offer premium. More concretely, in the
first stage we estimate the specification shown in Equation 3.2, where the go-shop decision
is modeled as a linear equation, which includes a set of control variables (αt , Controlsit)
and exogenous instruments (Instrumentsit):
GOi = αt + δ · Controlsit + µ · Instrumentsit + wit (3.2)
Controls are defined as variables that affect both the go-shop decision and the acquisition
premium. Instruments are assumed only to affect the go-shop decision; instruments only
matter for the acquisition premium through their effect on the go-shop decision. For each
deal, this linear first stage would yield estimates of the probability of including a go-shop
decision, and this projected probability ( ˆGOi) would be used in the place of the go-shop
dummy in the second stage, which models the offer premium. The second stage is shown in
Equation 3.3, where the exogenous effect of the go-shop provision on the offer premium is
captured by the estimated value of β:
OPit = κt + β · ˆGOi + γ · Controlsit + uit (3.3)
3.5.1 2SLS methodology adjusted for a binary endogenous variable
The go-shop decision is a binary variable, and although we could model this variable using a
linear equation as described above, we can greatly improve the fit and efficiency of 2SLS by
employing the use of a non-linear binary choice model such as the probit model for the first-
stage regression. As in the linear case, we estimate the probit model using as explanatory
variables a set of control variables that are common to the first and second stage, as well
as one or more instrumental variables. The specification we use is shown in Equation 3.4,
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where I() is the indicator function and it is a normally distributed error term:
GOi = I(αt + γ · Controlsit + λ · Instrumentsit + it) (3.4)
Following the steps outlined as procedure 18.1 in Wooldridge (2002), the fitted proba-
bilities from this "zeroth" stage regression can then be used as the sole instrument in the
first stage of the 2SLS estimator. Denoting the fitted values from the probit ˆGOpri, the first
stage of the 2SLS now becomes:
OPit = κt + δ · ˆGOpri + µ · Controlsit + wit (3.5)
The second stage is estimated as in a normal 2SLS estimation. With an endogenous
binary variable, this approach improves efficiency over the standard 2SLS estimator. We
need not adjust the standard errors to account for having a generated instrument because
(a) the probit estimates are
√
N -consistent and (b) E(uit|Controlsit, Instrumentsit = 0),
and hence the
√
N -asymptotic distribution of β is the same whether we use the true or
estimated coefficients from the probit stage in constructing the instrument.
This method relies on the standard 2SLS assumption that the control variables only have
a linear effect on the second-stage dependent variable. In other words, in the offer-premium
equation any non-linear effects should only be due to the nonlinearity introduced by the
go-shop decision. Under this approach, in principle one could model the go-shop decision
in the probit stage without including any additional exogenous regressors as instruments
(i.e., just using the control variables from the second stage) and have the identification come
exclusively from the non-linearity introduced by the probit model. To avoid issues of severe
Wooldridge (2002), pg 623
Wooldridge (2002), pg 117
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multicollinearity in the first stage, however, it is recommended that excluded instruments
be added to the probit stage.
3.5.2 Choice of exogenous instruments
We use three dummy variables that proxy for some combination of litigation risk and lawyers’
conflicts of interest in recommending go-shops to capture exogenous variation in the go-shop
decision. These three variables (the same three legal indicators discussed in Section 4) affect
the propensity to include a go-shop provision in the merger agreement, but should not be
directly related to target firm’s value and, therefore, should not directly affect the offer
premium.
First, we include an indicator for whether a special committee was formed to examine the
transaction. The special committee explores different options before making a recommenda-
tion to the board, and aims at structuring a deal which strengthens the legal defenses of the
firm against future lawsuits challenging the fairness of the transaction; its formation is either
an indication of the presence of high litigation risk, or of a legal team that is excessively
cautious about litigation risk (the lawyer conflict).
Second, as we argued in Section 4, the number of legal advisors involved in the transaction
is also an indicator either of higher litigation risk or greater lawyer conflicts. We thus include
a binary indicator variable, indicating whether the target’s legal team included multiple legal
advisors.
Third, for each legal advisor, we construct another binary indicator variable that captures
whether the legal advisor is a highly ranked law firm. Again, this variable can either be
viewed as an indicator of high litigation risk or as an indicator of a greater potential lawyer
conflict (higher ranked law firms have more reputational risk, and therefore, more potential
conflict with target shareholders). To construct the legal rank variable, we first construct
a variable (deals) which contains the total number of deals that each legal advisor was
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involved in over the three-year period prior to the year of announcement of the acquisition.
We then create a new variable (avgdeals) which averages these deals over all of the legal
advisors involved in each particular acquisition. Finally, we construct a dummy variable
(Legal_Adv_Rank) which assumes the value of 1 if the value of avgdeals for the particular
acquisition lies above a certain threshold. The threshold we use is the upper quartile of
the distribution of avgdeals over all acquisitions that were announced during the same year.
This is the last instrument used to proxy for legal advisor driven litigation risk.
3.6 Regression Results
3.6.1 Determinants of the go-shop decision
Column (1) of Table 3.5 shows the coefficients of the probit model estimated over the com-
plete sample (including MBOs) and using a full set of controls and exogenous instruments.
The three variables capturing litigation risk have a positive influence on the decision of
whether to include a go-shop provision in the initial agreement. Legal_Adv_Rank and
Special_Committee are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, while
Multiple_Lawyers narrowly misses statistical significance at the 10% level.
Acquisitions where broad marketing (an "auction") was conducted as part of determining
the initial bid are less likely to include a go-shop provision, since the auction process reduces
the marginal benefit of shopping around for competing bids, as discussed in Sections 2 and
4.
Large targets are more likely to choose go-shops. As discussed in Section 2, size is likely
We have experimented with different definitions of this variable involving the value of the deals instead
of the number of deals, the maximum value of deals instead of the average for each acquisition, and using
alternative threshold rules such as the mean and median of the distribution. The definition that created the
strongest instrument was the one using the number of deals, averaged over the legal advisors involved in the
acquisition, and compared against the upper quartile of the distribution.
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a proxy for asset opacity, or perhaps for asset specificity (the number of potential bidders
may be increasing in target size), where opacity can be thought of as the variance of the
distribution of valuations around the true fundamental value of the target.
Shareholding structures in which a single block controls more than 20% of the firm are
less likely to include go-shop provisions, as discussed in Section 2. Interestingly, however,
the sign on Total Ownership by 5% shareholders is positive and sometimes significant. The
sum of the two ownership coefficients is negative, indicating that high concentration with
a blockholder results in a lower probability of a go-shop, but high concentration without a
block holder possibly results in a higher probability of a go-shop. One interpretation of this
latter effect is that high concentration without a blockholder may give greater incentives for
a disgruntled shareholder to challenge the deal, resulting in higher expected litigation costs.
Three more variables may be important for the go-shop decision, although they enter
with statistical significance that misses the 10% threshold. The first variable is the dummy
for MBOs. MBOs are special in that the potential buyer (the management) has an infor-
mational advantage over the seller (board) and there is therefore additional pressure related
to litigation risk in an MBO to take any measures (such as including a go-shop) that are
necessary to ensure the fairness of the transaction. The second variable is the number of
officers and directors, which as discussed in Section 4, may reflect the need for more formal
assurances in assessments of fairness. Finally, a financing condition also results in a higher
propensity to include a go-shop provision. A financing condition offers the acquiror the
option to exit the deal if it is unable to secure financing and thus raises the need for a con-
tingency plan in case the initial deal collapses; the option of shopping around for competing
bids provides such a contingency plan through greater access to other potential acquirors.
Finally, market-related variables, leverage, termination fees and variables capturing various
parameters of the involvement of the target’s financial advisor do not have an impact on the
go-shop decision.
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Column (2) estimates the same model using as explanatory variables only the variables
capturing litigation risk. The coefficients of these three variables remain largely unchanged
from the results in the full model, and this attests to the very robust effect these variables
have on determining the go-shop decision. This parsimonious model will be used repeatedly
in robustness tests throughout the next few sections, but due to its low predictive power
(as attested by the low value of pseudo-R2) any results obtained through its use should be
interpreted with caution.
Columns (3) and (4) repeat the regressions in the first two columns for the sample
that excludes MBOs. The results remain largely unchanged (however, the coefficients for
Number_OD, and Financing_Condition exhibit appreciable increases in magnitude).
3.6.2 2SLS estimates of the effect of the go-shop provision on the offer premium
Column (1) of Table 3.6 shows the 2SLS estimates. As predicted in Section 2, and contrary
to the result reported in Subramanian (2008), the option provided to the target firm by the
go-shop provision is indeed priced in the form of a lower initial bid premium. The magnitude
is economically significant, indicating that the go-shop provision results in a 41% decrease in
the initial offer premium. The estimated coefficients of the control variables assume values
similar to the ones obtained in the OLS specification discussed earlier, the two exceptions
being Large_Target and Financing_Condition which now decrease in magnitude and lose
their high level of statistical significance.
The sole instrument used in this 2SLS specification is the fitted values from the probit
model and, as discussed earlier, one identifying assumption of our methodology is that any
non-linearity in the offer-premium equation comes solely through the effect of the non-linear
go-shop decision. Relaxing that assumption could cast doubt on the results, on the grounds
that what our instrumented variable (probit projection) may be identifying is non-linearities
in the relationship between the offer premium and each of the control variables (that is,
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non-linearities that exist in addition to the non-linear effect of the go-shop decision).
As a robustness test, we re-estimate our model using only the exogenous variables cap-
turing litigation risk as explanatory variables in the probit model. The probit estimates
of this model were previously discussed and are shown in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3.5,
respectively, for the full sample and for the sample that excludes MBOs. The 2SLS estimates
that result from using this more "distilled" probit projection as the instrument are shown
in column (2) of Table 3.6, where we again identify a negative and statistically significant
effect of the go-shop provision. The magnitude is now larger but the Kleibergen-Paap rank
Wald F-statistic indicates the presence of weak instruments.
To further test the robustness of this result, we re-estimate the model using a parsimo-
nious specification both in the probit and in the second stage and the results are shown in
column (3) of Table 3.6. Although the go-shop coefficient now decreases in magnitude, we
still identify a negative exogenous effect of the go-shop provision on the offer premium; the
null of a weak instrument is marginally rejected in this parsimonious version.
The results of these two robustness tests are obtained in the presence of marginally weak
instruments and they should thus be treated with caution. This caveat notwithstanding,
the results suggest that our method is indeed identifying the exogenous effect of the go-shop
provision on the offer premium and not the presence of some unrelated non-linearity in the
second stage.
Columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 3.6 repeat the same estimations on a sample that
excludes MBOs, where we observe the same negative relationship but with a slight decrease
in magnitude. Also, as can be seen in Table 3.7, all of the above results are robust to the
use of the 5-day closing price as the pre-offer price in our definitions.
140
3.6.3 Endogenous litigation risk
As discussed in Section 3, previous studies (Coates (2001) and Johnson and Yi (2012) have
argued that the choice of legal advisors is a valid instrument, both in the context of IPO
transaction outcomes and takeover defenses. One could object, however, that firms’ choices of
legal counsel result from unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity with respect to litigation
risk - that is, firms with high litigation risk tend to be more likely to appoint a special
committee, employ multiple lawyers, and choose lawyers with a great market share in M&A
transactions. We cannot rule out this possibility. We would argue, however, that endogeneity
would be more likely to be a concern with regard to the target’s choices about forming a
special committee and retaining the services of multiple legal advisors.
To test the robustness of our results with respect to the possible endogeneity of the legal
advisory variables, we re-ran our estimations treating the special committee and multiple
lawyer dummies as control variables rather than instruments, and found the effect of the
go-shop decision retained its magnitude and also remained statistically significant at the
10% level. We also ran an even stricter test in which we treated all three instruments as
control variables, thus relying only on the non-linearity of the go-shop decision as the sole
source of identification, and found the effect of the go-shop decision to have a negative, albeit
somewhat reduced in magnitude, effect. The null of a zero effect was rejected at the 20%
level, and the null of a non-negative effect was rejected at the 10% level. Although we cannot
completely rule out the possibility of our instruments partly capturing the endogenous effect
of target litigation risk, the results of these rather strict tests strongly suggest that the
instruments are capturing the exogenous effect of the go-shop clause on the offer premium.
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3.6.4 The Effect of Go-Shop Choice on CARs
The previous results show that the option provided to the target by the go-shop provision is
priced in the form of a lower initial bid; this is in line with what our theoretical discussion in
Section 2 predicts. These results, however, do not answer the question of whether, on average,
the go-shop provision is value-generating or value-destroying. In Section 2, we found that
go-shops could be either value-destroying or value-creating, depending on a combination of
two considerations: (1) the motivations for the go-shop, and (2) the extent to which, absent
those motivations, the firm would have been value maximizing. Thus, the overall effect of
go-shop choice on value is ambiguous.
To address the question of whether, on average, go-shops are value creating, we turn our
attention to a market measure of value, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). We first plot
the distribution of CARs for the 31-day window starting 15 days prior to the announcement
date. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution separately for the populations of go-shop and no-shop
deals, where it appears to be the case that go-shop deals exhibit slightly higher CARs.
Following Subramanian (2008), in Figure 3.7 we also plot the daily evolution of average
CARs for the period starting 15 days prior to the announcement date and ending 15 days
after the announcement date; we plot these means separately for go-shop and no-shop deals.
Note that the means of the distributions shown in Figure 3.6 correspond to the rightmost
values in Figure 3.7.
Up until and including the day prior to the announcement date, CARs exhibit a slightly
upward but rather undifferentiated path between go-shops and no-shops; CARs reach a
moderate 2% level at that time. We then observe significant gains in CARs taking place
on the day of the announcement and the day following the announcement. As the figure
shows, at the end of this 31-day window, go-shop deals accumulate an excess of 5% in CARs
Figure 3, pg 754
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when compared to no-shop deals. This is quite similar to the result reported by Subramanian
(2008). Interestingly, this differential is achieved over the same two-day window where CARs
exhibit their rapid increase for both populations; the day of the announcement and the day
following the announcement.
Table 3.8 shows means tests for CARs for complete 31-day and 11-day windows centered
at the date of announcement, but also breaking down each window to its pre-announcement
and post-announcement components; the post announcement window is inclusive of the
date of announcement. At the end of the 31-day window, go-shop deals generate a statisti-
cally significant 6.66% excess in CARs compared to no-shop deals. Go-shops experience a
statistically significant though economically insignificant 0.07% gain in CARs during the pre-
announcement window, but the major gains are experienced from the day of the announce-
ment onwards, where go-shops accumulate a 6.59% excess in CARs. Similar observations
hold if we examine the 11-day window instead, the only difference being the economically
significant loss during the pre-announcement window.
3.6.5 OLS Estimates of the Effect of the Go-Shop Provision on CARs
Although the means tests suggest a positive effect of the go-shop provision on value (as prox-
ied by CARs), these simple estimates are likely to contain significant omitted variable bias.
Proceeding as with the offer premium estimates, we first correct for this bias by estimating
an OLS specification, where we include the same extensive list of explanatory variables used
in the offer premium equation. Column (1) of Table 3.9 shows the results for the 31-day
CARs estimated over the complete sample, which includes MBOs. The effect of the go-shop
decision appears to be positive but not significant under this specification. 52wk_high_ratio
and Leverage correlates positively with CARs and Large_Target and Auction come in with
a negative sign; these effects are statistically significant.
Columns (2) and (3) break up the 31-day window into a pre-announcement window
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and a post-announcement one; the latter includes the announcement date. Note that the
sum of the coefficients in columns (2) and (3) should be equal to the coefficient in column
(1). Comparing these two columns, the main differences are the reversal of the sign of the
go-shop decision and volatility. With regards to the go-shop decision, we see that it has
a positive and statistically significant effect during the post-announcement period, which
is what is driving the positive effect identified in column (1). Columns (4), (5) and (6)
repeat the estimations on a sample that excludes MBOs and the results are shown to remain
qualitatively unchanged. 2SLS estimates of the effect of the go-shop provision on CARs
As discussed earlier, the decision of whether to include a go-shop provision is endoge-
nously determined, and in this section we estimate the exogenous effect of the go-shop
provision on CARs using the same 2SLS methodology we employed in estimating the effect
on the offer premium. Column (1) of Table 3.10 shows the results for the 31-day CARs
estimated over the complete sample. The sign of the go-shop variable now becomes negative
but the size of the standard error suggests that the effect is not statistically different than 0.
Columns (2) and (3) break this effect down to its pre- and post- announcement components.
We see that the magnitude of the go-shop coefficient reverses moving from the pre- to the
post- announcement window and, as with the OLS results, the post-announcement effect
dominates the pre-announcement effect.
Columns (4)-(6) repeat the estimation on the full sample, using however only the three
variables capturing litigation risk in the probit model of the go-shop decision. The same
pattern is observed as regards the switching of the sign, but the magnitudes of the effects
are now stronger, although they still are not statistically significant. The instrument tests,
however, indicate the presence of weak instruments so these results should be interpreted
with caution.
In the regressions involving CARs the sample size falls from 321 to 313 because 8 observations had fewer
than 29 non-missing values during the 31-day window.
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Table 3.11 repeats the estimates on the sample excluding MBOs. Table 3.12 and Table
3.13 replicate the estimates in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 using an 11-day window instead
of a 31-day one. The same general patterns are observed in all of the experiments, the only
exception being the negative effect identified in the pre-announcement period in column (2)
of Table 3.12 and Table 3.13.
The go-shop decision does not appear to have any robust economically or statisticaly sig-
nificant effect on CARs during the pre-announcement period. During the post-announcement
period the results indicate the existence of a negative effect, but though this effect is statis-
tically further removed from 0, it is still not statistically significant.
3.6.6 Robustness: CEO Age
Following Brewer and Wall (2012), CEOs involved in acquisitions may accumulate private
benefits after the successful conclusion of the deal. Yim (forthcoming) develops and em-
pirically validates a theory which connects CEO age to the propensity for acquisitions. In
that model, private benefits to the CEO stemming from an acquisition, such as permanent
increases in compensation, accumulate over a longer period for younger CEOs and thus
increase the propensity for acquisition that is exhibited by acquirors with younger CEOs.
Brewer and Wall (2012) argue that a similar mechanism may be at play on the target’s
side. The CEO of the target may be offered private benefits from the acquiror in exchange
for recommending a lower offer premium to the target’s board. To the extent that such
benefits are permanent and accumulate over time, there should be a positive correlation
between CEO age and the offer premium.
We tested that hypothesis in our sample and found no evidence that the age of the CEO
Following Brewer and Wall (2012), we added as additional controls the age of the CEO, a dummy variable
indicating whether the CEO was chairman, and their interaction.
145
has a statistically significant effect on the go-shop decision, the offer premium or CARs.
Our results regarding the effect of the go-shop provision on the offer premium and CARs
remained unchanged by the inclusion of controls for the age of the target’s CEO.
3.6.7 Robustness: 13E-3 Disclosure
A member of the target’s board may hold an equity share in the acquiring firm, or may
be offered equity participation in the merged entity. This presents a conflict of interest, as
on one hand, the board member needs to work towards securing the best possible deal for
the target shareholders, but on the other hand, he/she stands to benefit from the acquiring
firm’s concluding the deal at a lower price. Conflicts of interest of this nature are more
likely to arise in targets with concentrated ownership. One implication of the presence of
such a correlation is that the variable capturing the effects of concentrated ownership on
the go-shop decision may actually be capturing more than the lower probability of future
litigation.
The target firm needs to disclose such potential conflicts of interest by filing Schedule
13E-3. We thus ran alternative specifications that include an indicator variable to capture
whether a Schedule 13E-3 was filed. This allows us to test for the effect of these conflicts
on either the go-shop decision or on target firm value. We found this variable to have
no statistically significant effect on the go-shop decision and its inclusion did not affect
the coefficient of the variable capturing the effects of concentrated ownership on the go-shop
decision. Also, it had no effect on CARs. It did affect the offer-premium equation marginally,
achieving significance at the 10% level only in the estimates on the sample that excluded
MBOs. More importantly for the main findings of this paper, its inclusion did not result in
any qualitative or quantitative changes on the estimated effect of the go-shop decision on
The signs of the age-related controls in the probit stage are as in Brewer and Wall (2012), but the
coefficients in our sample are not statistically significant.
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either the offer-premium or CARs.
3.6.8 Robustness: Reputation of the Investment Advisor
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) show that top-tier financial advisors generate higher
bidder returns in public acquisitions. Since "tier" is determined by deal activity, a reasonable
assumption is that the tier of the financial advisor correlates positively with the tier of the
legal advisor. Such a correlation could probably be driven by size (i.e., larger targets retain
the services of both top-tier legal advisors and top-tier financial advisors). Although we do
control for size in our estimation, it is still possible that our proxies for litigation risk are
capturing residual effects generated by the tier of the financial advisor.
To test that hypothesis, we constructed a binary variable indicating whether the target
firm worked with a top-tier financial advisor during the acquisition; the variable was con-
structed as in Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012). We found that including this variable
in the list of controls did not affect our results regarding the determinants of the go-shop
decision, or its exogenous effect on either the offer premium or CARs.
3.7 Conclusion
We construct a theoretical framework for explaining the choice of go-shop clauses by ac-
quisition targets, which takes account of value-maximizing motivations, as well as agency
problems related to conflicts of interest of management, investment bankers, and lawyers.
On the basis of that framework, we empirically investigate the determinants of the go-shop
decision, and the effects of the go-shop choice on acquisition premia and on target firm
value, using a regression methodology that explicitly allows for the endogeneity of the go-
shop decision. Our sample includes data on 321 cash acquisition deals - the entire sample of
transactions - for the period 2004-2011.
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We allow many aspects of target firms to enter into their go-shop decision, including the
nature of their legal counsel, their ownership structure, their size, and various other firm,
and deal characteristics. We find that legal advisor characteristics, ownership structure, and
the extent to which the transaction was widely marketed prior to the first accepted offer all
matter for the go-shop decision.
We employ legal advisor characteristics as instruments when analyzing the effects of go-
shop decisions on target acquisition premia and value. We find, as predicted in our theoretical
framework, that go-shops result in lower acquisition premia, ceteris paribus. In other words,
when targets insist on including a go-shop provision, they receive a lower offer. This result
reverses the previous finding in Subramanian (2008), which we argue resulted from a failure
to adequately control for endogeneity.
Our theoretical framework has an ambiguous prediction about the effects of go-shop
choice on target firm valuation. Whether the go-shop choice should increase the value of
a target should depend on a combination of the motivations underlying the go-shop choice
(that is, whether it arises from value-maximizing considerations or agency problems), as well
as whether, in general, the target firm makes value-maximizing decisions. We find some
evidence of a positive post-announcement effect for CARs related to go-shop choice, but this
effect is not robust to controlling for endogeneity. We regard the evidence regarding the
consequences of go-shops for target firms’ valuation responses, on average, as inconclusive -
not a surprising result, given the lack of any strong theoretical basis for a positive or negative
effect.
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Figure 3.1: Value-maximizing choice of adopting a go-shop provision
(a) Determination of the equilibrium size cutoff
(b) Shifts in the cutoff due to endogenous considerations
(c) Shift in the cutoff due to exogenous lawyer conflicts
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Figure 3.2: Number of go-shop vs no-shop deals by year of announcement. The total number of deals per
year is shown for each of the years 2004-2011. For each year, the upper bar shows the number of go-shop
deals and the lower bar the number of no-shop deals.
Figure 3.3: Value of go-shop vs no-shop deals by year of announcement. The total dollar value of deals per
year is shown for each of the years 2004-2011. For each year, the upper bar shows the total value of go-shop
deals and the lower bar the total value of no-shop deals.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of offer-premium for go-shop vs no-shop deals. The diagrams show a kernel
density function for the offer-premium for go-shop deals (dashed line) and no-shop deals (solid line). Panel
(a) shows the distribution for the offer premium defined using the 30-day pre-offer price and panel (b) shows
the distribution for the offer premium defined using the 5-day pre-offer price.
(a) Distribution of the 30-day offer premium
(b) Distribution of the 5-day offer premium
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of the log of enterprise value for go-shops vs no-shops. The diagrams show a kernel
density function for the natural logarithm of enterprise value for go-shop deals (dashed line) and no-shop
deals (solid line).
Figure 3.6: Distribution of target 31-day CARs. The figure shows the distribution of cumulative abnormal
returns for the target for the period starting 15 days prior to the announcement date and extending to 15
days after the announcement date. The distributions are shown separately for go-shops (dashed line) and
no-shops (solid line).
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Figure 3.7: Evolution of target CARs. The figure shows the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns for
the target for windows starting 15 days prior to the announcement date and eventually extending to 15 days
after the announcement date. CARs are shown separately for go-shops (dashed line) and no-shops (solid
line).
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Table 3.1: Variable Definitions
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Table 3.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics. This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of acqui-
sitions announced over the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011 identified based on information
set forth in the database of MergerMetrics, which is a product of FactSet, where the target is a U.S. public
company, consideration paid to the target shareholders was cash and was offered pursuant to a transaction
whereby public ownership in the target would cease, the acquiror was either a financial or private equity
buyer, the transaction was not pursuant to a tender offer and target had available each of the (a) merger
agreement and Merger Proxy Statement for the transaction and the most recent proxy statement for the
regularly scheduled annual meeting of shareholders on the EDGAR database of the SEC and (b) stock price
data. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 3.1. Columns (1)-(6) show the mean, median, standard
deviation, minimum value, maximum value, and number of observations respectively.
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Table 3.3: Conditional Means Tests. This table presents t tests on the equality of means for a list of
variables for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies, announced over the period January 1, 2004
to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 3.1 and sample selection is discussed
in detail in Section 4. Column (1) shows the mean value of each variable within the group of deals with a
no-shop provision, column (2) shows the mean value within the group of deals with a go-shop provision, and
column (3) shows the difference in the means of the two groups tested against the null of equal means and
assuming unequal variances for the distributions of the two groups, ***, **, and * denote that the mean of
deals with go-shop provisions differs significantly from the mean of the deals with no-shop provisions at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3.4: OLS Regressions For The Offer Premium. This table shows the results of an OLS regression of
the offer premium, for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies announced over the period January
1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 3.1 and sample selection is
discussed in detail in Section 4. The offer premium is defined as the initial bid price divided by the pre-offer
price, minus 1. Go-Shop is a variable that takes the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop
provision and 0 otherwise. In columns (1)-(2) variables are defined using the closing price 30 days prior to
the announcement date as the pre-offer price. Column (1) reports the coefficients for the complete sample
which includes MBOs and column (2) for the subsample which excludes MBOs. Columns (3)-(4) repeat
the estimations shown in columns (1)-(2), using definitions of variables based on the closing price 5 days
prior to the announcement date as the pre-offer price. The regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
respectively.
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Table 3.5: Determinants Of The Go-Shop Decision. The table presents results for a probit regression
analysis of the decision to include a go-shop provision in the initial agreement, for a sample of acquisitions
of U.S. public companies announced over the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for
the variables are shown in Table 3.1 and sample selection is discussed in detail in Section 4. The dependent
variable takes the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise. In all
definitions, the closing price 30 days prior to the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. Column
(1) reports the coefficients for a model which includes a full set of control variables and year fixed effects, and
column (2) reports the coefficients for a parsimonious model which includes only the subset of controls which
capture exogenous litigation risk and does not control for year fixed effects. Both models are estimated over
the complete sample which includes MBOs. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the estimations shown in columns
(1) and (2) respectively over the subsample which excludes MBOs. Robust standard errors in parenthesis,
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 3.6: 2SLS Estimates For The 30-Day Offer Premium. The table shows the results of a 2SLS
estimation of the effect of the go-shop provision on the offer-premium for a sample of acquisitions of U.S.
public companies announced over the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the
variables are shown in Table 3.1 and sample selection is discussed in detail in Section 4. We employ a 2SLS
methodology, adapted for the case of an endogenous binary variable and discussed in detail in Section 5.
The dependent variable in the second stage is the offer premium, defined as the initial bid price divided by
the pre-offer price, minus 1. The endogenous variable is Go-Shop, and takes the value of 1 if the merger
agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise. In all definitions the closing price 30 days prior to
the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. Columns (1)-(3) show the coefficients for the second
stage, estimated over the complete sample which includes MBOs. Column (1) corresponds to a model which
uses the full probit stage shown in column (1) of Table 3.5, as well as a full set of control variables for the
2SLS estimation. Column (2) corresponds to a model which uses the parsimonious (litigation risk only)
probit stage shown in column (2) of Table 3.5, and a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation.
Column (3) corresponds to a model which uses the parsimonious (litigation risk only) probit stage shown in
column (2) of Table 3.5, as well as a parsimonious set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. Columns
(4)-(6) repeat the estimations shown in columns (1)-(3) over the sample which excludes MBOs. All 2SLS
regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
159
Table 3.7: 2SLS Estimates For The 5-Day Offer Premium. The table shows the results of a 2SLS estimation
of the effect of the go-shop provision on the offer-premium for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public
companies announced over the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are
shown in Table 3.1 and sample selection is discussed in detail in Section 4. We employ a 2SLS methodology,
adapted for the case of an endogenous binary variable and discussed in detail in Section 5. The dependent
variable in the second stage is the offer premium, defined as the initial bid price divided by the pre-offer price,
minus 1. The endogenous variable is Go-Shop, and takes the value of 1 if the merger agreement included
a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise. In all definitions the closing price 5 days prior to the announcement
date is used as the pre-offer price. Columns (1)-(3) show the coefficients for the second stage, estimated over
the complete sample which includes MBOs. Column (1) corresponds to a model which uses the full probit
stage shown in column (1) of Table 3.5, as well as a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation.
Column (2) corresponds to a model which uses the parsimonious (litigation risk only) probit stage shown in
column (2) of Table 3.5, and a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. Column (3) corresponds
to a model which uses the parsimonious (litigation risk only) probit stage shown in column (2) of Table
3.5, as well as a parsimonious set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the
estimations shown in columns (1)-(3) over the sample which excludes MBOs. All 2SLS regressions control
for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 3.8: Conditional means tests for target CARs. This table presents t tests on the equality of means
for target CARs for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies, announced over the period January
1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 3.1 and sample selection
is discussed in detail in Section 4. Daily abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with
parameters estimated over the period which starts 268 days and ends 16 days prior to the announcement
day. The S&P 500 index return is the market return. The CARs are computed over the windows indicated
in the square brackets, with the numbers indicating days from the announcement date. Day 0 corresponds
to the announcement dates, negative numbers indicate days prior to the announcement date and positive
numbers days after the announcement date. Column (1) shows the mean value of each variable within the
group of deals with a no-shop provision, column (2) shows the mean value within the group of deals with
a go-shop provision, and column (3) shows the difference in the means of the two groups tested against the
null of equal means and assuming unequal variances for the distributions of the two groups, ***, **, and *
denote that the mean of deals with go-shop provisions differs significantly from the mean of the deals with
no-shop provisions at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3.9: OLS Regressions Of CARs. This table shows the results of an OLS regression of CARs, for a
sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies announced over the period January 1, 2004 to December
31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 3.1 and sample selection is discussed in detail in
Section 4. Daily abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with parameters estimated over the
period which starts 268 days and ends 16 days prior to the announcement day. The S&P 500 index return is
the market return. Go-Shop is a variable that takes the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop
provision and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined using the closing price 30 days prior to the announcement
date as the pre-offer price. Columns (1)-(3) report the coefficients for the complete sample which includes
MBOs. In column (1), the dependent variable is CARs over the period which starts 15 days prior to the
announcement date and ends 15 days after the announcement date. In column (2) the dependent variable
is the pre-announcement CARs, computed over the period which starts 15 days and ends 1 day prior to
the announcement date. In column (3) the dependent variable is the post-announcement CARs, computed
over the period which starts on the announcement date and ends 15 days after the announcement date.
Columns (4)-(6) repeat the estimations shown in columns (1)-(3) over the sample which excludes MBOs.
The regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 3.10: 2SLS Estimates For Target 31-day CARs - Complete Sample Including MBOs. The table shows the results
of a 2SLS estimation of the effect of the go-shop provision on CARs for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies
announced over the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 3.1 and
sample selection is discussed in detail in Section 4. We employ a 2SLS methodology, adapted for the case of an endogenous
binary variable and discussed in detail in Section 5. The dependent variable in the second stage is CARs. Daily abnormal
returns are calculated using the market model with parameters estimated over the period which starts 268 days and ends 16
days prior to the announcement day. The S&P 500 index return is the market return. The endogenous variable is Go-Shop, and
takes the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise. In all definitions the closing price
30 days prior to the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. Estimates are over the complete sample which includes
MBOs. Columns (1)-(3) show the second stage coefficients corresponding to a model which uses the full probit stage shown in
column (1) of Table 3.5, as well as a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. In column (1), the dependent variable
is CARs over the period which starts 15 days prior to the announcement date and ends 15 days after the announcement date.
In column (2) the dependent variable is the pre-announcement CARs, computed over the period which starts 15 days and ends
1 day prior to the announcement date. In column (3) the dependent variable is the post-announcement CARs, computed over
the period which starts on the announcement date and ends 15 days after the announcement date. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the
estimations shown in columns (1)-(3) corresponding now to a model which uses the parsimonious (litigation risk only) probit
stage shown in column (2) of Table 3.5 and a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. The regressions control for
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level respectively.
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Table 3.11: 2SLS estimates for target 31-day CARs - Subsample Excluding MBOs. The table shows the results of a 2SLS
estimation of the effect of the go-shop provision on CARs for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies announced
over the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 3.1 and sample
selection is discussed in detail in Section 4. We employ a 2SLS methodology, adapted for the case of an endogenous binary
variable and discussed in detail in Section 5. The dependent variable in the second stage is CARs. Daily abnormal returns are
calculated using the market model with parameters estimated over the period which starts 268 days and ends 16 days prior
to the announcement day. The S&P 500 index return is the market return. The endogenous variable is Go-Shop, and takes
the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise. In all definitions the closing price 30
days prior to the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. Estimates are over the subsample which excludes MBOs.
Columns (1)-(3) show the second stage coefficients corresponding to a model which uses the full probit stage shown in column
(3) of Table 3.5, as well as a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. In column (1), the dependent variable is
CARs over the period which starts 15 days prior to the announcement date and ends 15 days after the announcement date. In
column (2) the dependent variable is the pre-announcement CARs, computed over the period which starts 15 days and ends 1
day prior to the announcement date. In column (3) the dependent variable is the post-announcement CARs, computed over
the period which starts on the announcement date and ends 15 days after the announcement date. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the
estimations shown in columns (1)-(3) corresponding now to a model which uses the parsimonious (litigation risk only) probit
stage shown in column (4) of Table 3.5 and a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. The regressions control for
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level respectively.
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Table 3.12: 2SLS estimates for target 11-day CARs - Complete Sample Including MBOs. The table shows the results of a
2SLS estimation of the effect of the go-shop provision on CARs for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies announced
over the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 3.1 and sample
selection is discussed in detail in Section 4. We employ a 2SLS methodology, adapted for the case of an endogenous binary
variable and discussed in detail in Section 5. The dependent variable in the second stage is CARs. Daily abnormal returns are
calculated using the market model with parameters estimated over the period which starts 268 days and ends 16 days prior to
the announcement day. The S&P 500 index return is the market return. The endogenous variable is Go-Shop, and takes the
value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise. In all definitions the closing price 30 days
prior to the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. Estimates are over the complete sample which includes MBOs.
Columns (1)-(3) show the second stage coefficients corresponding to a model which uses the full probit stage shown in column
(1) of Table 3.5, as well as a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. In column (1), the dependent variable is
CARs over the period which starts 5 days prior to the announcement date and ends 5 days after the announcement date. In
column (2) the dependent variable is the pre-announcement CARs, computed over the period which starts 5 days and ends 1
day prior to the announcement date. In column (3) the dependent variable is the post-announcement CARs, computed over
the period which starts on the announcement date and ends 5 days after the announcement date. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the
estimations shown in columns (1)-(3) corresponding now to a model which uses the parsimonious (litigation risk only) probit
stage shown in column (2) of Table 3.5 and a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. The regressions control for
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level respectively.
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Table 3.13: 2SLS estimates for target 11-day CARs - Subsample Excluding MBOs. The table shows the results of a 2SLS
estimation of the effect of the go-shop provision on CARs for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies announced
over the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 3.1 and sample
selection is discussed in detail in Section 4. We employ a 2SLS methodology, adapted for the case of an endogenous binary
variable and discussed in detail in Section 5. The dependent variable in the second stage is CARs. Daily abnormal returns are
calculated using the market model with parameters estimated over the period which starts 268 days and ends 16 days prior
to the announcement day. The S&P 500 index return is the market return. The endogenous variable is Go-Shop, and takes
the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise. In all definitions the closing price 30
days prior to the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. Estimates are over the subsample which excludes MBOs.
Columns (1)-(3) show the second stage coefficients corresponding to a model which uses the full probit stage shown in column
(3) of Table 3.5, as well as a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. In column (1), the dependent variable is
CARs over the period which starts 5 days prior to the announcement date and ends 5 days after the announcement date. In
column (2) the dependent variable is the pre-announcement CARs, computed over the period which starts 5 days and ends 1
day prior to the announcement date. In column (3) the dependent variable is the post-announcement CARs, computed over
the period which starts on the announcement date and ends 5 days after the announcement date. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the
estimations shown in columns (1)-(3) corresponding now to a model which uses the parsimonious (litigation risk only) probit
stage shown in column (4) of Table 3.5 and a full set of control variables for the 2SLS estimation. The regressions control for
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Appendix A
No Free Shop: Why Target Companies in MBOs
and Private Equity Transactions Sometimes Choose
Not to Buy ’Go Shop’ Options
As an additional robustness test, we estimate the exogenous effect of the go-shop provision
on the offer premium and CARs using a Heckman estimator.
If we think of the go-shop decision as the treatment variable, the bias we are concerned
with arises from the fact that assignment to the treated (go-shop) and untreated (no-shop)
groups may not be random and thus potentially endogenous to the outcome variable (offer
premium or CARs). Similar to the 2SLS case, we can think of two stages, an assignment
first stage and a primary second stage as shown in Equations A.1 and A.2 respectively:
GOi = I(αt + γ · Controlsit + λ · Instrumentsit + it) (A.1)
See Vella and Verbeek (1999) for a detailed discussion of the similarities between the IV and Heckman
approach.
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OPit = κt + β ·GOi + γ · Controlsit + uitInstrumentsit + it) (A.2)
In this setting, the endogeneity of the go-shop variable in the offer premium equation
arises from a correlation between the error terms of the first and second stages. The Heckman
estimator employs a control function approach in which the nature of the endogeneity is
explicitly modeled in the second stage. In particular, after estimating the non-linear first
stage, we include the generalized probit residual as an additional control in the second stage.
Defining Zit as in Equation A.3 and allowing for the covariance between the error terms in
the two stages to differ between the treated and untreated groups, the augmented second
stage used in this approach is shown in Equation A.4. In this framework, β consistently
estimates the exogenous effect of the go-shop provision on the offer premium.
Zit = αt + γ · Controlsit + λ · Instrumentsit (A.3)
OPit =κt + β ·GOi + γ · Controlsit
+ ω1
φ(−Zit)
1− Φ(−Zit) ·GOi + ω0
−φ(Zit)
Φ(−Zit) · (1−GOi) + uit
(A.4)
The estimation method proceeds in two stages. We first estimate the decision to include
a go-shop provision in the merger agreement using a probit model with a full set of controls,
including variables capturing litigation risk. We then add the generalized probit residuals
from this first stage (_wL1, _wL0) as additional controls in the second stage.
The results are shown for samples including or excluding management buyouts, and for
full or parsimonious specifications of the offer-premium equation. Regressions control for
year fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are computed over 500 iterations. Table
The results remain unchanged if we assume the treated and untreated groups to have equal covariances
between the error terms of the two stages.
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A.1 displays the Heckman estimates for the 30-day premium using samples including or
excluding MBOs, and for full and parsimonious specifications. Note that the corresponding
probit stage always includes the full list of controls and the instruments. As can be seen,
the results are qualitatively unchanged when compared to the ones obtained employing the
2SLS approach. The Heckman estimates also remain unchanged for the 5-day premium, as
shown in Table A.2.
We also repeat our tests for CARs using the Heckman estimator. Table A.3 shows the
results for the three CAR periods. Columns (1)-(3) show estimates for the complete sample
and columns (4)-(6) show estimates for the sample that excludes MBOs. The estimates are
very similar to those obtained using the 2SLS estimator. Table A.4 repeats the experiments
for 11-day CARs and the results, again, remain qualitatively unchanged.
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Table A.1: Heckman Estimates For The 30-day Offer Premium. The table shows the results of a Heckman estimation of
the effect of the go-shop provision on the offer-premium for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies announced over
the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 1 and sample selection
is discussed in detail in Section IV. We employ a Heckman estimator discussed in detail in the Appendix. The dependent
variable in the second stage is the offer premium, defined as the initial bid price divided by the pre-offer price, minus 1. The
selection variable is Go-Shop, and takes the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise.
In all definitions the closing price 30 days prior to the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. We first estimate
the decision to include a go-shop provision in the initial agreement using a probit model with a full set of controls, including
variables capturing litigation risk, shown in Column 1 of Table 5. We then add the generalized probit residuals from this first
stage (_wL1, _wL0) as additional controls and estimate the second stage. Columns (1)-(2) show the coefficients for the second
stage, estimated over the complete sample which includes MBOs. Column (1) corresponds to a model which uses a full set of
control variables for the second stage. Column (2) corresponds to a model which uses a parsimonious set of control variables
for the second stage. Columns (3)-(4) repeat the estimations shown in columns (1)-(2) over the sample which excludes MBOs.
All regressions control for year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis, bootstrapped over 500 iterations, ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table A.2: Heckman Estimates For The 5-day Offer Premium. The table shows the results of a Heckman estimation of
the effect of the go-shop provision on the offer-premium for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies announced over
the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 1 and sample selection
is discussed in detail in Section IV. We employ a Heckman estimator discussed in detail in the Appendix. The dependent
variable in the second stage is the offer premium, defined as the initial bid price divided by the pre-offer price, minus 1. The
selection variable is Go-Shop, and takes the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise.
In all definitions the closing price 5 days prior to the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. We first estimate
the decision to include a go-shop provision in the initial agreement using a probit model with a full set of controls, including
variables capturing litigation risk, shown in Column 1 of Table 5. We then add the generalized probit residuals from this first
stage (_wL1, _wL0) as additional controls and estimate the second stage. Columns (1)-(2) show the coefficients for the second
stage, estimated over the complete sample which includes MBOs. Column (1) corresponds to a model which uses a full set of
control variables for the second stage. Column (2) corresponds to a model which uses a parsimonious set of control variables
for the second stage. Columns (3)-(4) repeat the estimations shown in columns (1)-(2) over the sample which excludes MBOs.
All regressions control for year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis, bootstrapped over 500 iterations, ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table A.3: Heckman Estimates For Target 31-Day CARs. The table shows the results of a Heckman estimation of the effect
of the go-shop provision on CARs for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies announced over the period January 1,
2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 1 and sample selection is discussed in detail in
Section IV. We employ a Heckman estimator discussed in detail in the Appendix. The dependent variable in the second stage is
CARs. Daily abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with parameters estimated over the period which starts
268 days and ends 16 days prior to the announcement day. The S&P 500 index return is the market return. The selection
variable is Go-Shop, and takes the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise. In all
definitions the closing price 30 days prior to the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. We first estimate the decision
to include a go-shop provision in the initial agreement using a probit model with a full set of controls, including variables
capturing litigation risk, shown in column 1 of Table 5. We then add the generalized probit residuals from this first stage
(_wL1, _wL0) as additional controls and estimate the second stage. Columns (1)-(3) report second stage coefficients estimated
over the complete sample which includes MBOs. In column (1), the dependent variable is CARs over the period which starts
15 days prior to the announcement date and ends 15 days after the announcement date. In column (2) the dependent variable
is the pre-announcement CARs, computed over the period which starts 15 days and ends 1 day prior to the announcement
date. In column (3) the dependent variable is the post-announcement CARs, computed over the period which starts on the
announcement date and ends 15 days after the announcement date. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the estimations shown in columns
(1)-(3) over a subsample which excludes MBOs. The regressions control for year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis,
bootstrapped over 500 iterations, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table A.4: Heckman estimates for target 11-day CARs. The table shows the results of a Heckman estimation of the effect
of the go-shop provision on CARs for a sample of acquisitions of U.S. public companies announced over the period January 1,
2004 to December 31, 2011. Definitions for the variables are shown in Table 1 and sample selection is discussed in detail in
Section IV. We employ a Heckman estimator discussed in detail in the Appendix. The dependent variable in the second stage is
CARs. Daily abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with parameters estimated over the period which starts
268 days and ends 16 days prior to the announcement day. The S&P 500 index return is the market return. The selection
variable is Go-Shop, and takes the value of 1 if the merger agreement included a go-shop provision and 0 otherwise. In all
definitions the closing price 30 days prior to the announcement date is used as the pre-offer price. We first estimate the decision
to include a go-shop provision in the initial agreement using a probit model with a full set of controls, including variables
capturing litigation risk, shown in column 1 of Table 5. We then add the generalized probit residuals from this first stage
(_wL1, _wL0) as additional controls and estimate the second stage. Columns (1)-(3) report second stage coefficients estimated
over the complete sample which includes MBOs. In column (1), the dependent variable is CARs over the period which starts
5 days prior to the announcement date and ends 5 days after the announcement date. In column (2) the dependent variable
is the pre-announcement CARs, computed over the period which starts 5 days and ends 1 day prior to the announcement
date. In column (3) the dependent variable is the post-announcement CARs, computed over the period which starts on the
announcement date and ends 5 days after the announcement date. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the estimations shown in columns
(1)-(3) over a subsample which excludes MBOs. The regressions control for year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis,
bootstrapped over 500 iterations, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
